Summary and Key Points: Amid rising tensions in January 2026, Iran has renewed threats to “close” the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime chokepoint for global energy.
-While Tehran lacks the conventional naval strength to enforce a sustained lockdown against U.S. and allied forces, it possesses significant asymmetric capabilities—including naval mines, fast attack craft, and anti-ship missiles—to harass shipping and spike global oil prices.
-A closure attempt would likely be a last-resort response to existential threats, triggering a massive U.S. Fifth Fleet surge and international coalition response.
-Ultimately, while Iran cannot physically seal the Strait indefinitely, it retains the power to make passage dangerously expensive and politically volatile.
The Strait of Hormuz Nightmare: What Happens If Iran Attacks?
Iran has periodically threatened to “close” or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz.
This rhetoric surged as recently as January 2026 amid growing tensions with the United States.
The Strait is a global economic pressure point, a narrow maritime chokepoint linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman/Arabian Sea. Closing the Strait would have significant ramifications.
And the question here isn’t whether Iran can declare the Strait closed, but whether Iran can physically deny passage and sustain that denial against superior opposing forces, i.e., the US. In reality, Iran likely lacks the ability to impose a pure lockdown of the Strait.
Why the Strait matters
The Strait’s narrowness creates predictable shipping lanes filtered through bottlenecks. A large share of Gulf energy exports (oil and LNG) transit the broader Hormuz route, making it a price-setting corridor for the global energy markets. The Strait is also symbolic, a lever that Iran can pull in crises.
Even limited harassment can raise insurance rates, divert shipping, and spike energy prices. The closure threat is as much about coercive messaging as about any practical military plan.
What would prompt closure?
Iran would likely escalate towards “closing” the Strait under certain extreme conditions, i.e., major strikes on Iranian territory or leadership (like those the US executed recently); severe economic strangulation (like maximum sanctions); a perceived existential threat to regime survival.
The threat of closure serves as a bargaining tactic, too, demonstrating the ability to impose costs and force negotiations. But Iran understands something else: closing the Strait harms Iran and everyone else economically. And closure risks alienating key partners who buy Gulf energy.
F-15EX Eagle II. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
So the trigger threshold for actually closing the Strait is very high—more of a last resort than a routine retaliatory tactic.
What does closing the Strait mean?
“Closing” the Strait could mean one of several things, militarily.
Closure could mean harassment in the form of sporadic attacks and seizures, drone deployment—things that raise the risk for those moving through the Strait. Closure could mean temporary denial, like mine strikes and coordinated attacks that halt traffic briefly. Or closure could mean sustained denial, the continuous suppression of shipping, which is, of course, the hardest form of closure to achieve.
Regardless, Iran doesn’t need to sink many ships to create a crisis; just one damaged tanker can clog lanes. And mine creates a disproportionate fear that is a deterrent. Iran absolutely can make the corridor dangerous, expensive, and politically volatile. The most plausible “closure” scenario likely involves intermittent disruption, sporadic efforts that inspire pause—and respect for Iranian influence.
The tools of closure
Iran’s strengths are asymmetric, including fast attack craft and swarm tactics; anti-ship cruise missiles along the coast; naval mines, which are cheap and psychologically powerful; submarines and small submersibles; drones for surveillance and strike; boardings and seizures. Iran can exploit their favorable coastal geography.
But Iran does have a weakness: its ability to sustain pressure. Many of Iran’s tools are effective in an opening phase, for limited durations. But once the US and allies concentrate counter-forces, Iran would have a difficult time maintaining control. In truth, Iran could disrupt traffic, cause episodic halts, and even spike global prices.
Oct. 9, 2022 – The first-in-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) steams the Atlantic Ocean during a simulated straits transit with the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group (GRFCSG) in the Atlantic Ocean, Oct. 9, 2022. The Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group is deployed in the Atlantic Ocean, conducting training and operations alongside NATO Allies and partners to enhance integration for future operations and demonstrate the U.S. Navy’s commitment to a peaceful, stable and conflict-free Atlantic region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jackson Adkins)
WESTERN PACIFIC (Nov. 12, 2017) The aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) transits the Western Pacific during a three-carrier strike force photo exercise. The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and USS Nimitz (CVN 68) Strike Groups are underway and conducting operations in international waters as part of a three-carrier strike force exercise. The U.S. Navy has patrolled the Indo-Asia Pacific region routinely for more than 70 years promoting regional security, stability and prosperity. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kelsey J. Hockenberger/Released)
WESTERN PACIFIC (Nov. 12, 2017) The aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) transits the Western Pacific during a three-carrier strike force photo exercise. The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and USS Nimitz (CVN 68) Strike Groups are underway and conducting operations in international waters as part of a three-carrier strike force exercise. The U.S. Navy has patrolled the Indo-Asia Pacific region routinely for more than 70 years promoting regional security, stability and prosperity. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kelsey J. Hockenberger/Released)
But Iran is unlikely to sustain a total closure for long, if at all, because US and allied air and naval superiority would prove decisive. Iran’s asymmetric advantages don’t translate into an attrition scenario that favors US assets.
The world’s response
The global community would not accept a closure. The immediate response would be multi-layered. The US Fifth Fleet would enter a surge posture, with escorts, patrols, and ISR. Mine countermeasures would commence. A naval coalition would form, likely including the UK, France, and other regional partners.
Air defense and counter-drone measures would commence. The shipping response would include a spike in insurance premiums, while some carriers would pause transit. Energy prices would spike. Strategic petroleum reserves could be released. Gulf producers could reroute limited volumes via pipelines, but would not be able to replace Hormuz flow fully. Diplomatically, intense pressure would be placed on Iran to open the Strait.
While the Strait of Hormuz is Hormuz’s bargaining chip and deterrent threat, it’s also a trap that risks global blowback and economic self-harm. Iran couldn’t outright close the Strait—but they could disrupt operations enough to harm the global economy.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is an attorney and journalist covering national security, technology, and politics. Previously, he was a political staffer and candidate, and a US Air Force pilot selectee. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in global journalism and international relations from NYU.