Russian Partial BAI Enabled Recent Russian Advances in Pokrovsk

Russian advances in Pokrovsk resulted not from a sudden breakthrough but rather from months of dedicated battlefield shaping. Russian forces were able to make significant advances in and around Pokrovsk only recently, after successfully achieving partial battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects over Spring-Summer 2025, which degraded Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs), enabled Russian infiltration missions, and subsequently undermined Ukraine’s ability to sustain tactical defenses. BAI refers to the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear behind the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.[1] New Russian technological and tactical adaptations and force structure changes allowed Russian forces to conduct a months-long BAI and infiltration campaign. The recent Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk would not have been possible, however, without the commitment of significant amounts of manpower and other traditional materiel in this direction at the expense of other efforts.

Russian forces are trying to expand the new BAI-infiltration campaign to other frontline sectors, including the Hulyaipole, Kupyansk, and Kostyantynivka directions, although it is unclear if Russia will be able to achieve similar effects across the entire battlefield. Russian adaptations during the battle of Pokrovsk show that defensive hubs such as Ukraine’s Fortress Belt — the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — require intensive protection of the immediate battlefield and near rear areas, particularly of critical GLOCs, from both tactical and intermediate-range strike campaigns.

Ukrainian forces have long relied on drone superiority to offset chronic and important shortages in materiel, but especially in personnel. The new Russian approach identified and attacked this critical Ukrainian offset, thereby facilitating more rapid and significant Russian advances. Ukraine and its partners must address Ukraine’s materiel and personnel shortages, but Ukraine will also have to restore its tactical and operational drone capabilities in order to be able to bring additional personnel and materiel to the front lines. Russian success around Pokrovsk thus also highlights the urgent requirement for Ukraine to expand its own BAI capabilities in order to disrupt Russian offensive operations and degrade the Russian elements conducting and supporting Russia’s BAI efforts.

Russian forces recently advanced in Pokrovsk and are trying to collapse the pocket between that settlement and nearby Myrnohrad. The situation in Pokrovsk significantly worsened starting in mid- to late-October 2025, when at least 250 Russian servicemen entered the settlement and began engaging Ukrainian troops in small arms combat.[2] Russian forces subsequently launched motorized and mechanized assaults against Pokrovsk, established firing positions in several areas of the settlement, extended their logistics operations into the settlement, and are now actively trying to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[3] Russian forces appear to be working simultaneously to complete the encirclement of the entire pocket and to reduce the pocket itself, but have not accomplished either objective as of this writing.[4] The rate of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction remains relatively low compared to the observed rate in late October 2025 for various reasons, including the Russian military command’s unwillingness to divert even more resources from other offensive efforts to this fight and the erosion of combat power that Russian forces around Pokrovsk have suffered during their protracted operations. Russian forces will likely eventually collapse the pocket around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, however, with or without additional reinforcements.[5] Ukrainian military officials maintain that Ukrainian forces still have access to logistics in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, and Ukrainian forces reportedly launched several localized counterattacks to hold the shoulders of the pocket and maintain positions in Pokrovsk itself.[6] Pokrovsk had served as an important logistics hub until about July 2025. The further operational significance of a Russian seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad depends on whether Ukrainian forces can withdraw from the pocket in good order; the strength of Ukrainian defenses beyond the pocket; and whether Russian forces have the necessary combat power to exploit the collapse of the pocket for further advances.[7]

The Russian advance in Pokrovsk did not result from a sudden breakthrough, nor does it indicate that Russian forces have been able to restore maneuver to the battlefield. It resulted from a grinding 21-month offensive involving at least 170,000 Russian servicemen and heavy personnel and materiel losses.[8] Russian forces took 21 months to advance the 39 kilometers (just over 24 miles) from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk and reportedly committed from 170,000 to 220,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces suffered 25,000 casualties in October 2025 alone, primarily around Pokrovsk.[10] Russian forces first began the Pokrovsk effort in February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka, and began setting conditions to take Pokrovsk through direct frontal assaults in March 2024.[11] This effort failed, however, and Russian forces instead shifted to an envelopment campaign in Fall 2024.[12] Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in the Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024.[13] Russian forces conducted a short series of assaults, including motorcycle raids, in the Pokrovsk direction in Winter 2024-2025, but did not reprioritize the direction again until Spring-Summer 2025 — after Russian forces repelled Ukraine’s incursion in Kursk Oblast in March 2025.[14]

Factors such as worsening weather conditions in October and November 2025 contributed to recent Russian advances in and around Pokrovsk, but were not decisive reasons for Russian advances. Ukrainian servicemen reported that cloudy and rainy conditions limited their ability to fly drones, enabling Russian forces to infiltrate positions with more troops at a time. A high-ranking Ukrainian officer reported that 30 to 40 Russian personnel can infiltrate into Pokrovsk when rainy or foggy weather conditions inhibit Ukrainian drone operations, while no more than 10 Russian servicemen can infiltrate during fair weather when Ukrainian forces can fly drones freely.[15] Russian forces most recently relied on thick fog to drive into Pokrovsk on motorcycles and other vehicles.[16] Lack of foliage also exposed Russian and Ukrainian positions, imposing additional concealment requirements on both sides.[17] Ukrainian servicemen added that muddy dirt roads further complicated Ukraine’s ability to use armored vehicles and cars for frontline logistics to Pokrovsk, as vehicles routinely moved through or got stuck in the mud and became more vulnerable to Russian drone strikes.[18] Weather and foliage benefit and inhibit both Russian and Ukrainian operations, but Russian forces were likely able to use these conditions to increase their ongoing offensive efforts in the area.

