Recently, Al Jazeera.net published an article by Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaidan, media adviser to Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, urging the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to dissolve itself in the broader interest of consolidating the newly strengthened regime. Around the same time, Sky News Arabia reported that Al-Sharaa distanced himself from any association with the Brotherhood or jihadist groups, while also disowning the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring.

According to Zaidan, the Brotherhood should dissolve because, as other groups have done, this is necessary at a critical juncture for the country’s consolidation—to prevent internal rifts and to allow the nation to fully harness the potential of its youth, including those affiliated with the Brotherhood who, due to the organisation’s dissatisfaction, have been reluctant to participate in nation-building.

The article also highlights the Brotherhood’s struggles: its inability to adapt to evolving domestic and regional conditions, combined with an obsolete structure, an unrenewed style, and outdated approaches, has led to poor performance. As a result, the only viable path, Zaidan suggests, is to follow the example of more pragmatic, like-minded Brotherhood offshoots, such as those associated with Hassan al-Turabi, Rached Ghannouchi, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and others. In this view, dissolving and embracing the current political movement led by Ahmad Al-Sharaa is seen as a way to reconstruct Syria.

However, this perspective overlooks the Brotherhood’s longstanding oppositional stance against the Asad father-son regime, its historical ability to adapt under extreme repression, and its determination to survive through decades of targeting. Although it was once pushed to the margins, the Brotherhood has once again resurfaced, carrying a legacy of debate, mobilisation, and organisational energy. More importantly, it retains a strategic culture capable of inspiring, motivating, and contributing to nation-building and reconstruction.

Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: An historical force against the Asad father and son

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was established in 1945, with Dr Mustafa al-Siba‘i appointed as its first Controller General (al-Muraqib al-‘Am). According to the organisation’s website, its ultimate goal is the worship of Allah and seeking His pleasure. Its broader mission is to revive the Islamic way of life by Islamising the individual, the family, society, and the state, through preaching and organised efforts, using all legal means.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has historically been more pragmatic and deeply rooted in Syrian realities, even at times decoupling from the main Brotherhood to serve local interests. As Lefevre, a PhD candidate at Cambridge University writes, it was formed in 1945 by the coalescence of reformist religious organisations that emerged under Ottoman and French mandate rule during the late 19th and early 20th century. Throughout its history, its priorities, agendas, and concerns have been shaped by factors and considerations peculiar to Syria.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has been regarded as Intellectually sound and more accommodative to other like-minded groups, the Brotherhood became part of a broader alliance of the Syrian opposition, called as “Syrian National Council”, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011. The Syrian Ikhwan was a movement that worked with the ‘Ulema’ unlike the case of Egypt where they more often were at loggerhead with the authority of al-Azhar, and their common social roots strengthened the connection, as Joshua Teitelbaum has pointed out, in his paper “The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945—1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology”, highlighting its collaboration with the “Ulema” and its embeddedness in Syrian society.

It should not be seen merely in the light of Shia–Sunni rivalry led by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the usual trend of the Brotherhood revising or opposing authoritarian monarchies, military dictators, and autocrats, the Syrian MB has appreciated Saudi Arabia’s contribution to Syrian rebuilding, as affirmed in a resolution of its last Shura Council meeting. At the same time, it has consistently condemned and opposed the Iranian regime for its nexus with the Asad family—a stance maintained consistently since the 1980s and not merely after Al-Sharaa’s takeover.

Similarly, intra-Sunni rivalry—between Brotherhood supporters and critics—cannot fully capture the Syrian Brotherhood’s nuanced political and social positioning, which combines principled opposition, strategic accommodation, and nation-centered pragmatism.

READ: Israel media accuses Syria’s President Al-Sharaa of repositioning Hamas, Islamic Jihad

What went wrong with the current regime regarding the Brotherhood?

Consolidation of state power

At first glance, as Muwaffaq argues, the call for the dissolution of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood appears aimed at consolidating state power and unifying fragmented voices. It is framed as being in the “greater interest of the nation.”

Regional realignments

Some scholars suggest that this move reflects the Syrian regime’s desire for closer alignment with the anti-Brotherhood camp, particularly as it cultivates ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. By distancing itself from the Brotherhood, the regime may be signalling loyalty to regional powers that view the group with suspicion.

Cracks in traditional support

Others argue that the timing mirrors declining support from traditional Brotherhood strongholds like Türkiye and Qatar. Since 2021, Ankara has softened its stance on Brotherhood-related issues in pursuit of rapprochement with Egypt. In recent years, Turkey has asked Brotherhood-linked media networks operating on its soil to moderate their criticism of Cairo, and it even revoked the permanent residency of the exiled Brotherhood’ official, Mahmood Hussein.

The struggle over power

Some analysts see the divergence as a contest over power—whether to share it or monopolise it. Historically, however, the Syrian Ikhwan’s membership structure reflected its commitment to the parliamentary process in Syria, writes Joshua Teitelbaum, highlighting the movement’s long-standing institutional engagement rather than simple authoritarian opposition.

Global messaging

Finally, this move can be seen as part of a strategic global message to the United States and Europe. Similar to the Hashemite Kingdom’s ban of the Brotherhood ahead of Donald Trump’s 2017 Gulf visit, the dissolution positions the Brotherhood as a “manufactured” security threat—a well-known narrative in Western and regional discourse. At a time when Al-Sharaa risks criticism over treatment of minorities and policy approaches to religious groups, emphasising the Brotherhood as a destabilising force signals to Western capitals that he has abandoned the Islamist vision once associated with the Brotherhood.

The problem with Muwaffaq Zaidan’s argument 

After the perusal of the history of Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, it appears, contrary to Zaidan’s argument that unlike the Egyptian Ikhwan, the Syrian Brotherhood was originally constituted by a highly educated class. When allowed to operate fully, its leaders held strong credentials in both sharia and secular law. This diverse expertise across knowledge traditions contributed to the movement’s relative openness in ideological positions within Syria.

It also demonstrates that, before the full-scale repression under the Asad duo, the Brotherhood displayed remarkable resilience and adaptability. They adjusted to circumstances according to the needs of the time. Before the coming of Hafiz Asad, the Ikhwan took part in the parliamentary elections and had been a vocal supporter of democratic politics at home. Had they been afforded opportunities like those enjoyed by other Ikhwan offshoots mentioned by Zaidan, they would have been far ahead in evolving ideologically to meet contemporary challenges. From the very first day they faced repression, they showed the capacity to adapt, and without the monopolising authority of the newly established regime, they would surely have drawn immense inspiration from their rich historical legacy.

Looking ahead: Why the Brotherhood still matters

The fate of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is a barometer for Syria’s political future. If dissolved, it risks silencing a dissenting voice that blends faith with progressive reform and coalition-building. Yet, if given space, it could revive as a moderating force between authoritarianism and extremist fringes—rooted in local realities and capable of shaping Syria’s post-conflict identity.

Will Syria suppress ideological diversity for short-term stability? Or allow the Brotherhood to transform and contribute meaningfully to rebuilding a pluralistic political order? That choice will shape not only Syria, but the broader trajectory of post-Islamist movements across the region.

OPINION: From Tunisia, Arabs participate in the Steadfastness Flotilla to break the Gaza blockade

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.