Toplines
Iranian officials are using Israel’s September 9 strike in Doha, Qatar, to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region. Israel’s September 9 airstrike targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, caused the Gulf states to condemn Israeli actions.[1] Iran has exploited these frustrations among Gulf states by questioning the reliability of US partnerships. Iranian officials have made statements and held a series of meetings and phone calls with Gulf and Arab states since September 9, in which they condemned the Israeli airstrike as a “violation of international law.”[2] Iranian officials have misrepresented the degree of US knowledge of the Israeli strikes and have suggested that the US-brokered agreements are incapable of defending Arab states from Israeli attacks.[3] The United States did not have adequate foreknowledge of the Israeli strike to discourage the Israelis from conducting the strike. Iranian officials have painted the Israeli strike as a direct threat to the security of Gulf countries and called for the international community to hold Israel accountable for its “criminal act.”[4] Iran, of course, has repeatedly targeted Gulf states with much less precision and to much greater effect. Iran fired missiles and drones at the Saudi oil terminal in Dhafran in 2019, for example, which forced Saudi Arabia to dip into its oil reserves to support exports.[5] Tehran interim Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami addressed the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia — all countries that have security partnerships with the United States — during Friday prayers on September 12 and warned that Israel would strike their country next if it was allowed to grow in power.[6]
This Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel is extremely unlikely to succeed, but Iran has presumably designed a gradual coalition-breaking effort to undermine US-led efforts to forge an anti-Iran coalition in the Middle East. The US-led effort to forge this coalition has paid dividends for the United States in the Middle East already. Many Gulf and other Arab states contributed to Israel‘s defense against Iranian missile and drone attacks in April and October 2024, for example. This defense decreased the likelihood of further escalation between Iran and Israel by helping prevent any significant damage to Israel. One Iranian diplomatic push is extremely unlikely to undo the progress the United States has made towards forging an anti-Iran coalition, especially after the Iranian attack on Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar in June 2025. The recent Iranian rhetoric degrading US diplomatic and security partnerships is part of a long-running line of effort in a long-standing Iranian campaign to weaken the United States and secure Iran’s role as a regional hegemon. This line of effort has had no success to date.
Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani called for an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 14 and 15.[7] An unspecified source cited by Lebanese media on September 12 claimed that the Qatari government is prepared to launch a ”comprehensive diplomatic campaign” against Israel through the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the United Nations Security Council, and “even within Washington itself and the halls of Congress.”[8] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will attend the emergency Arab-Islamic summit on September 14 and 15 in Doha, Qatar.[9]
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is similarly trying to sow doubt about the United States’ role in the region. These narratives, although not coordinated with Iran, support Iranian objectives to decrease regional support for the United States. The PRC’s Foreign Ministry stated on September 10 that the Israeli strikes were linked to the US bias towards Israel, implying that the United States ignored the Gulf states’ security concerns.[10] Chinese state-owned media widely covered the Israeli strike in Doha and accused the United States of foreknowledge of the strikes. Chinese state media Xinhua reported on September 10 that the Israeli airstrikes in Doha were “a clear escalation” involving a sovereign Arab country that has no direct military hostilities with Israel.[11] State broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) reported on September 11 that it would have been “very difficult” for Israel to have launched its airstrikes on Doha without US approval.[12] A Chinese scholar similarly told CCTV on September 11 that the United States did not attempt to stop the Israeli strikes after receiving advanced warning from Israel about the strikes.[13] The PRC has previously tried to exploit unpopular US policies among Arab states to undermine the US role as the primary regional partner.[14]
The PRC’s statements incorrectly characterize the United States’ role in Israel’s recent strikes in Doha and attempt to demonstrate that the United States is an unreliable security partner for Gulf states. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office indicated that Israel unilaterally conducted its airstrikes in Doha.[15] US officials stated that Israel’s warning gave the United States no time to warn Qatar.[16] The United States was only informed while Israeli jets were in the air, giving the United States only enough time to briefly inform Qatar and no time to force Israel to call off the strike.
