Tomorrow morning (23 December), the Security Council is scheduled to hold a briefing under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item to discuss the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme. The meeting was requested by Denmark, France, Greece, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, the UK, and the US, with support from Panama. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo is expected to brief on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the implementation of resolution 2231, which is dated 15 December and covers developments since the previous report of 19 June.

Background

Resolution 2231 requested the Secretary-General to submit a biannual report to the Security Council on the resolution’s implementation. A related presidential note decided that the Security Council would annually select a Council member to serve as facilitator for its 2231-related work. The Council’s customary practice has been to hold biannual meetings to receive briefings from a UN Secretariat official on the Secretary-General’s report, as well as from the 2231 facilitator on its activities during the reporting period. The European Union (EU) has also briefed at these sessions in its capacity as coordinator of the JCPOA’s Joint Commission, a body established to oversee the JCPOA’s implementation and resolve disputes. These meetings have been held in June and December under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item.

Tomorrow’s briefing on resolution 2231 will be the first to take place since the “E3” parties to the JCPOA—France, Germany, and the UK—triggered the “snapback” mechanism to reimpose the UN sanctions on Iran that the JCPOA and resolution 2231 had suspended. China and Russia have contested the E3’s legal and procedural standing to activate the mechanism and argued that all sanctions were permanently lifted on 18 October, when the JCPOA and resolution 2231 were originally set to expire. At that point, resolution 2231 stated that the Council would end its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file and “Non-Proliferation” would be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. China and Russia—as well as Iran—contend that this has now happened.

By contrast, the E3 and like-minded Council members have argued that the triggering of the snapback mechanism was valid and therefore that only specific paragraphs of resolution 2231 related to the suspension of sanctions have expired. As such, they maintain that all previous UN sanctions measures on Iran have been reactivated and that the Security Council’s 1737 Sanctions Committee and its supporting Panel of Experts (PoE) have been restored. They further contend that other provisions of resolution 2231 and the related presidential note remain in effect, including those mandating the Secretary-General’s reporting and establishing the position of 2231 facilitator. (For more information on the snapback mechanism and the Council dynamics surrounding it, see our What’s in Blue stories of 28 August, 18 September and 25 September.)

Due to members’ diverging positions, Slovenia, the Council’s president in December, did not include the regular biannual briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231 on the Council’s provisional programme of work for December, which members adopted at the beginning of the month. Instead, the Council members who requested tomorrow’s meeting apparently called for it after the advance copy of the Secretary-General’s report was circulated to members on 12 December.

In their request, it seems that these members referred to the “continued operation” of resolution 2231 and the corresponding presidential note and called for the convening of the “regular biannual Council briefing” under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item, which they argued is in accordance with established practice. In response, China and Russia apparently urged the presidency not to accommodate the request, reiterating their argument that all provisions of resolution 2231 had expired in October, that the Council has ended its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file, and that there was no basis for the Secretary-General to report on the resolution or for the Council to hold regular discussions on the matter. On 17 December, the E3 convened an expert-level briefing for the Council’s ten elected members (E10), during which they apparently rejected those claims and stressed the need for the Council to remain seized of the issue and continue its customary practice of biannual Council meetings.

Tomorrow’s Meeting

At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo is expected to brief Council members on the Secretary-General’s report, which notes that diplomatic efforts by JCPOA members and the US to achieve a negotiated solution to Iran’s nuclear programme were suspended following the military escalation between Israel and Iran from 13 to 24 June and the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities by the US on 21 June. Diplomatic activity resumed in August and September, but these engagements “did not succeed in identifying a way forward satisfactory to all parties involved”. The report subsequently describes letters that the parties have sent to the Secretary-General to convey their respective positions on later developments during the reporting period.

The report also refers to the latest quarterly report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This report, dated 12 November, describes serious and ongoing challenges to the Agency’s ability to implement safeguards in Iran following the June hostilities involving Iran, Israel, and the US. The report notes that the IAEA temporarily halted verification activities and withdrew inspectors for safety reasons. It adds that, although the “Cairo agreement” announced by Iran and the IAEA in September established procedures for resuming inspections consistent with the Safeguards Agreement, Iran did not provide a required special report on the status of nuclear material and facilities affected by the attacks. As a result, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge over Iran’s previously declared inventories, including significant quantities of highly enriched uranium, which it has been unable to verify for several months—a situation that the report describes as “a matter of serious concern”.

On 20 November, the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) adopted a resolution calling on Iran to provide the Agency “without delay” with information on the status of its uranium stockpile and nuclear facilities and to grant it all access required to verify this information. It also adjusted the IAEA’s reporting mandate, requesting it to report on the provisions of “all relevant” Security Council resolutions, including the previous resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran. In response, Iran formally withdrew from the Cairo agreement on the same day.

Tomorrow, Council members such as France, the UK, the US, and others who requested the meeting may express concern about the IAEA report’s findings. They may echo the BoG resolution’s call on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency in accordance with the country’s safeguards obligations and to account for the status of its nuclear facilities and stockpile of highly enriched uranium. These members are also likely to reiterate their position that the snapback mechanism was properly invoked, giving legally binding effect to all previous UN sanctions; restoring the 1737 Sanctions Committee and its PoE; and maintaining the Council’s 2231 architecture. In this context, they may urge the swift operationalisation of relevant institutional bodies through the appointment of a Committee chair as well as a new 2231 facilitator—a position that has been vacant since the end of Slovenia’s term in this role in October. Additionally, while emphasising their longstanding position that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon, these members may stress their continued preference for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and call on the country to resume bilateral negotiations with the US on a new agreement to succeed the JCPOA.

By contrast, China and Russia are likely to repeat their argument that the E3 did not have legal standing to invoke the snapback mechanism and therefore that any measures based on it are null and void, including the reimposition of sanctions and the restoration of the UN’s sanctions regime. In this context, they may criticise the UN Secretariat for actions that it has taken in accordance with obligations stemming from the snapback, such as circulating a note to correspondents on the reapplication of sanctions and drafting the Secretary-General’s most recent report on resolution 2231. Reiterating their claim that the Council has ended its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file, these members may also object to the holding of the meeting under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item and could call for a procedural vote or raise a point of order in that regard. Additionally, while also reaffirming support for a diplomatic solution to the issue, they may contend that the US is responsible for the current impasse due to its withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and subsequent military action against Iran.

Tags: Insights on non-proliferation, Insights on the Middle East, Iran

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