Toplines
The Russian people are increasingly feeling the effects of the Kremlin’s continued prioritization of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). In a January 12 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov highlighted Russia’s industrial development growth in 2025, primarily within the Russian DIB.[1] Manturov claimed that investment in the manufacturing sector grew 23 percent or roughly five trillion rubles (roughly $64 billion) in the first nine months of 2025 and that manufacturing industries were growing at the rate of about three percent at the end of 2025 despite recent cooling of the Russian economy. Manturov said that the Russian government’s Industrial Development Fund, which provides low-interest loans to Russian manufacturers, was the main driver of growth in the manufacturing sector. Manturov stated that the Russian DIB employs 3.8 million people, having added an additional 800,000 workers over the last three years. The Russian government has struggled to find financing for its DIB amidst heavy Western sanctions and restrictions and has introduced a series of measures to increase the capital available to the Russian DIB, including through the Industrial Development Fund, off-budget subsidies, and policies strongarming banks into providing preferential lending to defense industrial enterprises.[2] The Russian Central Bank also lowered its key interest rate four times in 2025, likely as part of the Russian government’s efforts to make more capital available for the Russian DIB and to lower the price of borrowing money for DIB producers.[3]
Putin’s prioritization of the Russian DIB is costing the Russian people as Russian banks pass lending pressures from the Russian DIB onto consumers. Russian labor shortages and competition between Russia’s defense and civilian sectors have raised average wages across Russian industries, fueling inflation and causing price spikes.[4] Several major Russian civilian manufacturers have introduced a four-day work week and announced layoffs in the second half of 2025 due to falling demand.[5] Russian civilians are struggling to afford homes, with most Russian commercial housing rates estimated at 20 percent or higher in January 2026.[6] Putin also signed a law in November 2025 increasing the Value-Added Tax (VAT), a federal tax imposed on most Russian goods and services domestically, from 20 to 22 percent — placing more of the burden of Russia’s costly war in Ukraine on the Russian people.[7] ISW continues to assess that increased Western economic pressure on Russia, along with helping Ukraine maintain and even increase pressure on the battlefield, remains critical to changing Putin’s calculus and forcing Putin to face more serious tradeoffs between continuing to pursue his maximalist war aims and sacrificing the quality of life of the Russian people.[8]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launched on the night of January 8 to 9 struck a Ukrainian defense industrial enterprise in Lviv City, which is consistent with the available visual evidence.[9] The Russian MoD claimed on January 12 that the Oreshnik IRBM strike against the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant in Lviv City halted operations at the plant.[10] The Russian MoD further claimed that the strike damaged production workshops, drone warehouses, and infrastructure at the plant’s airfield. ISW has not observed confirmation or Ukrainian official reporting about the Russian MoD’s claims of the damage. Geolocated footage published on January 9 of the Oreshnik attack indicated that Russian forces struck in the vicinity of southwestern Lviv City, and OSINT analysts on X (formerly Twitter) and Russian milbloggers assessed that the geolocated footage indicated that Russian forces were targeting the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant.[11]
Dozens of shadow fleet tankers off the coast of Venezuela have reportedly switched to using Russian flags in recent months. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on January 11 that Lloyd’s List Intelligence identified more than 15 tankers involved in shipping sanctioned oil that re-registered as Russian-flagged in the past two weeks (since roughly December 29), and Lloyd’s List editor-in-chief Richard Meade noted that changing flags is likely an attempt to gain protection against raids.[12] The WSJ reported that most of the shadow fleet had sailed until recently under “obscure,” “convenient,” or “bogus” flags from countries like Gabon, Liberia, East Timor, and Malawi. The WSJ noted that S&P Global Market Intelligence reported that 25 tankers switched to the Russian flag from October to December 2025, with 18 switching in December 2025 alone. Sixteen of the tankers are under US or UK sanctions. The BBC reported on January 11 that the UK has identified legal mechanisms to enable the UK military to board and detain vessels transporting sanctioned oil in the shadow fleet that are not legitimately flagged.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky applauded the approach that governments are taking against elements of the shadow fleet.[14]
Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide weapons and military equipment to Ukraine. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall reported on January 12 that Ukraine will receive its first five Lynx KF41 infantry fighting vehicles from a December 2025 contract as early as the beginning of 2026.[15] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 11 that the UK is developing the Nightfall short-range ballistic missile, with a likely range of more than 500 kilometers, a 200-kilogram warhead, and the ability to operate in areas with heavy electromagnetic interference.[16] The UK MoD reported that Ukrainian forces will be able to launch the missile from a range of vehicles, fire multiple missiles in quick succession, and withdraw quickly. The UK MoD noted that the UK will produce 10 missile systems per month at a maximum price of £800,000 (roughly $1 million) per missile. The UK will award contracts to three enterprises in March 2026 to design, develop, and deliver their first missiles within a year for Ukrainian forces to then test.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 11 that he met with Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi to discuss air defense supplies from Ukraine’s partners.[17] Zelensky noted that Ukraine’s first priority is procuring more missiles for air defense, including through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russia’s long-range drone strikes seek to exploit Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent need for point-defense air defense systems to defend frontline areas and critical infrastructure in the rear in the face of such a geographically pervasive threat.[18]
Key Takeaways
The Russian people are increasingly feeling the effects of the Kremlin’s continued prioritization of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launched on the night of January 8 to 9 struck a Ukrainian defense industrial enterprise in Lviv City, which is consistent with the available visual evidence.
