KEY MESSAGES

Yemen is the third-most food insecure country in the world, with over half its population, 18.1 million people, projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or above levels of food insecurity between September 2025 and February 2026, including 41,000 people in Ansar Allah (AA)- controlled governorates projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), the highest level of the food insecurity classification. The 2025 Global Hunger Index indicates that hunger remains alarming in Yemen, with available indicators pointing to deteriorating conditions and that the country is likely to fall into the ‘extremely alarming’ category.

● Food consumption levels in Yemen remain deeply concerning, with 61% of households unable to meet their minimum food needs in September 2025. Although this marks a seasonal improvement from the record-high 70% in July, severe food deprivation (poor food consumption) persists for 33% of families. Peaks of inadequate food consumption were reported in Ad Dali’, Lahj, and Raymah at 75%, in Al Bayda at 73%, in Abyan and Shabwah at 68%, and in Hajjah at 67%. The prevalence of poor food consumption was higher in Al Bayda and Lahj at 48% and in Raymah and Hajjah at 46% and 45%, respectively. In response to continued food consumption gaps, 42% of households nationwide resorted to severe foodbased coping strategies, with the highest prevalence in areas under AA control. The most common strategies include limiting portion sizes (67%), reducing the number of meals (60%), and restricting adult consumption to prioritize children (50%), highlighting widespread coping exhaustion. Malnutrition remains widespread and deeply interlinked with food insecurity. Nutrition Cluster projections suggest a potential increase of 15–30% in acute malnutrition within lowland and coastal areas by the end of 2025. This rise is primarily driven by elevated levels of food insecurity, persistent nutrition supply constraints, and high disease burden.

● The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR)-modeled estimates of people living in areas at risk of experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or above levels of food security reached 9.4 million (27%), of whom 7.3 million live in AA-controlled governorates and two million in Government of Yemen (GoY) areas. This indicator takes into consideration overall risk indicator trends for the previous 11 months, even in absence of escalationdriven alerts. While this figure is higher compared to July and August, it is still below most of the values recorded since April 2024 (see Annex VI for more information on JMR modeling updates).

● Risk indicator alerts in September were lower than previous months, with only 36 critical and 459 heightened risk alerts. The exchange rate indicator recorded zero alerts for the second consecutive month following the appreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER) in GoY areas since August. On the other hand, the divergence between local and global food commodity prices (proxy food imports indicator) continued to raise the highest number of alerts, with the large majority raised in AAcontrolled governorates, where the US dollar (USD) value of food commodities is much higher than global prices. This, however, was not reflected in the food prices indicator to the same extent as the price of the monthly food basket (MFB) in Yemeni rial in AA areas, which was the lowest since March 2021, and only 19 districts raised food prices alerts. The same dynamic, albeit at a reduced scale, applies to fuel prices in AA-controlled governorates, where average fuel prices in YER saw no major fluctuations, but the price divergence raised alerts for the proxy fuel imports indicator when converted into USD. Conflict also saw a considerable decline, with the lowest number of alerts in September since at least February 2024. Yet, displacement alerts saw a slight increase in August and September compared to previous months, with a total of 120 households displaced, raising alerts in Al Hodeidah, Hadramawt, Ibb, Shabwah, and Ta’iz. In September, flooding cause 40% of displaced households to flee, while conflict and economic reasons accounted for 31% and 27% respectively. The drought indicator raised ten critical and two heightened risk alerts resulting from the rainfall deficit in Al Maharah and parts of Hadramawt; while the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) marks these areas as off season or with no crops, it is likely the drought could pose risks for livestock by reducing natural forage availability.

● Looking forward, a number of variables have the potential to lead to a deterioration of the food security situation. Shrinking humanitarian space in the north, resulting from reduced funding and following the recent detention of humanitarian staff by AA forces in Sana’a and Al Hodeidah in October, is likely to result in a further reduction in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, with severe unmet needs increasing in AA-controlled areas. This is also likely to lead to a significant reallocation of human and financial resources from AA-controlled areas to those under GoY control, reflecting operational shifts but not funding increases, often as a result of pauses or suspensions in interventions. Decreasing fuel imports through Red Sea ports is also a major trend to monitor, as a fuel supply crisis and an increase in fuel prices will have clear impacts on food security. In GoY areas, despite recent currency appreciation, the sustainability of these gains remains uncertain. Without broader economic reforms to strengthen reserves and address trade deficits, renewed currency depreciation and rising food prices are likely, leaving many families increasingly unable to afford basic food items.