The months-long Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian logistics in the immediate and near rear played a more decisive role in shaping the battlefield to permit Russian advances in and near Pokrovsk than other factors. BAI refers to the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear behind the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.[19] Russian forces were able to isolate sectors of the frontline with persistent unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and loitering munition strikes, forcing Ukrainian forces to adopt additional protection tactics to avoid manpower and equipment losses.[20] Those adaptations complicated Ukrainian forces’ ability to maintain defenses. Ukrainian forces began to disperse positions within the “kill zone” or the 20-kilometer area from the front line, where there is an elevated risk of drone strikes.[21] The dispersion of Ukrainian manpower and equipment created a more porous frontline that was no longer defined by continuous trench lines and permanently fixed positions, creating exploitable gaps in the defensive lines.[22] This phenomenon is increasingly prevalent all along the frontline but posed particular challenges in defending against the intensive Russian offensive operations focused on the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Persistent drone strikes forced Ukrainian personnel to avoid personnel concentrations, adopt new deception measures, and constantly reposition equipment to avoid discovery and attack by Russian drone operators.[23] Russian persistent drone strikes against Ukrainian vehicles forced Ukrainian servicemen to walk 10 to 15 kilometers to reach the frontline, which significantly impacted Ukraine’s ability to reinforce Pokrovsk with manpower and equipment in a timely manner.[24] Russian forces also made it challenging for Ukrainian forces to rely on highways in the near rear, over 30 kilometers from the frontline, by targeting Ukrainian vehicles.[25] A Ukrainian military observer assessed that persistent drone strikes make it “impossible” for Ukrainian forces to retain positions even in the most fortified areas because these strikes deprive them of their logistics.[26]

Partial BAI and isolation effects enabled Russian forces to identify gaps in Ukraine’s tactical “wall of drones” and exploit them with infiltration tactics in and near Pokrovsk. The tactical “wall of drones” is a Ukrainian defensive barrier that uses a large number of tactical strike UAVs and loitering munitions to destroy manpower and equipment on the frontline. Ukrainian forces adopted this defensive approach in part to offset manpower and equipment shortages while protecting over 1,200 kilometers of frontline from Russian infantry and mechanized advances. The defensive barrier effectively creates the “kill zone.”[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets argued that Russian forces began increasingly to rely on infiltration tactics as a response to Ukraine’s technological superiority, which allowed Ukraine to use drones to monitor the battlefield, detect assault groups, and disrupt massed Russian attacks in early stages, often before they even reached the line of contact.[28] The Ukrainian “wall of drones” effectively rendered Russian large, mechanized attacks and dense infantry assaults ineffective by late 2024, causing the Russian military command to experiment with small assaults using motorcycles, golf carts, and buggies.[29] Mashovets observed that small, mechanized assaults allowed Russian forces to approach Ukrainian positions and move through the “kill zone” quickly with fewer casualties. New Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drone innovations eventually complicated Russia’s ability to conduct even motorcycle assaults, however.

Russian forces adopted infiltration tactics to undermine Ukrainian forces’ ability to operate the “wall of drones” by targeting Ukrainian drone operators and positions and degrading Ukrainian logistics and force coordination capabilities.[30] Mashovets noted that Russian forces sought to exploit the unevenness in Ukrainian defenses by first studying the defense structure of an area to identify gaps and achieving partial BAI effects to expand identified gaps ahead of an infiltration mission. Russian partial BAI efforts, for example, can make it more challenging for Ukrainian elements to maintain positions by depriving them of a consistent flow of supplies, creating weak points in the defensive line. Small assault groups then covertly infiltrate Ukrainian positions and find cover. Forward assault groups then wait for the arrival of reinforcements or attack Ukrainian positions from the rear to enable subsequent assault groups to advance. Russian forces are therefore achieving partial BAI effects with drone, air, and missile strikes to allow Russian small assault groups to infiltrate and eventually consolidate positions in and beyond Ukrainian defensive lines.

Russian partial battlefield air interdiction efforts, for example, can make it more challenging for Ukrainian elements to maintain positions by depriving them of a consistent flow of supplies, creating weak points in the defensive line.

Russian forces achieved partial BAI effects by leveraging new technological adaptations and tactics into their campaign design throughout 2025. The Russian adoption of drones controlled through fiber-optic cables for use as tactical, mothership, and sleeper drones — and the subsequent expansion of their ranges — enabled Russian forces to target Ukrainian vehicles and unmanned systems that performed logistics functions. These mid-range drones also enabled Russian forces to target Ukrainian GLOCs in the near rear, thinning and stretching Ukrainian logistics lines. Russian forces used these new technological adaptations to augment “human safari” tactics — the precise targeting of any moving vehicles along highways. Russian forces were thus able to undermine Ukrainian logistics and hinder Ukrainian mobility with low-cost, small-payload systems, obviating the need for the larger and more expensive weapons needed to destroy roads and bridges.

