The Trump administration is now working in the United Nations, marshalling support for an international peacekeeping force in Gaza. It might seem ironic that a government that has been so dismissive of this international body has taken this route, but Middle East peace and much else depends on this negotiation, as regional players manoeuvre for advantage.
So, the US mission in New York last week circulated a draft of a UN security council resolution filling in detail on how the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) will operate. Arab diplomats tell me they urged the US to take the UN route, since a military presence numbering up to 40,000 troops requires that solid legal foundation.
But if that broad approach has garnered agreement, myriad differences remain between regional players and the US, not to mention the belligerents themselves. Indeed, neither Israel nor Hamas have formally agreed to take matters beyond the initial (shaky) ceasefire, return of hostages and resumption of aid deliveries.
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The UN security council will start negotiations over the resolution on Thursday. Somehow negotiators have to find a way to convince Israel that the stabilisation force will disarm Hamas, while reassuring that group that they will remain a part of Gaza’s political future — and finding troop contributors ready in extremis to confront armed Palestinian factions, when many of them see the main purpose of dispatching soldiers as protecting Gazans from further Israeli invasions.
This may sound like a diplomatic mission impossible, but there are some signs of emerging consensus. Privately, Israeli officials acknowledge that stripping Hamas of pistols or even assault rifles used for personal protection may not be possible.
For its part, the Islamist movement last week signalled its willingness to give up weapons that would range beyond the border areas that will be patrolled by the ISF and into Israel. Mousa Abu Marzouk, a Hamas leader, apparently gave a tacit acceptance of some disarmament last week, telling Al Jazeera: “If you mean weapons whose range goes beyond the buffer zone, I say this is understandable, because such weapons could threaten the other side.”
That could make the task of disarmament more straightforward, since the rocket launchers or mortars Marzouk was referring to are hard to conceal from troops or police patrolling Gaza’s streets. But if Hamas retains its personal firearms, then it could still use them to intimidate other factions, making a mockery of its pledge to give up power, prompting basic questions about who is in charge.
Evidently, managing internal Palestinian tensions is a mission few of the Islamic nations that have agreed in principle to send troops would relish, preferring this to be done instead by a newly established Gaza police force. “It must be entirely Palestinian to Palestinian,” one official close to the negotiations told me.
Yet the draft US resolution circulating in New York defines the purpose of the stabilisation force expansively as, “along with the newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force, to help secure border areas; stabilise the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarising the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of the military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, as well as the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups”.
Hamas says it is open to giving up weapons, but Israeli officials say privately that disarming the group entirely will be a challenge
OMAR AL-QATTAA/AFP
Nations that have so far said they would be willing to take part include Egypt, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia. But King Abdullah of Jordan signalled last week that his country would not join in, saying of the ISF’s mission, “We hope that it is peacekeeping, because if it’s peace enforcing, nobody will want to touch that.”
How does Egypt, a key player, see its role? Government officials want it mainly limited to securing Gaza’s borders, something they can tell their domestic audience is about safeguarding this part of a future Palestinian state and keeping the Israelis out.
Training Gaza’s police
However, the country will also have a role in training Gaza’s new police, an organisation that could number about 30,000. Egypt is well placed to screen those wanting to join, given that its intelligence agencies maintain extensive networks in Gaza. But there seems to be an acceptance that many of those who served in the Hamas-run security forces will find their way in.
If all this seems too difficult, it’s worth noting that some foreign troop contingents are already on the ground. A Civil Military Co-ordination Centre led by the US military has in fact been operating for the past three weeks.
This command, in which a British officer serves as the No 2 and which already has more than 200 international military staff, is located at an Israeli military camp in Kiryat Gat, not far from Gaza, but is also developing its presence inside the Strip.
So far, the centre has been monitoring the occasionally rocky ceasefire and co-ordinating aid deliveries. But if the plan to send in a stabilisation force were to gather momentum, its role would expand considerably.
President Trump will need to draw on a solid team if his peace plan is to stand a chance of success
MANUEL BALCE CENETA/AP
Will Israel stifle the stabilisation force before it can even be born? Its hosting of the US-led co-ordination centre and the wording of the new security council draft suggest that the White House has successfully nudged Binyamin Netanyahu down the road, for now at least.
Historically, Israeli politicians have never liked international solutions to their own security, regarding elements such as the UN force in southern Lebanon, in place these last 47 years, as an inconvenience to be shoved out of the way when they want to act. But many Israeli generals have had enough of Gaza, understanding that they cannot completely disarm Hamas themselves and that continued operations have exhausted their reservists, thousands of whom were demobilised last week.
So assuming the American plan does move further, which countries might deploy to Gaza? Although several have said they’re willing, tensions have already emerged. Egypt and Qatar, for example, want to prevent Turkish troops being used.
Their fear, given some of President Erdogan’s tougher recent statements on Gaza, is that Turkey having a foothold there might lead to a military confrontation with Israel. They also suspect Erdogan of harbouring broader designs to increase Turkish influence across the Arab world.
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The US draft resolution calls for “unified command” of the ISF reporting to the “Board of Peace”, or international committee that will take overall charge of the Palestinian territory and will be chaired by Trump himself. He may find that only an American general can lead the force, given the need to marshal querulous troop contributor nations while keeping the Israelis onside.
It may also become clear, despite the president’s pledges not to put troops on the ground, that only US and other western detachments could be willing to take on certain missions.
What all of this speaks to is the need for a continuous American focus and a mastery of detail, not exactly hallmarks of the present White House, but which might be achieved by someone suitably empowered by Trump. If that seems unlikely, then a couple of months ago so did his US administration heading to the UN for its blessing.
If it all unravels, the future will look bleak indeed for Gaza, with the Israeli military still occupying half the territory, and an atmosphere of violence and instability that will hamper reconstruction. This sense of what failure could bring, as well as the fragile gains already achieved in alleviating Gaza’s humanitarian crisis, may just be enough to bring agreement in the security council and the deployment of international forces.