An-Nahar, Lebanon, November 21
The Lebanese military establishment now confronts a grave and unprecedented challenge: the growing risk of losing the confidence of key international and Arab partners after failing to achieve the primary objective those powers expected following the November 27 ceasefire with Israel—namely, the disarmament of Hezbollah and Palestinian armed factions.
This erosion of trust stems from several factors, foremost among them the executive branch’s reluctance to confront Hezbollah, and its increasing tendency to appease the group by adopting its conditions for handing over weapons. Many are beginning to question whether the president has abandoned the resolve he expressed early in his term to restrict arms to the state.
Doubts are also mounting about his team’s ability to accurately assess regional dynamics and the gravity of repeated warnings from Washington and other capitals urging the completion of weapons monopolization before the year’s end. A quick review of developments in Lebanon and the broader region since the fragile truce began—during which Israeli strikes continued daily against Hezbollah personnel and positions—reveals several key points.
First, the purpose of forming the Mechanism Committee was to implement the ceasefire in a manner that would ultimately end the war by addressing its root causes. This means withdrawing Hezbollah’s weapons from all of Lebanon, not merely from south of the Litani River. According to the international powers involved, Israel’s continued presence at five points along the border and the ongoing displacement of residents from more than thirty towns are direct consequences of a war that Hezbollah triggered in support of Hamas in Gaza. As a result, global and Arab actors no longer accept the duality that once existed between the Lebanese state and the Hezbollah-controlled entity. They now back Israel’s demand that Hezbollah disarm as a prerequisite for an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, a formal end to hostilities between the two countries, and a return to the 1949 Armistice Agreement.
Second, Hezbollah has not relinquished its weapons in any areas south or north of the Litani, and claims of cooperation between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah on this issue—often circulated by certain factions within the executive branch—are unfounded. The only weapons collected so far have been those abandoned in vacated Hezbollah positions reached by the Lebanese Army based on intelligence supplied by the Joint Operations Command.
While overt coordination between the army and Hezbollah regarding weapons transfers north of the Litani has ceased, the army appears to be taking no substantive measures to prevent such transfers. Third, Hezbollah effectively lost its military presence south of the Litani following its defeat in the recent conflict. The collapse of the Syrian regime two weeks after the Lebanese ceasefire further severed the group’s vital supply lines from Iran. Despite this, Hezbollah is working to rebuild its military capabilities north of the Litani. The period of vulnerability it experienced after the ceasefire—marked by the election of a president, the appointment of an opposition prime minister, and the formation of a government in which it lacked veto power—led many to believe its parallel state was close to collapse.
However, visits by Iranian officials to Lebanon revived the group’s confidence, prompting it to harden its stance on the weapons issue, reject government directives, and resume activities aimed at weakening state authority. Fourth, fragmentation within Lebanese state institutions deprives the executive branch of the tools needed to strengthen state sovereignty and dismantle the parallel structure. Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement, dominate most Shiite posts across state institutions, enabling the parallel state to exploit public resources to maintain control over the broader population. Additionally, friction between the president and prime minister—despite shared strategic goals—undermines government effectiveness. As a result, the government regularly adopts crucial decisions but fails to implement them, as seen repeatedly, from the effort to collect illegal weapons to the far simpler task of preventing Hezbollah gatherings near Raouché Rock.
Fifth, the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa to power in Syria, following the collapse of the Assad regime, dramatically reshaped the regional landscape in ways Lebanese political actors did not anticipate. Most Lebanese factions expected the new Syrian administration to crumble, for the country to fracture along sectarian lines, and for Iranian influence to reassert itself. Instead, international support for the new Syrian leadership has grown, sanctions have been lifted, and significant investment has begun to flow. Yet some Lebanese actors continue to bet on the opposite scenario, behaving as if nothing has changed.
Al-Sharaa, for his part, has joined the international coalition against the Islamic State and other groups designated as terrorist organizations by the United States. In light of all this, Lebanon, a year after the ceasefire, remains mired in institutional weakness, dominated by parallel power structures, and stripped of full sovereignty due to ongoing Israeli occupation and Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm. The Lebanese Army—the last institution still respected by the international community—now risks losing support because the executive branch lacks a clear political vision and the unity needed to enforce its decisions.
The US stance could escalate from canceling the army commander’s visit to halting aid, including salary support, and scrapping the upcoming donor conference. Such a shift could provide Israel with justification to target the Lebanese Army in a future conflict—an idea increasingly discussed in strategic circles. According to Western sources, support for the Lebanese Army was originally intended to ensure its ability to combat terrorism and to preserve an institution that might one day reclaim the state from the parallel authority. Today, after the defeat of the so-called resistance axis, the international community has resolved to dismantle Hezbollah and strengthen the Lebanese state, placing its hopes squarely on the army.
These sources note that past army commanders consistently cited the absence of both political will and military capacity to impose state authority across Lebanese territory. Now, with Hezbollah weakened and the government having formally decided to disarm the group, the army is refusing to act. Accordingly, international partners are asking: What is the purpose of supporting the Lebanese Army if Lebanese authorities will not deploy it decisively to seize illegal weapons? And if the army will not—or cannot—do so, should Israel be permitted to finish the job in a new war?
Riad Kahwaji (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)