Dozens of shadow fleet tankers off the coast of Venezuela have reportedly switched to using Russian flags in recent months.
Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide weapons and military equipment to Ukraine.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on January 12.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of January 11 and 12. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novocherkassk State District Power Plant in Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast, causing a fire.[19] Geolocated footage published on January 12 shows a likely Ukrainian drone strike against the Oryol Thermal Power Plant (TPP), Oryol City.[20]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Andriivka and toward Nova Sich and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske on January 11 and 12.[21]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 12 that Ukrainian forces recently intensified artillery and drone strikes against elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[22] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade suffered casualties from their own mines near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City) and that servicemembers are unable to retrieve drone-delivered medical supplies due to heavy Ukrainian fire. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command refuses to allow servicemembers to withdraw from untenable positions.
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Lyman, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsia and toward Ternova, Hrafske, and Kruhle on January 11 and 12.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[24]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces are attempting to exploit poor weather while using small group infiltration tactics to attack in the Vovchansk direction.[25] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are exploiting snowy conditions to advance but have conducted significantly fewer assaults in 2026 as cold weather also degrades Russian soldiers’ effectiveness. The spokesperson reported that a Russian prisoner of war (POW) stated that the Russian military command sends Russian servicemembers to attack in Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City) without informing them of Ukrainian forces’ presence in the settlement.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Chuhunivka and Dovhenke, east of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on January 11 and 12.[26]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[27]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka on January 11 and 12.[28]
A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that the Russian military command continues to exaggerate Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction and described Petropavlivka and Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk) as contested “gray zones” despite claimed seizures of these settlements.[29] The milblogger criticized the Russian military command’s recent employment of a small infantry group to raise a flag on the outskirts of Podoly as a risky mission designed purely to resolve the dispute between the Russian military command and Russian milbloggers over the status of Kupyansk.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of mobilized personnel, reportedly of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Kupyansk.[30] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[31]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Ridkodub (southeast of Borova) and advanced northwest of the settlement and south of Vovchyi Yar (south of Borova).[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Ridkodub on July 1, 2025, indicating that Russian forces have likely lost positions in the area since July 1.[33]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and toward Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Shandryholove, Hrekivka, Karpivka, and Novoyehorivka on January 11 and 12.[34]
Order of Battle: KVN fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Oleksandrivka (south of Borova).[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced marginally northeast of Sosnove (northwest of Lyman).[36]
Russian forces attacked near and toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova, Novoselivka, Sosnove, Svyatohirsk, Tetyanivka, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman toward Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk toward Zakitne and Platonivka; and east of Slovyansk near Svyato-Pokrovske on January 11 and 12.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pryshyb (northwest of Lyman) and toward southern Dibrova.[38]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 11 that Russian forces have increased the intensity of assaults in this direction but that Ukrainian drone operators continue to repel Russian forces.[39] The Ukrainian spokesperson reported that Russian forces often send lone servicemembers to attack. The spokesperson stated that the Russian infantry in the Lyman direction are generally poorly trained but that relatively well-trained Russian drone operators are targeting Ukrainian logistics.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Novoselivka and Yarova.[40] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Siversk (east of Slovyansk) and Zakitne.[41] Artillery elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction and assault elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on January 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kostyantynivka, southwest of Berestok, and marginally north of Oleksandro-Kalynove (both south of Kostyantynivka).[43]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske, Markove, and Vyrolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on January 11 and 12.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Vyrolyubivka, Popasne, and Klynove (both north of Kostyantynivka) and the western outskirts of Pleshchiivka and Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) are contested ”gray zones.”[45]
Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating west of Stepanivka.[46] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[47] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Ivanivka, and Toretske; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on January 11 and 12 but did not advance.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne on January 11 and 12.[50]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue infiltration missions in fireteams of up to five personnel using anti-thermal imaging cloaks.[51] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are trying to offset their equipment losses by increasing their use of strike drones to complicate Ukrainian logistics. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces stated that Russian forces have intensified their infiltration missions into Pokrovsk north of the Donetska railway.[52] The corps reported that Russian attacks near the industrial zone on Pokrovsk’s northwestern suburbs aim to accumulate forces to attack toward Hryshyne.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Rodynske.