Before the turn of 2026, the former chief of the defence staff, Sir Tony Radakin, argued publicly that there may not be enough money to protect budgets from cuts. The defence secretary told us that was wrong. But the following week, the new chief of the defence staff told us yes, there had already been some cuts to some capabilities. Awkward!
And that spat, and the government’s big defence review, was before the United States’ new security strategy, which, in dramatic language, laid bare the approach of the Trump White House. It was before the American strikes on Venezuela, which showed he would act, not just threaten. And it preceded the White House’s re-stated ambition this week to possess Greenland, even using military force – yes, it may go after a member of the defence alliance the US itself is signed up to defend.
After Trump’s recent actions, the question of how much the UK is really willing to pay for its own protection, and what politicians are willing to sacrifice to make that happen, becomes more urgent by the day.
Many argue, including some opposition parties, that ministers have already vowed to spend more on defence. But have ministers really accepted how big that shift needs to be, or levelled with the public about it? That’s a different question.
A rule of British politics has long been that voters do not switch on foreign policy: what happens at home is more important. As one government source said: “People want to see us handle the foreign stuff competently but it’s not really what people care about – they only vote on foreign affairs grounds in genuinely exceptional circumstances.”
But the opposition parties are eager to open up a new front to attack the prime minister. There is a genuine and profound question over the government’s priorities in a dangerous world.
All politics is local, so the saying goes. But after the last seven days, could 2026 be the exception that proves the rule?