Russian forces intensified efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and isolate the frontline near the Fortress Belt by targeting Ukrainian vehicles with new fiber-optic drones in late April and early May 2025. The introduction of fiber-optic drones allowed Russian forces to pursue targets that had previously been protected by EW or were beyond the 20-30 kilometers range reachable by ordinary radio-controlled drones.[31] Ukrainian and Russian observers started to observe in May 2025 that Russian forces began intensively targeting vehicles along Ukrainian GLOCs in the rear and near rear, particularly near Kostyantynivka and along the T01514 Kramatorsk-Dobropillya highway.[32] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence observed in early May 2025 that Russian forces intensified their efforts to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs near Kostyantynivka — around 25 kilometers from the frontline at the time — by targeting moving vehicles with first-person view (FPV) fiber-optic drones.[33] The source revealed that Russian drone operators were “hunting down anything that moved” in the settlement and along supply routes to the frontline. Russian forces also began interdicting Ukrainian GLOCs in forested environments with fiber-optic drones that can operate in such environments where strong radio signals are unavailable.[34] Russian forces also actively used fiber-optic sleeper drones to ambush Ukrainian military and civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[35]

Ukrainian and Russian sources amplified footage of the aftermath of Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian vehicles traveling along the T01514 highway, some sections of which were 40 to 50 kilometers from the active frontline.[36] Ukrainian officials had to restrict civilian movement along the T01514 highway by mid-July 2025 due to the increased Russian drone threat, indicating that Russian forces were able to achieve partial BAI effects in the area within two months of starting intensified drone operations.[37] A Ukrainian milblogger assessed that Russian forces may have been using fiber-optic-controlled mothership UAVs, modified Molniya FPV drones with EW resistance, or Tyuvik UAVs with optical navigation capabilities that allowed the drones to prosecute targets even in communications-denied environments.[38] Russian forces have since been increasingly integrating all these drone variants and capabilities at scale to improve their BAI efforts, specifically targeting Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces, for example, have been more intensely targeting Ukrainian logistics routes and positions in the near rear in these areas and in the Zaporizhia and Kupyansk directions using mothership UAVs, particularly motherships based on variants of the Orlan and Molniya fixed-wing drones, since at least August 2025.[39] Fixed-wing drones are, notably, more effective in some bad weather conditions than rotary-wing drones often are.[40]

Russian vehicle “hunting” tactics and the use of fiber-optic drones are not new, as Russia began testing and employing these adaptations during “human safari” drone strike campaign against Ukrainian civilians in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast and in operations against Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian drone operators pursued a persistent strike campaign with FPV drones targeting civilians and vehicles in west bank Kherson Oblast along the Dnipro River starting at least in July 2024.[41] Russian drone operators effectively isolated sectors of west bank Kherson Oblast by making it very challenging for residents to move along highways and within settlements due to the threat of precise FPV drones.[42] Russian drone operators were likely able to practice conducting these tactical drone strikes against moving targets in west bank Kherson Oblast because of the low electronic warfare (EW) coverage in the area. Russian forces improved upon these tactics by using fiber-optic drones to target Ukrainian military vehicles with EW protection. Russian forces had first introduced fiber-optic drones to the battlefield in early 2024, later using a limited number of fiber-optic drones to strike Ukrainian armored vehicles during the initial phase of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in Summer-Fall 2024.[43] Russian sources later credited updated fiber-optic drones, specifically of the Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky type, with allowing Russian forces to repel subsequent Ukrainian mechanized attacks in Kursk Oblast in early 2025.[44] Russian sources claimed in late January 2025 that Russian forces operated fiber-optic drones in the lower-priority Kursk, Belgorod, Zaporizhia, and Dnipro (Kherson) directions, which suggests that Russian forces were still largely testing these drones in Winter 2024-2025.[45]

Russian drone operators pursued a persistent strike campaign with FPV drones targeting civilians and vehicles in west bank Kherson Oblast along the Dnipro River starting at least in July 2024.

Russian forces augmented their tactical drone campaign against Ukrainian ammunition depots and fortified defensive structures in the Pokrovsk direction with KAB glide bombs and Shahed drone strikes. KAB glide bombs and Shahed drone strikes deliver larger payloads than tactical UAVs, enabling Russian forces to damage or destroy more fortified structures.[46] The source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence observed in early May 2025 that Russian forces were reinforcing the drone strike campaign against Ukrainian logistics with KAB glide bombs across other frontline settlements in eastern Ukraine.[47] Ukrainian servicemen operating in the Pokrovsk direction routinely reported intensifying Russian KAB strikes in the area, and a former Russian Storm Z instructor and milblogger implied in May 2025 that KABs played a role in isolating Ukrainian frontlines in the Kostyantynivka direction alongside fiber-optic drones — a practice that Russian forces likely recreated in the Pokrovsk direction.[48] Russian forces notably launched guided air strikes and persistent FPV drone strikes against infrastructure in Dobropillya — a Ukrainian logistics hub located northwest of Pokrovsk at the juncture of the T01514 and T1515 highways — in mid-July 2025 to shape conditions for Russian infiltration efforts near Dobropillya in August 2025 (which were subsequently rolled back over the course of the fall).[49] Geolocated footage also shows Russian forces targeting high-rise buildings in Pokrovsk with KABs, likely in an effort to destroy Ukrainian fortified positions in the settlement.[50]

