Key Takeaway: Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has expanded his military purges to include two of the seniormost officers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Xi may have purged them because he saw them as undermining his leadership and military objectives. The continued purges have reduced the Central Military Commission (CMC) since 2023 from seven members to two members, including Xi, transforming the body into an extension of Xi’s will rather than a major military decision-making forum. The CMC purges consolidate Xi’s control over the military but risk isolating him or surrounding him with sycophants, which in turn risks military miscalculations.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has expanded his military purges to include two of the most senior officers in the PLA. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) National Defense Ministry announced investigations into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli on January 25, stating that they were “suspected of serious violations of discipline and law.”[1] Zhang and Liu were members of the CMC—the seniormost PRC military decision-making body—at the time of the announcement. Zhang had been a CMC vice chairman since October 2017, serving directly under Xi, who is the CMC chairman in addition to CCP general secretary.[2] Xi promoted Zhang to CMC senior vice chairman in October 2022 and exempted him from the required PLA retirement age, demonstrating Xi’s trust in him.[3] Liu had been the CMC Joint Staff Department chief of staff since September 2022, making him one of the top commanders overseeing PLA operations. Zhang and Liu were among the few senior PLA officers with combat experience, which they gained from conflicts with Vietnam in 1979 and the 1980s.[4] The publicly announced investigations strongly suggest that the CCP will expel Zheng and Liu and possibly impose legal consequences.
The investigations into Zhang and Liu are part of a broader military purge campaign that Xi has led in recent years. Purges since 2023 have targeted dozens of senior officers across the CMC, PLA, Ministry of National Defense, and People’s Armed Police.[5] These purges have reduced the CMC from seven members to two, including Xi. The other remaining CMC member is Zhang Shengmin, who is the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection secretary, making him responsible for disciplinary investigations. Purged CMC members He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Li Shangfu were publicly removed from the CCP and their jobs, while other generals and officials have disappeared from public view and their fates remain unknown. Top-level purges at this scale are unprecedented in the PRC since the Cultural Revolution.
Xi may have purged Zhang and Liu because he saw them as undermining his leadership or military objectives. Official PRC sources framed the investigations as being part of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign but did not accuse Zhang and Liu of being corrupt themselves.[6] That is in contrast to previous corruption investigations into PLA officers that explicitly accuse them of taking bribes. Instead, the official PLA newspaper reported that Zheng and Liu had “seriously betrayed the trust and expectations” and “severely trampled on” the CMC Chairman Responsibility System, which refers to Xi’s ultimate authority over the CMC and PLA.[7] The CMC Chairman Responsibility System is in contrast from organizational models that favor collective leadership or empower the CMC vice chairs. The PLA newspaper also accused Zheng and Liu of undermining ideological cohesion in the PLA, likely referring to Xi’s efforts to ideologize the military and reinforce its unwavering loyalty to him.
Xi may have also perceived Zheng and Liu as being obstacles to his military modernization goals. Xi has reportedly ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. One China analyst argued that Zhang may have disagreed with that timeline, assessing that the PLA needed more time, and may have recently become more openly defiant in meetings.[8]
Xi may have also purged Zhang and Liu to prevent any faction from challenging his influence. Many of the generals purged in 2025, including He Weidong and Miao Hua, were likely part of a human network centered known as the Fujian Clique.[9] The Fujian Clique is comprised of officials who grew close to Xi during his time in the government of Fujian Province from 1985 to 2002.[10] Zhang Youxia was a core member of another faction called the Shaanxi Gang, which—like the Fujian Clique—has been close to Xi historically. He is also a “princeling” like Xi, as both of their fathers were high-ranking CCP members.[11] That Xi has targeted members of his historic support bases, including a longtime personal friend and confidant like Zhang Youxia, highlights how extensive his purges have become. Xi may be especially focused on consolidating his position as the PLA approaches his 2027 modernization deadline and has embraced an increasingly aggressive foreign policy.
The remaining CMC member other than Xi—Zhang Shengmin—appears to be one of the few remaining senior military officers whom Xi still trusts. Zhang Shengmin has likely been involved in the investigations into the other CMC members given his role at the top discipline inspection official. Zhang Shengmin has been one of the most evident beneficiaries of previous purges, as he became a CMC vice chairman after the expulsion of He Weidong in October 2025 while retaining his discipline inspection role. Zhang Shengmin is not necessarily safe from the purges, however, especially as he has consolidated power on the CMC.
