Iran Update Special Report, March 19, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

Israeli strikes on Iranian internal security forces, including decapitation strikes, have likely caused shock and confusion within the Iranian internal security apparatus and disrupted internal security operations to some degree. It remains impossible to assess based on the available open-source evidence to what degree internal security operations have been disrupted.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck vessels at a major Caspian Sea port in northern Iran that Iran uses to conduct trade with Russia. The IDF targeted “dozens” of vessels, including the Artesh Navy Moudge-class frigate IRIS Deylaman, at the 4th Artesh Naval District Headquarters at Bandar Anzali Port, Gilan Province, on March 18. The IDF’s March 18 airstrikes on Bandar Anzali follow reports that Russia is providing Iran with Russian-produced and possibly modified Shahed drones.

Israeli strikes on Iranian internal security forces, including decapitation strikes, have likely caused shock and confusion within the Iranian internal security apparatus and disrupted internal security operations.

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure and air capabilities to degrade Iran’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks and maintain air superiority over parts of Iran. Israeli Army Radio, citing the IDF, reported on March 19 that the combined force has destroyed around 85 percent of Iran’s surface-to-air missiles.

Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks targeting the Gulf states and Gulf energy infrastructure, including the Ras Laffan Industrial City in Qatar, on March 18 and 19. US President Donald Trump threatened on March 18 to “blow up the entirety of the South Pars Gas Field” if Iran launches another drone or missile attack targeting Qatar following Iran’s missile attacks targeting the Ras Laffan Industrial City.

Israeli media reported that Hezbollah conducted a long-range missile attack targeting southern Israel, marking the group’s longest-range attack since the group was founded. The attack triggered sirens in Ashkelon and several areas near the Gaza Strip, which is located approximately 200 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah has several long-range missiles, including the Fateh-110, Scud, and Zelzal-2, that it could have used in this attack.

Toplines

Israeli strikes on Iranian internal security forces, including decapitation strikes, have likely caused shock and confusion within the Iranian internal security apparatus and disrupted internal security operations to some degree. It remains impossible to assess based on the available open-source evidence to what degree internal security operations have been disrupted. The IDF has targeted internal security and political figures at every echelon, from senior leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani, and Basij Organization Commander Brigadier General Gholamreza Soleimani to low-ranking Basij members manning checkpoints.[1] The IDF has also shifted from targeting high-level headquarters to smaller sites, including checkpoints, roadblocks, and local police stations.[2] Some of the strategic-level strikes are unlikely to have immediate effects on tactical units. It remains unclear, for example, how much Soleimani’s death will affect Basij forces’ ability to operate. But all strikes have both kinetic and psychological effects. The psychological effects include shock and fear caused by a sense that Israel can target any Iranian servicemember at any time and for any reason. Mossad has amplified this sense of fear in some cases by calling individual Iranian officers, but the strikes also generate this effect on their own. Fear and shock have caused some Iranian internal security personnel to abandon established headquarters and bases, set up improvised facilities, and adapt command-and-control structures under pressure, for example.[3] Some Iranian security forces are hiding under bridges, and Soleimani was reportedly operating from a tent in a wooded area before he was killed, for example.[4] Allowing overpasses to dictate one’s tactical deployments rather than determining deployments based on tactical realities is certainly suboptimal. Running a headquarters out of a tent rather than an established facility is certainly suboptimal, though not necessarily wholly ineffective. These reports indicate a notable level of operational shock across the regime’s coercive apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Basij, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC), and suggest that elements of Iran’s internal security system are functioning suboptimally at this time.

Israel would need to sustain these psychological effects by continuing to target Iranian security officers in order to achieve its objective of “creating conditions for regime change.”[5] The operational-level disruption caused by this shock and demoralization could “create the conditions for regime change” over time and if desertions or refusal to obey orders spread. But the disruption will not cause regime collapse without an indigenous force to exploit the disruption.[6] The current level of disruption appears limited and is likely insufficient to meet Israel’s objectives at this time. Shock will dissipate, potentially quickly, if strikes on internal security targets subside.