Russian forces began using Shahed drones to strike targets in the immediate and near rear areas of Pokrovsk as Russian Shahed drone production increased dramatically over Spring-Summer 2025. Geolocated footage published in late May and early July 2025 shows Russian Shahed strikes against a Ukrainian storage facility in Novofedorivka (southwest of Dobropillya) and a reported ammunition depot on Dobropillya’s southern outskirts, respectively.[51] Ukrainian servicemen and experts observed in October 2025 that Russian forces were increasingly using Shahed-type drones to target Ukrainian frontline positions and assessed that Russian forces may be attempting to replace KAB strikes with Shahed strikes.[52] Russian forces also began launching Shahed-style drones from pickup trucks and other mobile platforms, establishing new Shahed launch points in occupied Ukraine, and actively recruiting Shahed operators, likely in an effort to leverage Shaheds against Ukrainian infrastructure and fortified positions near the frontline more intensely.[53] Russian forces had previously reserved Shahed drones for long-range strikes against Ukrainian energy, civilian, and military infrastructure in the deep rear. Russia’s improving Shahed production capabilities with support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC); technological updates to Shaheds, such as the introduction of FPV capabilities; and the integration of EW-resistant controlled reception pattern antennas to the Shaheds are likely enabling Russian forces to use them to attack Ukrainian infrastructure and defensive targets along the frontlines and in the near rear.[54]

Russia’s improving Shahed production capabilities with support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC); technological updates to Shaheds, such as the introduction of first-person view capabilities; and the integration of EW-resistant controlled reception pattern antennas to the Shaheds are likely enabling Russian forces to use them to attack Ukrainian infrastructure and defensive targets along the frontlines and in the near rear.

The Russian military command tasked elements of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies with interdicting Ukrainian GLOCs in and near Pokrovsk using Rubikon’s lessons from Kursk Oblast.[55] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began forming the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies in July-August 2024 as an entity that forms specialized drone units, carries out centralized procurement and training functions, and focuses on unmanned systems research and development.[56] Rubikon notably participated in Russian counteroffensives in Kursk Oblast in Winter and Spring 2025, with many Russian and Ukrainian sources crediting Rubikon for regaining control over the town of Sudzha after successfully interdicting Ukrainian logistics with drones.[57] Ukrainian military sources and analysts assessed that the redeployment of combat-experienced Rubikon elements to the Pokrovsk direction following the conclusion of Russia’s Kursk counteroffensive resulted in Russia’s ability to significantly degrade Ukraine’s logistics around Pokrovsk.[58] Rubikon elements first appeared in the Pokrovsk direction in late January 2025, and the Russian military command began to reinforce these elements with additional crews around May 2025 after Russian forces completed their counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast.[59] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported in July 2025 that the Russian command redeployed at least half of Rubikon’s elements, around 40 crews, from Kursk Oblast to the Pokrovsk direction in Spring 2025.[60]

Russian forces further complicated Ukrainian logistics near Pokrovsk by tasking Rubikon elements with intercepting Ukrainian heavy bomber UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) delivering supplies. Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk began relying on multicopter and heavy bomber UAVs, such as Vampire and Nemesis drones, that can carry up to 10 kilograms to deliver supplies to troops defending positions within the “kill zone.”[61] Rubikon began using its UAVs, particularly fiber-optic drones, to intercept Ukrainian heavy bomber UAVs in an effort to sever Ukrainian logistics to the “kill zone.”[62] Fiber-optic drones allow Rubikon elements to target even advanced Ukrainian drones with onboard EW capabilities.[63] Rubikon also reportedly deployed compact radar stations in the Pokrovsk direction that enabled Rubikon elements to detect Ukrainian unmanned and manned targets at low altitudes.[64]

Rubikon also targets unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), which Ukrainian forces have adopted as a cost-effective alternative to armored vehicles to evacuate wounded personnel and deliver heavier cargo to the ”kill zone.”[65] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi notably stated on November 11 that UGVs delivered nearly 300,000 kilograms of provisions to Ukrainian units in the “kill zone.”[66] Some Ukrainian brigades operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that UGVs fulfilled nearly half of all logistics functions.[67] Ukrainian servicemen recalled that Russian forces regularly hunted UGVs involved in delivering supplies and evacuating wounded personnel, requiring Ukrainian forces to protect UGVs from Russian FPV drone strikes.[68] Rubikon claimed on November 10 that its elements had struck over 11,000 Ukrainian targets since the start of 2025, of which the plurality — 37.7 percent — were multicopters, fixed-wing UAVs, and UGVs.[69]