[53] Elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 11 and 12 but did not advance.[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast and east of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[56]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka toward Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka, Vyshneve, Verbove, Oleksiivka, and Sichneve on January 11 and 12.[57]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka and Pryluky and toward Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Varvarivka, Nove Zaporizhzhia, Yehorivka, and Dobropillya; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne and Zlahoda on January 11 and 12.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole.[59]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 12 that Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction are adapting their offensive tactics based on the weather, increasing the number of infantry assaults when poor weather conditions hinder drone use.[60] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attempting to reinforce positions in Hulyaipole and are striking settlements near the frontline with KAB guided glide bombs. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on January 12 that Russian forces are deploying reserves to the Hulyaipole direction.[61] The commander stated that Russian forces continue costly attacks and that Russian forces are using both infiltration tactics and mechanized assaults in the Hulyaipole direction. A drone operator of a Ukrainian reconnaissance battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on January 10 that the frontline near Hulyaipole is porous and that the contested ”gray zone” extends between 10 and 15 kilometers deep.[62] The drone operator stated that Russian infantry and Ukrainian drone operators and infantry are interspersed within this contested ”gray zone” and that Russian forces are suffering heavy casualties.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating on the eastern outskirts of Hulyaipole.[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 12 that Russian forces seized Novoboikivske (northwest of Orikhiv).[64] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), north of Stepove, and north of Stepnohirsk (both west of Orikhiv).[65]
Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Stepnohirsk and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivske on January 11 and 12.[66]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Prymorske.[67] Engineer elements of the 7th VDV Division reportedly continue to demine Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[68]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on January 12.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[69]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 156 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 110 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 135 drones as of 0800 local time, that 16 drones struck 11 locations, and that drone debris fell at two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, residential, and non-residential infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, and Chernihiv oblasts.[71] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on January 12 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Odesa, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Chernihiv oblasts.[72] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that 33,500 families in Odesa Oblast are without power due to significant damage from Russian strikes.[73] Chernihiv Oblast authorities reported that Russian drones struck an ambulance returning from a call and injured two medical workers in Semenivka, Chernihiv Oblast on January 11.[74] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Energy Committee Member Serhiy Nahornyak stated on January 12 that two combined heat and power plants (CHPPs) in Kyiv City, CHPP-5 and CHPP-6, are still in need of repairs after Russian strikes on the night of January 8 to 9.[75]Russian forces continue to adapt their long-range drones to counter Ukrainian aircraft and helicopters and to cause harm to Ukrainian civilians. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that Russian forces have equipped Geran-2 drones with Verba man-portable air defense system (MANPADS).[76] The GUR noted that the drones with MANPADS have a main warhead on the drone itself, such as a thermobaric warhead — unlike the modified Geran drones with R-60 air-to-air missiles. The GUR noted that the drones with MANPADS can continue their main strike mission after firing an air defense missile as the operator performs target guidance. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported that Ukrainian authorities have observed Russian Shahed-type drones dropping PTM-3 anti-tank mines with magnetic detonators near the target site, expecting Ukrainian emergency responders to approach the area.[77] Beskrestnov noted that this is not a new Russian adaptation but that deep snow is concealing the mines on the ground.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
Endnotes
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79001
[2] https://legalacts dot ru/doc/FZ-o-gosudarstvennom-oboronnom-zakaze/glava-3.1/statja-8.2/; https://rg dot ru/documents/2022/03/01/oborona-dok.html
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2025/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/ ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/08/21/poka-rossiyskie-vlasti-zatyagivayut-peregovory-o-mire-v-ekonomike-kopyatsya-problemy-iz-za-voyny-eto-uzhe-krizis-ili-kak-uveryayut-chinovniki-vsego-lish-myagkaya-posadka ; https://istories dot media/opinions/2025/08/13/pochemu-rossiiskie-kompanii-perekhodyat-na-chetirekhdnevnuyu-rabochuyu-nedelyu/
[6] https://ludiipoteki dot ru/news/index/section/mortgage/entry/izmenenie-stavok-po-ipoteke-na-9-yanvarya-2026-goda
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2025/
[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/60253 https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/
[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/60253
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/
[12] https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/russian-flags-proliferate-over-shadow-fleet-of-oil-tankers-41b0bed4
[13] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8pn7jgy3no
[14] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17619
[15] https://www.rheinmetall dot com/de/media/news-watch/news/2026/01/2026-01-12-rheinmetall-liefert-lynx-an-die-ukraine
[16] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-develop-new-deep-strike-ballistic-missile-for-ukraine
[17] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/pershij-prioritet-raketi-dlya-ppo-zavtra-odna-iz-zustrichej-102369
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2025/
[19] https://t.me/astrapress/101834; https://t.me/supernova_plus/47303
[20] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2010772590906707983?s=20
[21] https://t.me/severnnyi/6322; https://t.me/wargonzo/31654; https://t.me/uvkkursk/180
[22] https://t.me/severnnyi/6325
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19896; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679