These operational-level effects are not causing strategic-level consequences at this time. Strategic-level decapitation strikes, including the killing of senior leaders such as Ali Khamenei, have caused political tensions and infighting within the regime. This infighting has not led to a breakdown within the regime, however, and largely represents ongoing political fights over succession that will persist. The strategic level could become less relevant if shock and disruption become severe enough at the operational level that internal security forces can no longer function and opposition groups exploit the security forces’ shock. CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that opposition groups are exploiting security forces’ shock or that opposition forces believe it is possible to exploit the disruption of security forces at this time. Such evidence may be difficult to detect in the open source, however.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck vessels at a major Caspian Sea port in northern Iran that Iran uses to conduct trade with Russia. The IDF targeted “dozens” of vessels, including the Artesh Navy Moudge-class frigate IRIS Deylaman, at the 4th Artesh Naval District Headquarters at Bandar Anzali Port, Gilan Province, on March 18.[7] Israeli officials stated that more than five of the targeted vessels possessed anti-aircraft capabilities that could threaten combined force aircraft.[8] An IDF spokesperson confirmed that the IDF also hit a command center and a shipyard.[9] The Bandar Anzali governor stated on March 19 that Israeli airstrikes also targeted a customs building and an unspecified shipping organization.[10] The shipping organization was likely Shahid Tamjidi Offshore Industries, which an Israeli open-source intelligence (OSINT) account reported on March 18 that Israeli airstrikes had targeted.[11] Shahid Tamjidi Offshore Industries is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[12]

Israeli media reported on March 19 that the Israeli strikes in Bandar Anzali “shut down” a critical supply line between Iran and Russia for both basic goods, such as wheat imports, and military equipment.[13] An Israeli journalist separately amplified reports that the IDF may have targeted a vessel that had returned from Russia in the past 24 hours and was suspected of carrying drone-related technology.[14] CTP-ISW is unable to verify this report. Iran and Russia have previously traded military equipment through this Caspian Sea route, however. Former US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby previously announced in June 2023 that Russian ships were transporting Iranian Shahed drones from Amirabad Port, Mazandaran Province, in northern Iran to Makhachkala, Russia, via the Caspian Sea.[15]

The IDF’s March 18 airstrikes on Bandar Anzali follow reports that Russia is providing Iran with Russian-produced and possibly modified Shahed drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told CNN on March 15 that he has seen intelligence that “100 percent” confirms that Iran has used Russian-produced Shahed drones “with Russian details” to attack US bases in the Middle East.[16] Russia began producing Shahed drones domestically in 2023 and has since upgraded them in several ways, including by equipping them with Verba shoulder‑fired man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).[17] Iran purchased 500 Verbas and 2,500 9M336 infrared homing missiles from Russia in December 2025, according to the Financial Times in February 2026.[18]

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure to degrade Iran’s ability to conduct retaliatory attacks. An Israeli analyst published satellite imagery on March 19 that shows that the combined force struck a launch pad at the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province, northeastern Iran, between March 11 and 19.[19] The IDF previously struck the missile facility at the beginning of the war, causing damage to a mixing building, casting building, and “warhead production line,“ according to an analyst at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.[20] Two OSINT accounts published satellite imagery from March 18 showing damage to multiple munition bunkers and multiple support buildings at the Khorgu Missile Base north of Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[21] The combined force has struck the Khorgu Missile Base several times since March 2.[22] An Israeli journalist also reported on March 19 that the combined force struck multiple unspecified IRGC missile sites near Borazjan, Bushehr Province.[23] The IRGC Navy 26th Salaman Missile Group is based near Borazjan.[24] It is unclear if the 26th Salaman Missile Group was one of the targets of these strikes, however.