Rubikon elements also helped to create weak spots in Ukraine’s tactical “wall of drones” by targeting Ukrainian drone operators. Russian forces, particularly Rubikon elements, began prioritizing targeting Ukrainian drone operators and drone launch points in Spring and Summer 2025, reportedly resulting in increased casualty rates among Ukrainian drone operators.[70] Rubikon reportedly uses all available equipment to strike detected Ukrainian drone operators, including cooperating with Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS).[71] Ukrainian drone operators in the area must now work from positions deeper underground, frequently rotate positions, and immediately relocate after launching drone strikes to avoid being discovered by Russian drone operators.[72] Rubikon attacked the core of the Ukrainian tactical “wall of drones,” which prevents Russian forces from restoring mechanized maneuver, by targeting or distracting drone operators who fly these drones. Recent Russian infiltration missions into Pokrovsk may also have inhibited Ukrainian forces’ ability to maintain some parts of the drone wall, as Ukrainian drone operators must curtail drone flights to engage in small arms combat to repel the infiltration groups in the near rear.[73] Rubikon also targets Ukrainian EW and signal systems, likely in an effort to degrade Ukrainian forces’ ability to defend against Russian drone strikes.[74]

Conclusion

Russian forces are trying to recreate the success of partial BAI campaign and infiltration tactics to advance in Hulyaipole, Kupyansk, and Kostyantynivka directions. The situation in the Hulyaipole direction suddenly deteriorated in mid-November 2025 after Russian forces have been conducting a monthslong BAI campaign targeting Ukrainian GLOCs in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, including highways, roads, and railway lines.[75] Russian forces intensified infiltration missions and have been making relatively rapid advances in the Hulyaipole direction in recent weeks, and Russian milbloggers have identified interdicting and cutting the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway as a goal of these Russian advances.[76] Russian assault groups similarly infiltrated the central part of Kupyansk and have been threatening Ukrainian supply routes to Kupyansk.[77] Russian forces, including Rubikon elements, have been degrading Ukrainian logistics in Kostyantynivka and increasingly targeting railways and highways that supply the Fortress Belt, likely to set conditions for further infiltrations and advances in the area.[78]

Russian forces will need to allocate significant manpower, materiel, and time to recreate their Pokrovsk successes in other frontline sectors, although they may already have done so around Hulyaipole. Russian forces allocated significant manpower resources and traditional materiel to advance in and around Pokrovsk in addition to the BAI campaign. It will likely take Russian forces time to achieve BAI conditions and conduct a series of infiltration missions before they can make advances and territorial gains. The former Russian Storm Z instructor and milblogger observed in May and October 2025 that the Russian offensive on Pokrovsk was slow because Russia needed to concentrate a lot more resources to enable Russian forces to infiltrate and consolidate positions in areas such as Dobropillya.[79] The milblogger noted that Russian forces had a shortage of working drones, qualified operators, and technicians necessary to reinforce infantry units. The milblogger complained that Russia was lagging in forming specialized strike drone units, likely referring to expanding the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces service. The Russian reliance on deploying Rubikon elements to priority frontline areas such as Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka, and Lyman may further indicate that Russian forces have not yet formed sufficient strike drone units across the entire frontline.[80]

The Russian pivot to BAI and infiltration tactics indicates that Russian forces were able to identify vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian “wall of drones.” The “wall of drones” defensive barrier is not obsolete, however, and remains an important defensive tool. Ukrainian forces rely on the tactical “wall of drones” to offset manpower and equipment shortages, and Russian forces uncovered ways to undermine the ability of this defensive barrier to function at the level necessary to repel Russian attacks in priority areas. Future technological innovations, such as the increased integration of optical navigation capabilities or new kinetic tactical drone countermeasures, can expose further vulnerabilities in the “wall of drones.” Improvements in Russian tactics and operational planning can also pose significant challenges to Ukrainian physical fortifications such as the Ukrainian Fortress Belt. Ukraine’s “wall of drones,” however, still holds off a major part of Russian advances and imposes significant casualties on Russian manpower and equipment even when degraded. Ukrainian forces appear to have partially reconstituted their positions around Pokrovsk in mid-November 2025, slowing Russian efforts to complete the encirclement.[81]

Ukraine must adapt by defeating the Russian partial BAI campaign and integrating BAI capabilities into its campaign design. Ukrainian forces can improve the “wall of drones” by expanding their drone detection and interception range to protect Ukrainian logistics in the near rear from Russian drone strikes. Ukraine, therefore, will need to develop new detection and kinetic interceptor capabilities that cover the emerging mid-range threat.

Ukraine’s manpower and materiel shortages have played important roles in enabling Russian advances. Sparsely-held Ukrainian defensive positions facilitated Russian infiltration efforts, and shortages of artillery and other traditional systems limited Ukrainian forces’ ability to operate when bad weather disrupted some drone operations. Ukraine and its partners must improve and accelerate efforts to address these shortages in both manpower and materiel. Addressing those problems will take considerable time, however, and will not be sufficient in itself. The availability of a larger manpower and materiel pool may not be decisive when Russian BAI efforts are able to prevent reserves and reinforcements from getting to the front at scale and quickly in the first place. Ukrainian forces must thus also disrupt the Russian BAI efforts and restore the effectiveness of the “wall of drones.”