Members of the Iranian regime are trying to prepare for supreme leader succession by taking steps to secure their influence within the regime after the eventual passing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. UK-based media outlet “IranWire” reported on September 12 that, according to a senior Iranian diplomat, Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber are the regime stalwarts most in contact with Khamenei and are positioning themselves for more influence in the regime in the event of a succession.[17] The report comes after elements within the Iranian regime used Khamenei‘s absence during the Israel-Iran War to attempt to exert more influence over regime policy.[18] The diplomat stated that Larijani is actively engaging with reformists, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders, and grand ayatollahs to prepare the country diplomatically, economically, and militarily for the transition period.[19] Larijani has been a key figure within the Iranian policy space over the past two decades and supported major initiatives, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, also known as the 2015 nuclear deal).[20] Larijani has taken on a prominent role in shaping Iranian foreign policy as a pragmatic hardliner since the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. The diplomat added that Mokhber is actively trying to undermine Larijani’s efforts by exploiting his “controversial” history with Iran’s media and security apparatus.[21] Mokhber previously served as the head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO)—a parastatal organization directly controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—between 2007 and 2021.[22]
This political maneuvering is occurring as Khamenei continues to be absent from important political decisions. The IranWire report stated that senior Iranian officials are growing increasingly concerned about the health of Khamenei following a reduction in communication from his office since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[23] The senior Iranian diplomat stated that Khamenei’s office did not brief Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi before this year’s UN General Assembly as it normally does, and that the Foreign Affairs Ministry is operating “almost independently.”[24] Khamenei’s personal absence could be explained by increased security measures, though it is unclear why his office could not communicate with other elements of the Iranian government. Khamenei did not make any public appearances during the Israel-Iran War except for three pre-recorded televised speeches.[25] Khamenei gave 12 speeches in the 80-day period before the Israel-Iran War (March 24-June 12), while he has only given four speeches in the 80-day period after the war (June 24-September 12).[26] Western media reported on June 22 that a group of Iranian businessmen, political and military figures, and relatives of high-ranking clerics had begun planning how to lead Iran without Khamenei.[27]
Key Takeaways
Supreme Leader Succession: Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber are the regime stalwarts most in contact with Khamenei and are positioning themselves for more influence in the regime in the event of a succession, according to a senior Iranian diplomat cited by a UK-based news site.
IDF Strikes in Doha: Iranian officials are using Israel’s September 9 strike in Doha, Qatar, to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region. This Iranian effort to dissuade Gulf states from cooperating with the United States or Israel is extremely unlikely to succeed, but Iran has presumably designed a gradual coalition-breaking effort to undermine US-led efforts to forge an anti-Iran coalition in the Middle East.
IDF Strikes in Doha: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is similarly trying to sow doubt about the United States’ role in the region. These narratives, although not coordinated with Iran, support Iranian objectives to decrease regional support for the United States. The PRC’s statements incorrectly characterize the United States’ role in Israel’s recent strikes in Doha and attempt to demonstrate that the United States is an unreliable security partner for Gulf states.
Iran
See topline section.
Iraq
Former Iraqi Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki met with US Charge d’Affaires in Iraq Joshua Harris on September 11 to discuss strengthening US-Iraq relations by developing economic cooperation and protecting Iraqi sovereignty.[28] This meeting comes after the US House of Representatives passed the National Defense Authorization Act on September 10, which included a bipartisan amendment to repeal two laws authorizing the use of military force (AUMF) in Iraq.[29] This effort to repeal the 2002 Iraq War and 1991 Gulf War authorizations coincides with the planned US withdrawal from Iraq.[30] The Senate has not yet passed the bill. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces in Iraqi Kurdistan would withdraw by the end of 2026.[31]
Syria
A covert Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force unit specializing in assassinations and kidnappings abroad recently recruited several Syrians, which suggests that the IRGC planned to use Syrians to conduct external attacks against unknown and unspecified targets.[32] The Israel Defense Force (IDF) announced on September 12 that it had captured several members of the IRGC Quds Force Unit 840 over the past few months in southern Syria who were planning unspecified attacks against Israel.[33] Unit 840 is an elite IRGC Quds Force covert unit responsible for conducting assassinations, kidnappings, and clandestine operations abroad.[34] The IDF captured two Syrian “field operatives” from Unit 840 in March and April 2025.[35] The IDF captured at least three additional Syrian Unit 840 members in recent weeks, who had been recruited by two Lebanese IRGC Unit 840 members.[36] The IDF killed the Lebanese Unit 840 members, who were responsible for smuggling Iranian weapons to the West Bank and Lebanon, in separate strikes in July.[37] The IDF previously captured seven Syrian IRGC Quds Force members in southern Syria on July 7, but it is unclear if they were affiliated with Unit 840.