[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/86491; https://t.me/severnnyi/6322
[25] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1211640-rosiani-sturmuut-vovcanskij-napramok-za-bud-akoi-pogodi-ale-ne-jdut-v-lob/
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19896; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679
[27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/194089
[28]https://t.me/epoddubny/26024; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19896; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679
[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/86491
[30] https://t.me/ornitologi_team/58; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2010506419687010565?s=20; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2010593755095818478?s=20
[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/86495
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38399; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47403
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2025/
[34] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70012; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19896; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38399
[35] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/12459; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2010524229914255631?s=20
[36] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70012
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19896; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70012; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38399
[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38399; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70012
[39] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1210998-na-limanskomu-napramku-zrostae-intensivnist-boezitknen-63-brigada/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM
[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70012
[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47404; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47415
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/60240; https://t.me/dva_majors/86488
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47422; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/194137
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/dva_majors/86491; https://t.me/wargonzo/31654; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38429; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38429
[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/86491; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38429; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38408
[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38408
[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14887
[48] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14889
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/dva_majors/86491; https://t.me/wargonzo/31654
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/tass_agency/356391; https://t.me/wargonzo/31654
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/12/ruhayutsya-po-odnomu-maskuyutsya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-okupanty-ne-zupynyayut-ataky/
[52]https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1UKrfeENcW/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/12/za-zaliznyczyu-ne-projshly-u-pokrovsku-drony-j-artyleriya-zupynyayut-sproby-voroga-nakopychytysya/
[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47404; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47415; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47426
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/107359
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47430
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47430
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47430
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33714; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/107362; https://t.me/wargonzo/31654
[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/86491; https://t.me/voin_dv/18332; https://t.me/voin_dv/18339; https://t.me/tass_agency/356350
[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/12/cherez-pogodu-menshe-droniv-i-bilshe-pihotnyh-shturmiv-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku-vazhki-boyi/
[61] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/12/vorog-perekydaye-rezervy-i-zdijsnyuye-shhodenni-shturmy-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-ne-zvazhayut-na-vtraty/
[62] https://t.me/romedronen/503
[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/18333
[64] https://t.me/mod_russia/60249; https://t.me/mod_russia/60251
[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/194089; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/107376
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33681; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13532; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33679; https://t.me/dva_majors/86491; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47425; https://t.me/wargonzo/31654
[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38424; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38422; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38398
[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38393
[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38393
[70] https://t.me/kpszsu/52214
[71] https://t.me/energyofukraine/5823; https://www.facebook.com/chernihiv.oblenergo.1998/posts/pfbid02chSvqcVbnAk4V2TnDHh2Vmtrwz8ahDN796WeihStpyPDkNMXTk4LxtPaDiodcFbAl; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/5991; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/12/udarni-drony-vnochi-atakuvaly-kyyiv-vynykly-pozhezhi/ ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/5991 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/12/udarni-drony-vnochi-atakuvaly-kyyiv-vynykly-pozhezhi/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/13506; https://t.me/odesaMVA/892; https://t.me/odesaMVA/892; https://t.me/odesaMVA/892; https://t.me/odeskaODA/13509; https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy.bunechko/posts/pfbid02eACFttAiCBTGLF8UCsXWTr8FWgkU1iWG3GWpyeqLj2nx2qb7j55NzQFa1XhhqeAZl
[72] https://t.me/energyofukraine/5823
[73] https://t.me/dtek_ua/3720
[74] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122145230300971242&id=61579137283645&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=e9B67lZuWUVzOBCb; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122145230300971242&id=61579137283645&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=e9B67lZuWUVzOBCb
[75] https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/teploelektrostanciji-kiyeva-nemozhlivo-povnistyu-zahistiti-vid-balistichnih-raket-zayaviv-nagornyak-50574938.html#goog_rewarded
[76] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/warsanctions-nova-modyfikatsiia-yerani-odnochasno-nese-na-bortu-pzrk-ta-boiovu-chastynu.html; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/
[77] https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02fuyifmafS4f5Babk6mXKC4WYptQhs72QueCxedmcnq9MV8DWHH54ZeG3tPCUSLkyl