Expanding Ukraine’s own BAI capabilities could provide a critical part of the solution to this problem. Russian BAI operations rely on the relative sanctuary that Russian forces in the near-rear areas enjoy. Rubikon operators can function in relative safety in those areas; Russian forces can concentrate manpower and materiel for attacks; and Russian longer-range systems, such as Shaheds and rocket artillery, can attack from those areas. A dramatically expanded Ukrainian BAI effort could contest the safety of Russian near-rear areas, disrupting the smooth operations of the current Russian offensive approach.

Ukraine already has systems capable of striking Russian near-rear areas and has been increasing such strikes in late October and the first half of November 2025.[82] Ukraine needs support to expand its production of mid-range strike systems rapidly and dramatically and must also perfect command-and-control structures and operation concepts to optimize the use of those systems. Such changes can occur more rapidly than fixing Ukraine’s chronic manpower challenges or the delays and limitations in the provision of traditional conventional weapons systems. They therefore offer the best short-term promise of preventing Russian forces from expanding their new offensive approach across the entire theater.

Endnotes

[1] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/CP_0017_MCCAFFREY_BATTLEFIELD_AIR_INTERDICTION.PDF; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[2] https://espreso dot tv/article-pokrovsk-yak-noviy-kritichniy-moment-viyni-chim-vin-nebezpechniy#goog_rewarded; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://english dot nv.ua/russian-war/around-200-russian-troops-infiltrate-pokrovsk-as-street-fighting-intensifies-general-staff-50555605.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2025/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/786
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/
[8] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-missile-united-nations-4624a6463aa3637e2d47baec9c5edcbe; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/
[9] https://hromadske dot ua/viyna/249715-proty-bryhad-shcho-oboroniaiut-pokrovsk-okupanty-vystavyly-220-tysiach-biytsiv-komandyr-serhiy-filimonov; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-missile-united-nations-4624a6463aa3637e2d47baec9c5edcbe; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/
[10] https://united24media dot com/latest-news/breaking-zelenskyy-counts-record-25000-russian-losses-in-october-pokrovsk-turns-into-a-mass-graveyard-13213
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-has-failed-to-break-ukraine-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-has-failed-to-break-ukraine-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-2/; https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1842341054428700784
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-has-failed-to-break-ukraine-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025/
[15] https://hromadske dot ua/ru/voyna/254005-est-li-risk-okruzheniya-v-pokrovske-i-chto-zhdet-mirnograd-otvechayut-voennye
[16] https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/russian-forces-ride-key-ukrainian-city-fog-battered-vehicles-video-sho-rcna243168
[17] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/osin-front-zsu-vyklyky-zahrozy/33577868.html
[18] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/osin-front-zsu-vyklyky-zahrozy/33577868.html
[19] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/CP_0017_MCCAFFREY_BATTLEFIELD_AIR_INTERDICTION.PDF; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf
[20] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/05/23/russias-triple-chokehold-tactic-driving-ukraine-back/; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3073; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid037YBQfUZQDMzC3PtLXTxu32ATsXYuMUEZdGmdkGSYuumrMBB9QnuC5NqKJ3fgcXRsl ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[21] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/osin-front-zsu-vyklyky-zahrozy/33577868.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[22] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/05/23/russias-triple-chokehold-tactic-driving-ukraine-back/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[23] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/05/23/russias-triple-chokehold-tactic-driving-ukraine-back/; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/osin-front-zsu-vyklyky-zahrozy/33577868.html; https://explainer dot ua/shho-take-taktyka-infiltratsiyi-i-yak-yiyi-zastosovuye-rosiya/; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid037YBQfUZQDMzC3PtLXTxu32ATsXYuMUEZdGmdkGSYuumrMBB9QnuC5NqKJ3fgcXRsl
[24] https://espreso dot tv/article-pokrovsk-yak-noviy-kritichniy-moment-viyni-chim-vin-nebezpechniy#goog_rewarded; https://explainer dot ua/shho-take-taktyka-infiltratsiyi-i-yak-yiyi-zastosovuye-rosiya/; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid037YBQfUZQDMzC3PtLXTxu32ATsXYuMUEZdGmdkGSYuumrMBB9QnuC5NqKJ3fgcXRsl; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[26] https://t.me/samotniyskhid/6463
[27] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/articles/kilzona-suchasnoyi-vijny-rozmiry-ta-struktura-kontrol-i-zasoby-urazhennya-vyzhyvannya-i-posuvannya-mezh/
[28] https://explainer dot ua/shho-take-taktyka-infiltratsiyi-i-yak-yiyi-zastosovuye-rosiya/; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3073; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid037YBQfUZQDMzC3PtLXTxu32ATsXYuMUEZdGmdkGSYuumrMBB9QnuC5NqKJ3fgcXRsl ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3074 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3075 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3076 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3077 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3078
[29] https://explainer dot ua/shho-take-taktyka-infiltratsiyi-i-yak-yiyi-zastosovuye-rosiya/