[38] The IDF said that Iran recruited some of the Syrian Unit 840 members without revealing that the new recruits would be part of an IRGC operation. The IDF said that the recruits were motivated by financial incentives rather than ideology.[39] It is not clear what the IRGC intended to use these operatives for because it would be extremely difficult for a Syrian to enter Israel, though it is possible the IRGC could have intended to use the operatives in a third country. IRGC Unit 840’s concealment of its identity and use of financial incentives with recruits is consistent with Unit 840 and the IRGC’s Quds Force’s previous activity abroad. The IRGC Quds Force attempted in 2011 to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States by hiring a Mexican cartel member to detonate a bomb targeting the ambassador at a restaurant in Washington, DC.[40] The IRGC recruiters did not inform the cartel member who they were when they recruited him.[41]
The Arab al Shaytat clan mobilized against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after SDF forces reportedly killed an unarmed civilian who failed to stop at a checkpoint in Gharanij, Deir ez Zor Province, on September 11.[42] The SDF reportedly refused to release the civilian’s body to his family.[43] The Gharanij mosque broadcast calls for “jihad and general mobilization” from its speakers in response to the killing, according to social media videos.[44] The al Shaytat clan mobilized in response to the killing and called on all clans in eastern Deir ez Zor Province to join their mobilization against the SDF.[45] Gharanij residents reportedly attacked SDF checkpoints in the town in response to the killing and mobilization order.[46] The SDF has not commented on the situation in Gharanij at the time of writing. The al Shaytat mobilization and calls for other tribes to do the same follow increased tensions between Arab tribes and the SDF. Seven Arab tribes announced their mobilization against the SDF on August 11 in response to a conference organized by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) in Hasakah on August 8.[47] Likely tribal forces abducted four off-duty SDF fighters in Gharanij on August 14 after the August 11 mobilization announcement.[48] The mobilized tribes have said that they are “waiting for the right moment to begin action,” possibly referring to a breakdown in the ceasefire between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government.[49] The mobilization of Arab tribes will impose new requirements against the SDF in the event of military operations between the SDF and the transitional government, even if the SDF attempts to withdraw into Kurdish-majority areas.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Bradley Cooper and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara met in Damascus on September 12 to discuss future defense cooperation, particularly on counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations.[50]US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab also attended the bilateral meeting.[51] Cooper and Barrack thanked the Syrian transitional government for its support in counter-ISIS operations in Syria.[52] Syrian forces assisted in US ground raids targeting ISIS leaders in northern Syria on July 25 and August 20.[53] Cooper and Barrack praised the Syrian government’s efforts to locate missing US citizens in Syria.[54] Cooper and Barrack also supported the Syrian government’s efforts to integrate Syrian armed factions into the Syrian Ministry of Defense.[55] The officials agreed to hold future US-Syrian meetings to continue counter-ISIS operation coordination.[56]
Arabian Peninsula
Nothing significant to report.
Palestinian Territories & Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Endnotes
[1] https://x.com/MofaQatar_EN/status/1965708070165881022 ; https://x.com/mofauae/status/1965419620741029996 ; https://x.com/KSAmofaEN/status/1965475297173651602 ; https://x.com/majedalansari/status/1965407402607677474
[2] https://t.me/alakhbar_news/62616 ; https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1965503736056610964 ; https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1965877098200891454 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/776526/ ;https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/244406/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/20/3397082/
[3] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/21/3397362/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/20/3397082/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/19/3396792 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/21/3397316/
[4] https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1965503736056610964 ; https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1965877098200891454
[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RPT-Kagan_Attribution-Intent-and-Response-3.pdf ; https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html
[6] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/21/3397316/
[7] https://t.me/almanarnews/222487
[8] https://t.me/alakhbar_news/62892
[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/21/3397380/
[10] https://x.com/MFA_China/status/1965757308702769293 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-condemns-israel-strike-doha-concerned-about-escalation-2025-09-10/
[11] http://www.news dot cn/world/20250910/8225d42afedc4d37988378f064ad1439/c.html
[12] https://tv.cctv dot com/2025/09/11/VIDE6rA4sdiXxGtMY9DC2DfC250911.shtml?spm=C45404.PlcSaTuIQb0E.ENSvHePEGND5.58
[13] https://tv.cctv dot com/2025/09/11/VIDE1VyYGRPqOkINpDAjTy17250911.shtml?spm=C45404.PlcSaTuIQb0E.ENSvHePEGND5.96
[14] https://responsiblestatecraft.org/arab-public-gaza-war/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-withdrawal-raises-questions-about-united-states-gulf-arab-official-says-2021-09-13/ ; https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3157506/china-draws-focus-unreliable-us-leaves-middle-east-allies-fast ; https://www.chinadailyhk dot com/hk/article/587312
[15] https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1965417269837602943
[16] https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-walks-careful-line-managing-fallout-israels-doha/story?id=125454248
