Before coming here, I looked over your (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s – ed.) previous yearbook. It was finalized on December 20, 2024. Will this year’s edition be wrapped up before Christmas as well? Is it ready?
The texts are basically compiled; we’ll give them a final polish right before it goes to print. The plan is to release it to the public in February.
When we talk about the threat assessment, how has it changed from Estonia’s perspective from the beginning of the year to the end?
What we’re still seeing today is that Russia currently has no intention of attacking any of the Baltic states or NATO more broadly.
We’ve seen that, as a result of our responses, Russia has altered its behavior following various incidents that have occurred more broadly in the region. So far, it’s still clear that Russia respects NATO and is currently trying to avoid any open conflict.
What do you mean when you say that Russia has changed its behavior in response to our actions?
Following various incidents — starting with the undersea cables some time ago or the different drone incursions into NATO airspace or aircraft violations — what we’ve seen is that, in response to reactions from the West or NATO, Russia has taken various measures to prevent such incidents from happening again in the future.
If we look at the current situation, including what’s visible to the public, the drone flight paths over Ukrainian territory or airspace have been adjusted to minimize risk. We’re also seeing that Russian aircraft are now very carefully monitoring their flight paths over the Baltic Sea, strictly adhering to their trajectories to avoid triggering incidents.
There have also been no cable-related incidents since the NATO mission [Baltic Sentry] was launched here. That’s the current situation. Of course, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of future incidents because military activity remains high and the war in Ukraine is ongoing. In theory, such events are still possible, but at the moment we don’t see any indication that Russia is deliberately trying to escalate.
When you mentioned the cable sabotage incidents in the Baltic Sea, the most well-known case ended up in court, but there was no conviction — Finland’s court said it had no jurisdiction to act. How might that affect the likelihood of such incidents happening again? After all, if there’s no punishment, why not do it again?
Let’s put it this way: when it comes to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, their main interest is maintaining freedom of movement in the Baltic Sea to secure revenue, as a large portion of their oil shipments pass through the area. That’s the priority and I’d say most other interests are subordinated to that.
But other Western allies have also taken action, for example, the French operation in which one of the shadow fleet’s tankers was boarded. So the shadow fleet isn’t entirely untouchable and every such operation gives pause to the flag states and insurance providers involved. That kind of pressure is definitely worth maintaining.
Since we’re on the topic of sabotage or hybrid attacks, Estonia was perhaps most affected by two incidents this year. One of them was the aircraft that remained in our airspace for 12 minutes. In your view, was the response to that incident appropriate?
I would say Estonia responded appropriately. Our Western allies also took the issue seriously. And it definitely registered with Russia as well. As a result, they have already made adjustments to their behavior.
The other incident everyone remembers is the Saatse Boot where with very minimal means — about seven men — a sense of alarm was created, which led to a new road quickly being built in Estonia. How do you assess that response?
The situation in the Saatse Boot was indeed quite interesting. In the fourth year of the war, Estonian citizens were still traveling through Russian territory. That alone is something very difficult to explain to our Western partners — how that was even possible.
What happened across the border in September was, in the broader picture, a large-scale internal security exercise. Activity levels were actually high all along our borders. The Russians have their own concerns they’re trying to manage — Ukrainian forces are still operating on Russian territory, there are drone strikes and various other operations. All of these are causing real anxiety for Russia and they’re trying to mitigate those risks using their own methods, which include exercises and maneuvers near the border.
And that activity wasn’t limited to the Estonian border; it also took place along the Latvian and Finnish borders. It was part of a broader operation.
This year also saw several cases involving individuals recruited by Russia. One court case revealed a scheme involving postal packages that originated in the Narva area and there was a member of the Defense League who had been recruited while crossing the border. How active is Russia currently with this kind of activity on our territory?
It’s definitely worth asking the Internal Security Service for their assessment on these matters, but there are a few different aspects here.
Intelligence gathering and information collection are ongoing and active all the time and I think that’s true for everyone — the Russian side, our side — that’s just the nature of this world. When it comes to sabotage, physical sabotage, that’s a different matter. That kind of activity is likely carried out with the knowledge and approval of Russia’s leadership. It’s primarily aimed at undermining support for Ukraine, destabilizing Ukraine itself and disrupting supply routes. This is something that is really happening.
But for Russia, this falls into a different domain, the covert domain, where they try to conceal their tracks as best they can. And as we’ve seen from various operations on Polish and Romanian territory, they’re not always successful at covering their tracks completely.
Right now we’re seeing a situation in Lithuania where planes can sometimes land and sometimes not. This seems like another one of those activities.
It’s worth asking our Lithuanian colleagues for their take on this — how much of it really is “hybrid” activity, which is an odd term in itself, and how much of it might actually involve other factors, like smuggling operations or criminal activity, and how much is just coincidence and so on.
Why did the term “hybrid attack” give you pause?
“Hybrid” is a nice-sounding word. It gives a sort of soft and fuzzy impression of the activities involved.
But in reality, we should call things by their proper names. If it’s sabotage, then it’s sabotage. If it’s a cyberattack, then it’s a cyberattack. The real question is how do we classify it? Do we, for example, define sabotage as state-sponsored terrorism?
The term “hybrid” tends to soften the reality and gives an overly innocent impression of what’s actually happening.