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/; https://explainer dot ua/shho-take-taktyka-infiltratsiyi-i-yak-yiyi-zastosovuye-rosiya/; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3073; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid037YBQfUZQDMzC3PtLXTxu32ATsXYuMUEZdGmdkGSYuumrMBB9QnuC5NqKJ3fgcXRsl ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3074 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3075 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3076 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3077 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3078
[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/11/11/lanczety-neefektyvni-dushymo-yih-rebom-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-ne-prypynyaye-sprob-atakuvaty/; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91879; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/14/obklaly-czegloyu-kolodamy-gumoyu-na-chomu-shturmuyut-rosiyany-bilya-pokrovska/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/14/drony-vzhe-davno-vstelyly-polya-vijskovi-pro-sytuacziyu-bilya-pokrovska/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1042495-na-maso-i-na-zivca-aku-taktiku-zastosovuut-vijska-rf-namagaucis-prorvatisa-do-pokrovska/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qyulh3wsf2Y; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[32] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21767; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91879; https://t.me/stranaua/196175; https://strana dot news/news/485185-drony-rf-nachali-zaletat-na-40-km-za-liniju-fronta.html; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5640; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5283; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5276;
[33] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21767; https://t.me/stranaua/194876
[34] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/shahed-fpv-killzone/33476992.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/30/vdaryty-kabamy-cze-yak-pryvitatysya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zapuskayut-fpv-drony-z-matok/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[36] https://strana dot news/news/485185-drony-rf-nachali-zaletat-na-40-km-za-liniju-fronta.html; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91879; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/; https://www.facebook.com/vadym.filashkin/posts/2227243127749021?ref=embed_post; https://t.me/rybar/70805
[38] https://t.me/stranaua/196175
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-technological-adaptations-update-october-9-2025/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/30/vdaryty-kabamy-cze-yak-pryvitatysya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zapuskayut-fpv-drony-z-matok/
[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/10/14/padaye-zelenka-sytuacziya-zminyuyetsya-poblyzu-dobropillya-sylnyj-viter-i-tumany-transformuyut-vorozhu-taktyku/
[41] https://www.dw.com/en/targeting-civilians-how-russian-drones-terrorize-a-ukrainian-city/video-70054983; https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coiukraine/a-hrc-59-crp2-en.pdf;
[42] https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/ckg7nwlex72o; https://tsn dot
ua/ato/u-hersoni-rosiyski-droni-polyuyut-na-lyudey-zhurnalistka-rozpovila-pro-zhittya-v-misti-2653731.html; https://kherson dot rayon.in dot
ua/topics/830791-nemae-bezpechnikh-dorig-kherson-zablokovaniy-atakami-rosiyskikh-droniv
[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-battlefield-ai-revolution-is-not-here-yet-the-status-of-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone-efforts/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment-2/; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/articles/2025/01/13/7493257/;
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[45] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22928237
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https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/warhead-with-napalm-russian-invaders-continue-to-experiment-with-shahed-lethality/; https://t.me/yurasumy/24504; https://kyivindependent dot
com/russia-ramps-up-shahed-drone-strikes-on-the-front-line-conserving-kabombs/; https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-ramps-up-shahed-drone-strikes-on-the-front-line-conserving-kabombs/
[47] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21767; https://t.me/stranaua/194876
[48] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2352; dot media/1113866-es-prodovziv-sankcii-proti-rf-genstab-rozgladae-mozlivist-vimknenna-mobilnoi-merezi-pid-cas-trivogi-1298-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1757752180&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/09/06/vony-svoyih-ne-vytyaguyut-yih-pokydayut-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-okupanty-ne-zastosovuyut-nrk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/30/vdaryty-kabamy-cze-yak-pryvitatysya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zapuskayut-fpv-drony-z-matok/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1086737-rosiani-vouut-za-grosi-e-problema-z-osobovim-skladom-vijskovij-zsu-rozpoviv-pro-taktiku-rf-na-pokrovskomu-napramku/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/09/bajduzhe-chy-mozhe-vin-ity-rosiyany-pid-pokrovskom-kydayut-u-bij-poranenyh-bez-palcziv-na-nogah/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1046565-situacia-stabilizovana-rf-pragne-vzati-u-kotel-pokrovsk/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_z6CKc54-k; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/11/vorog-koryguye-aviacziyu-ochyma-droniv-vijskovi-pro-strategiyu-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/11/vorog-koryguye-aviacziyu-ochyma-droniv-vijskovi-pro-strategiyu-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2025/06/11/vorog-koryguye-aviacziyu-ochyma-droniv-vijskovi-pro-strategiyu-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/https://suspilne dot