The CMC purges risk isolating Xi while further consolidating his control and influence. Senior PLA officers may become less willing to challenge Xi out of concern of being purged. Xi may repopulate the CMC with sycophants and personal loyalists who are even less inclined to disagree with him. That risks leading Xi to make inaccurate judgments based on skewed information, increasing the chance of potentially dangerous miscalculations. The risk is especially salient given that neither Xi nor the other remaining CMC member, Zhang Shengmin, have military command experience. Xi could alternatively keep the CMC in its dramatically reduced form, which would weaken it as a military decision-making institution and thus concentrate even more authority in Xi himself. Either scenario reduces the relevance of the CMC, transforming it into an extension of Xi’s will. Xi will likely push the CMC aggressively to meet his 2027 timeline for being ready to invade Taiwan.
Unnamed Western officials told Bloomberg that the purge of Liu Zhenli in particular could increase the risk of miscalculation between the PRC and Western countries.[12] The officials said that Liu had been the most effective point of contact in the PLA for risk management, because he was more willing than others to keep open communication channels. Xi will likely exercise greater personal control over risk management given the removal of Liu.
A source that broke news of the investigations into Zhang and Liu separately claimed that Xi has also purged one of his former aides and the president of the National Defense University (NDU). [13] The source, David Tsai, has a track record of breaking accurate information about the arrests of CCP officials before the CCP acknowledges that they are under investigation.[14] The CCP has yet to report any action against Xi’s former aide, Zhong Shaojun, and NDU President Xiao Tianliang.
Zhong had served as Xi’s office secretary for decades.[15] Zhong was also the CMC General Office director from 2018 to 2024 and was promoted to lieutenant general in 2024 despite having no military experience.[16] Zhong was most recently the political commissar for the NDU, before being replaced for unknown reasons in October 2025 – the same month the CCP expelled He Weidong and Miao Hua.[17] Zhong’s closeness to Xi further highlights his willingness to purge even trusted associates, if the reports of his purge are accurate.[18] Xiao had been the NDU president since February 2023 and has edited influential PLA doctrinal documents, such as Science of Military Strategy.[19]
Endnotes
[1] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16439135.html
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/26/world/asia/china-xi-zhang-youxia-military.html
[3] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3341173/why-chinas-rapid-ousting-2-top-generals-sharp-warning-party-purity
[4] https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/what-chinas-new-central-military-commission-tells-us-about-xis-military-strategy ; http://wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-places-his-top-general-under-investigation-as-military-purges-heat-up-d07f9c7d?mod=article_inline
[5] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/08/did-china-just-demote-its-defense-ministry.html ; https://english.news dot cn/20240627/ed54cc4029c44a8e9a163d47fb8c77cd/c.html ; https://english.news dot cn/20231024/d070e246e8bd4378a5b6a35e75b47d27/c.html ; https://english.news dot cn/20251017/c6d31cf05cac49f496512d848ee2aae0/c.html ; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-24-2025/
[6] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16439135.html ; http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16439154.html
[7] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16439135.html
[8] https://jamestown.org/zhang-youxias-differences-with-xi-jinping-led-to-his-purge/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-24-2025/
[10] https://jamestown.org/members-of-the-xi-jinping-clique-revealed/
[11] https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Xi-Jinping-Inner-Circle.pdf
[12] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-27/diplomats-worry-xi-s-purge-will-curb-critical-contact-with-china?srnd=next-china
[13] https://x.com/cskun1989/status/2014568629548077295
[14] https://x.com/cskun1989/status/2014172783878783132
[15] https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/rise-xi-jinpings-young-guards-generational-change-ccp-leadership
[16] https://jamestown.org/peng-liyuan-rises-up-the-ranks-implications-for-xis-despotic-rule/; https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf; https://www.prcleader.org/post/can-xi-jinping-control-the-pla
[17] https://www.prcleader.org/post/can-xi-jinping-control-the-pla ; https://www.zaobao.com dot sg/realtime/china/story20251027-7722491
[18] https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf
[19] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26 2020 Science of Military Strategy.pdf; https://china dot caixin.com/2023-02-23/102001245.html