[17] https://iranwire.com/en/news/144768-exclusive-with-khamenei-unreachable-iranian-officials-fear-for-his-health-and-the-regime/
[18] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-26-2025
[19] https://iranwire.com/en/news/144768-exclusive-with-khamenei-unreachable-iranian-officials-fear-for-his-health-and-the-regime/
[20] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/larijani-has-the-credentials-but-not-the-charisma-to-be-irans-president/
[21] https://iranwire.com/en/news/144768-exclusive-with-khamenei-unreachable-iranian-officials-fear-for-his-health-and-the-regime/
[22] https://www.president dot ir/en/130489
[23] https://iranwire.com/en/news/144768-exclusive-with-khamenei-unreachable-iranian-officials-fear-for-his-health-and-the-regime/
[24] https://iranwire.com/en/news/144768-exclusive-with-khamenei-unreachable-iranian-officials-fear-for-his-health-and-the-regime/
[25] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=60432 ;
https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=60462 ;
https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=60502
[26] english.khamenei dot ir/news/11597 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11631 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11633 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11668 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11695 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11670 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11693 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11694 ; farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=60314 ; farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=60345 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11727 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11788 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11819 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11831 ; english.khamenei dot ir/news/11880 ; farsi.khamenei dot ir/speech-content?id=61231
[27] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/06/inside-plot-push-khamenei-aside/683286/
[28] https://x.com/USEmbBaghdad/status/1966360926262890823
[29] https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5497564-house-passes-defense-bill/
[30] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/170820254
[31] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/ ;https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-and-iraq-agree-to-withdraw-american-troops-by-the-end-of-2026-3a7b23e1?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAitCTMDjAHdNHHWyRbW5PwgLJ8uc6U3hEZLE-94Y1y9CRQkR1ouQPhV&gaa_ts=68c47f84&gaa_sig=VNZmgmpKDsJJbR2p8iMrTDaiGoqYJtvPjJ4fKmtxV4pYRO7VvbXz3CvOQamOVQWafP30wnvVDrhNh3zFxywigg%3D%3D
[32] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1966398371226390831/photo/1
[33] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1966398371226390831/photo/1
[34] https://thearabcenter dot org/%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A/
[35] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1966398371226390831/photo/1
[36] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1966398371226390831/photo/1
[37] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1966398371226390831/photo/1
[38] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/763405/%d8%a5%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%8a%d9%84-%d8%aa%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%86-%d8%aa%d9%81%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%83-%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%85%d9%86-%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%84%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%af%d8%b3/# ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-july-7-2025/
[39] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1966398371226390831/photo/1
[40] https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/01/04/iran-agents-once-plotted-kill-saudi-ambassador-dc-case-reads-like-spy-thriller/
[41] https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/01/04/iran-agents-once-plotted-kill-saudi-ambassador-dc-case-reads-like-spy-thriller/
[42] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/773501/%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AD/#
[43] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/773501/%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AD/#
[44] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=embed_video&v=700272566399157
[45] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/773501/%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AD/#
[46] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/773501/%D8%B9%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AD/#
[47] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/150166 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/150167 ; https://x.com/ALI_M9H/status/1955716367073653241 ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B6%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7 ; https://www.facebook.com/farj.hamoud/posts/pfbid02T2naSj1SW1tnZogfMccc4M484uDGg3QFth8TRG46pgysnSXEkmPudwpWFAjt4duWl ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2555932148100626
[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-14-2025/ ; https://thearabcenter dot org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88/
[49] https://thearabcenter dot org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%88/
[50] https://x.com/SyPresidency/status/1966489407176708502; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1966504782748639399
[51] https://x.com/SyPresidency/status/1966489407176708502; https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1966504782748639399
[52] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1966504782748639399
[53] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-20-2025/ ; https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4255485/centcom-forces-kill-senior-isis-leader-in-al-bab-syria/
[54] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1966504782748639399
[55] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1966504782748639399
[56] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1966504782748639399