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Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s first year in office has been marked by an unusually intense amount of diplomatic activity, including 32 foreign visits to 22 countries. With presidential activism dominating the diplomatic stage, there is greater need to align Prabowo’s personal initiatives with Indonesia’s foreign policy machinery.

Prabowo has strengthened Indonesia’s economic and defence partnerships and taken clearer positions on humanitarian issues, including supporting a two-state solution for Palestine. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains the institutional centre of foreign policy, Prabowo’s visibility has overshadowed bureaucratic processes and become the main reference point for interpreting Indonesia’s diplomacy.

Several early episodes show how presidential diplomacy has outpaced institutional coordination. During Prabowo’s first official visit to China in November 2024, he proposed setting aside overlapping claims in the Natuna Sea in favour of ‘joint development’. While he intended to promote economic cooperation and satisfy domestic interests, Indonesian analysts argued the resulting bilateral agreement implicitly recognised China’s claims and departed from Indonesia’s long-standing legal position.

The foreign ministry later clarified that Indonesia does not recognise China’s nine-dash line in the South China Sea, but the confusion revealed the absence of a vetting mechanism to ensure new diplomatic proposals cohere with established positions before being announced.

A similar incident occurred in April 2025, when Prabowo proposed evacuating thousands of Gazan civilians to Indonesia for medical treatment, directing Foreign Affairs Minister Sugiono to open talks with the Palestinian government. Domestic agencies scrambled to assess the move’s logistical, social and health implications. After facing public opposition and concerns over operational difficulties, the plan appears to have been quietly shelved.

Another incident created controversy in October 2025 when Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin stated that Chinese-made J-10 jets would soon ‘fly over Jakarta’. The ministry spokesperson later clarified that the Indonesian Air Force was still considering the plan and Sjafrie confirmed that no decision had been made. The confusion surrounding the announcement underscored weaknesses in coordination prior to the completion of technical, fiscal and diplomatic assessments.

Such coordination challenges are not new and previous presidents have experimented with different institutional models for managing foreign policy. Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took a hands-on approach, with career diplomat Dino Patti Djalal accompanying him on overseas trips, preparing speeches and handling media queries. Major presidential initiatives like the Aceh peace process were developed from within the president’s foreign policy office.

By contrast, former president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) eschewed the use of a foreign policy office in the presidential palace. Former foreign affairs minister Retno Marsudi handled formal diplomacy, while trusted individuals such as former coordinating minister Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan managed other more specific policy domains. Other advisers, including Andi Widjajanto and Rizal Sukma, contributed to foreign policy speeches. Jokowi’s more detached approach favoured professional management and ad hoc assignments.

Prabowo has so far adopted an arrangement closer to Jokowi’s. He appointed his protege and former aide Sugiono as foreign minister and issued a presidential regulation in 2024, granting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs broad authority to ‘coordinate, synchronise, control and organise foreign policy’ across government. Sugiono has taken steps to centralise institutional mechanisms. In April 2025, he signed a Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue with China, replacing a Jokowi-era structure previously led by Luhut’s coordinating ministry and bringing China-related strategic coordination under his own authority.

Yet a formal coordinating mandate cannot compensate for the absence of a system through which presidential initiatives are reviewed by line ministries before being made public. The pattern of misalignment points to structural gaps within the policy machinery rather than isolated missteps.

Sugiono is best placed to advise Prabowo, but his dual role as the Gerindra Party’s Secretary–General and his ministerial workload constrain his ability to shape day-to-day foreign policy speeches and initiatives. Key loyalists working from the presidential palace also lack significant foreign policy experience.

The administration would benefit from institutionalising foreign policy coordination within the palace in a manner aligned with Prabowo’s activist style and preference for loyalists. Following Yudhuyono’s approach, Prabowo could establish a Special Assistant for Foreign Policy who would focus exclusively on staffing Prabowo’s foreign policy needs and serve as a coordination node between the palace and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The role should combine strong personal rapport with Prabowo and support from professional diplomats seconded from the foreign ministry. A small well-resourced unit could support Prabowo’s international engagements, gather input from relevant agencies, track follow-up actions and translate presidential priorities into actionable proposals.

The administration also needs a clearer process for synthesising analysis from Indonesia’s broader ecosystem of bureaucratic and advisory bodies. The Cabinet Secretariat and Executive Office of the President both monitor geopolitical developments, while new advisory bodies such as the National Economic Council and National Defence Council provide additional insights. The Special Assistant could integrate these varied information streams into a coherent decision-making framework.

Prabowo’s energetic diplomacy has given Indonesia renewed visibility on the world stage. Yet an effective foreign policy requires Prabowo to be not only the chief diplomat, but also the chief manager. Establishing a Special Assistant for Foreign Policy would be a practical step towards institutionalising coordination within the Istana. It would help translate presidential instincts into workable policy options, reduce the risk of backpedalling and ensure that Indonesia’s diplomacy remains both active and institutionally anchored.

Jefferson Ng is a PhD Student at The Australian National University.

EAF | Indonesia | Prabowo’s active diplomacy requires stronger institutional alignment