media/1113866-es-prodovziv-sankcii-proti-rf-genstab-rozgladae-mozlivist-vimknenna-mobilnoi-merezi-pid-cas-trivogi-1298-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1757752180&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/09/06/vony-svoyih-ne-vytyaguyut-yih-pokydayut-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-okupanty-ne-zastosovuyut-nrk/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/30/vdaryty-kabamy-cze-yak-pryvitatysya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zapuskayut-fpv-drony-z-matok/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1086737-rosiani-vouut-za-grosi-e-problema-z-osobovim-skladom-vijskovij-zsu-rozpoviv-pro-taktiku-rf-na-pokrovskomu-napramku/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/09/bajduzhe-chy-mozhe-vin-ity-rosiyany-pid-pokrovskom-kydayut-u-bij-poranenyh-bez-palcziv-na-nogah/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1046565-situacia-stabilizovana-rf-pragne-vzati-u-kotel-pokrovsk/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_z6CKc54-k; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/11/vorog-koryguye-aviacziyu-ochyma-droniv-vijskovi-pro-strategiyu-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/11/vorog-koryguye-aviacziyu-ochyma-droniv-vijskovi-pro-strategiyu-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2025/06/11/vorog-koryguye-aviacziyu-ochyma-droniv-vijskovi-pro-strategiyu-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/;
[49] https://pokrovsk dot news/news/view/rosiya-skinula-kab-na-tsentr-dobropillya-e-zagiblij-ta-poraneni; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1068735-pivtora-desatki-kab-500-za-cej-rik-pro-so-svidcit-tip-zbroi-akou-rf-vdarila-po-dobropillu-analiz-prokuraturi/; https://suspilned ot media/donbas/1068461-tam-zavzdi-zbiralosa-bagato-ludej-so-rozpovidaut-mistani-pro-ataku-po-dobropillu-16-lipna/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/; https://t.me/legitimniy/20405; https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/dobropillya-pid-pritsilom-k-rosiya-atakue-1753118593.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1966787913514930294
https://t.me/Dobropillya_info/14736
[50] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/23661
https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1923015042649256005
https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1923681586471391620
[51] https://x.com/ShahedTracker/status/1941327541798830208
https://t.me/mod_russia/54342; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1928169149072597070
https://t.me/Dobropillya_info/10793
[52] https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-ramps-up-shahed-drone-strikes-on-the-front-line-conserving-kabombs/; https://www.facebook.com/kateryna.zarembo/posts/pfbid0xQQHH5xeSsPev3JoJ3d1oLDz84zkSL58AaJBnWv1MVS4gQZB7oP9SimauCESmuqcl?cft[0]=AZX2t_X_kpW8HdMOScGEN3oAI6fOU1m6QKhIgHAlWmvUZ_J3AtEayNWlw6iKksR3Gd5SPIFGCaC9H9auI0F3Pb_2p0SUI908X1GMfYqQI8n3HuEYKQDs3DEUILexK3-kdjXGOB_yN2VSZF6BTN-ndSUNn2CHRK15JTnBT3C0YSSwJA&tn=%2CO%2CP-R
[53] https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-launching-shahed-drones-from-pickup-trucks-ram-2025-7; https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-ramps-up-shahed-drone-strikes-on-the-front-line-conserving-kabombs/; https://united24media dot com/latest-news/satellite-images-expose-russias-largest-shahed-drone-base-built-to-strike-ukraine-13299; https://t.me/geran231/5643
[54] https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-can-produce-up-to-2-700-shahed-type-drones-per-month-intelligence-says/; https://24tv dot ua/rosiyskiy-pidrozdil-rubikon-chomu-yogo-biytsi-perebuvayutsya_n2950758; https://t.me/serhii_flash/6100
https://t.me/serhii_flash/6404; https://t.me/serhii_flash/6521;
https://t.me/serhii_flash/6414; https://t.me/serhii_flash/6357;
https://t.me/serhii_flash/5928; https://united24media dot com/latest-news/russia-is-deploying-three-types-of-shahed-drones-built-with-foreign-parts-12316; https://english dot nv.ua/nation/ukraine-chinese-electronics-now-make-up-65-of-russia-s-shahed-drones-50527763.html
[55] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/08/bagato-fantastychnyh-vkydiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistyczi-i-psyhologiyi/
[56] https://www.svoboda.org/a/tayna-rubikona-bpla-spetsnaz-v-parke-patriot-/33531165.html; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-efforts-to-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations-2/
[57] https://www.svoboda.org/a/tayna-rubikona-bpla-spetsnaz-v-parke-patriot-/33531165.html; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23075269; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682
[58] https://t.me/samotniyskhid/6463; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/06/vony-svoyih-ne-vytyaguyut-yih-pokydayut-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-okupanty-ne-zastosovuyut-nrk/; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3076; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/08/bagato-fantastychnyh-vkydiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistyczi-i-psyhologiyi/
[59] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/42; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/51; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/06/vony-svoyih-ne-vytyaguyut-yih-pokydayut-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-okupanty-ne-zastosovuyut-nrk/; https://t.me/rybar/74805; https://t.me/serhii_flash/5682
[60] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/shahed-fpv-killzone/33476992.html
[61] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/osin-front-zsu-vyklyky-zahrozy/33577868.html
[62] https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/osin-front-zsu-vyklyky-zahrozy/33577868.html; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/178451; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/690; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/09/06/vony-svoyih-ne-vytyaguyut-yih-pokydayut-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-okupanty-ne-zastosovuyut-nrk/
[63] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-technological-adaptations-update-october-9-2025/
[64] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=842911111548764
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[66] https://t.me/osirskiy/1310
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