Looking ahead to the new year, how do you predict the direction these kinds of influence operations in Europe and Estonia might take? Will they intensify or are they likely to remain at the same level?
What we’re seeing is that Russia’s interest lies in slowing down Europe’s momentum toward rearmament. There are various ways to achieve that and the toolbox is likely quite broad.
On one hand, we’re already seeing efforts to send a calming, peace-focused message to Europe. For example, Putin has publicly stated that Russia might even write into its legislation that it has no intention of attacking Europe. That’s part of this “soothing” narrative, meant to give the impression that everything is fine, that Russia poses no threat and there’s no need to rush into rearmament.
On the other hand, Russia clearly sees value in engaging with certain political parties or population groups to promote the idea that an arms race is pointless — that it diverts money away from other areas like social welfare and that, ultimately, it’s harmful to Europe itself. The goal is to create societal divisions and put political pressure on decision-makers. It’s a multi-layered approach and we can already clearly see it in action.
But ultimately, Russia is concerned about Europe’s rearmament. If Europe stays on this course, it’s entirely possible that in the coming years, we could actually win this arms race, if we choose to call it that, against Russia.
Let’s return briefly to the war situation. In the [EFIS] yearbook that was released at the beginning of the year, you stated that it is in Estonia’s interest for Russia to be clearly defeated in this war and for that to be understood as such. Right now, however, it seems we’re drifting away from that goal: Russia has gone from being a pariah to walking on red carpets and is increasingly re-engaged in international relations. What are your thoughts on the course of these peace talks and where they might lead?
That really falls into the realm of policymaking, which isn’t exactly my area.
Let me ask it another way: How does it affect our security if peace in Ukraine doesn’t come on terms that clearly amount to a Russian defeat, which now seems increasingly unlikely?
It likely increases the risks for us, especially if Russia grows more confident and emboldened. That’s certainly a point of concern. Even if some kind of truce, peace deal or frozen conflict emerges — if it gets that far — Russia would still need to maintain a significant military presence against Ukraine, which would continue to tie up its resources.
We also know that Russia has planned a military reform that includes our region, along the Finnish border, the Norwegian border and in Kaliningrad. We’ll have to see how their resources are allocated, how much gets freed up from the Ukrainian front and whether that enables them to move forward with their military restructuring in our area.
How much stamina does Russian society have left? In the previous yearbook, you spoke about the impact of sanctions, how they were slowly eating away at Russian society. Is there evidence that things have gotten harder for them or have they actually adapted better?
I think the issue isn’t really about society per se. Sanctions aren’t aimed at ordinary people, they’re targeted at Russia’s war industry and state apparatus. And in that regard, we do see that all sanctions restricting Russia’s access to resources are effective and their impact is deepening.
Resource-restricting sanctions include, for example, access to Western financial markets, which Russians currently don’t have. That severely limits their ability to borrow and so on. On the other hand, sanctions targeting the energy sector — oil and gas — aim to reduce Russia’s revenue.
To give a sense of scale: every $1 change in the price of a barrel of oil equals about $120–140 million a month in gains or losses for Russia. So, when sanctions lower prices, because buyers perceive more risk and Russia is forced to sell at a discount, that directly reduces their income. As a result, the economic impact of the overall sanctions package is steadily increasing.
Russia is facing more and more problems. It’s not going to collapse in the next few months or even within six months to a year, but the pressure is beginning to take a toll. That impact might not reach the front lines within the next six months, but after that, we’ll have to see how things develop.
At the moment, things are moving in the right direction for us. The key is that the sanctions must hold. We also see that in negotiations, sanctions are one of Russia’s top priorities — they want them lifted because that would immediately give them breathing room.
Hasn’t Russian society already become a war society — one that needs war? If the war in Ukraine ends, wouldn’t all forces quickly be rebuilt and a new external enemy sought?
The way I see it, this is something that’s necessary for Putin and his regime…
That’s exactly what I mean, that this kind of societal structure needs to be sustained.
Yes, but from the perspective of ordinary people, some interesting dynamics have emerged. For example, veterans returning from the front are already having an impact at the local level — through their behavior, rising crime and so on. And the severely wounded, who are increasingly visible in city streets across various regions, also have a certain psychological effect on the average citizen.
How well do we actually know what’s going on there?
Well, we do know, broadly speaking.
At times it feels like Russia is becoming our version of North Korea — distant and walled off.
It’s true that the number of people in our society with personal experience of Russia is steadily declining. But our task remains to understand what’s happening there, what the key processes are and what’s going on within the state apparatus. That’s exactly why we have intelligence and security agencies in place.
Looking in the other direction, not toward Russia, how much have our alliances changed over the past year from a security standpoint? In today’s international climate, how confident can we be in all of our allies?
Again, that’s more a question for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as they’re responsible for managing alliance relationships.
From our side, in terms of partnerships, things are continuing as before — I don’t see anyone losing momentum or pulling back.
And in closing, coming back to the current situation: Russia does still respect NATO. Our task is to keep it that way, so that if they respect it today, they will also respect it a year from now and three, five or 10 years into the future. To achieve that, we have to invest in our defense — we meaning Estonia, meaning the European Union and NATO. Keeping the situation as it is today requires significant effort.
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