The combined force has continued to degrade Iranian air capabilities in order to maintain air superiority over parts of Iran. Israeli Army Radio, citing the IDF, reported on March 19 that the combined force has destroyed around 85 percent of Iran’s surface-to-air missiles.[25] Israeli Army Radio reported that unspecified Iranian military personnel have refused to report to their positions.[26] An Iranian OSINT account reported on March 19 that combined force airstrikes targeted either aircraft or fuel storage facilities at the Yazd Airport in Yazd Province.[27] An Israeli journalist reported “loud explosions” near the Mehrabad International Airport in Tehran on March 19.[28] The 1st Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase is co-located at the Mehrabad Airport.[29] The combined force has repeatedly struck the Mehrabad International Airport and 1st Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase since the start of the war.[30]

Two informed sources told CNN on March 19 that unspecified Iranian anti-aircraft fire struck a US F-35 fighter jet, forcing the jet to make an emergency landing at an unspecified US base.[31] US Central Command (CENTCOM) Spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins said that the F-35 was “flying a combat mission over Iran” before it had to make an emergency landing.[32] The combined force has made significant progress in degrading Iran’s air defense capabilities, as evidenced by the fact that the combined force has destroyed around 85 percent of Iran’s surface-to-air missiles.[33] The degradation of Iran’s air defenses does not make US or Israeli aircraft completely invulnerable to Iranian anti-aircraft systems, however.

The combined force struck the Shiraz Electronic Industries (SEI) in Fars Province on March 18 after previously striking the complex on March 13.[34] SEI is a subsidiary of Iran Electronics Industries (IEI), which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The United States sanctioned SEI in 2008 for producing military electronics, including radars, avionics, missile-guidance technology, and other electronic systems, for the Iranian armed forces.[35] Repeated combined force strikes on SEI likely aim to disrupt Iran’s ability to produce missiles and other military equipment.

The combined force has continued to strike Iranian internal security institutions. Anti-regime media posted footage on March 19 of an explosion at a police station in Tehran’s Tehranpars neighborhood.[36]  An OSINT account published satellite imagery on March 18 of a destroyed police station in Javanrud, Kermanshah Province.[37] Anti-regime media reported a strike on the same police station on March 5.[38] The IDF also said on March 19 that it struck a Basij member who was guarding a Basij base in western Tehran.[39] The Basij is a paramilitary organization that the regime uses extensively to suppress protests and maintain internal security.

US CENTCOM has deployed aircraft to target Iranian fast attack craft that Iran uses to attack commercial vessels and lay mines around the Strait of Hormuz.[40] US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Dan Caine announced that CENTCOM has deployed A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft to target and destroy “watercraft.”[41] CENTCOM confirmed on March 10 that it had destroyed 16 Iranian mine-laying vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.[42] Caine added that CENTCOM has also deployed AH-64 Apache helicopters on the “southern flank,” referring to Iran’s southern coast.[43] CENTCOM has reportedly used Apache helicopters to intercept Shahed drones targeting shipping and the Gulf states.[44] Caine stated that CENTCOM has deployed Apache helicopters to attack Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as well.[45]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant’s reactor did not sustain damage after a projectile recently landed near the facility.[46] Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency of a “projectile incident” near the plant on March 17.[47] The Institute for Science and International Security reported that satellite imagery from March 18 shows an impact crater about 350 meters from the power plant’s reactor.[48] The IAEA previously warned that any strike that destabilizes power to the facility could cause the reactor’s core to melt and release radioactivity into the environment.[49] About 480 Russian technicians currently operate the plant on behalf of Rosatom State Corporation.[50] None of the technicians was injured in the March 17 incident.[51]

Iranian Retaliation

Iran launched 12 missile barrages at Israel between 3:00 PM ET on March 18 and 3:00 PM ET on March 19.[52] Israeli media reported on March 18 that an Iranian cluster munition killed one individual and injured four others in Moshav Adanim, central Israel.[53] An Israeli journalist also reported on March 18 that an Iranian cluster munition hit a house in southern Israel.[54] An Iranian missile attack also killed four Palestinians in the West Bank on March 18, according to Israeli media.[55] Iran also conducted a missile attack targeting the Bazan oil refinery in Haifa, northern Israel, on March 19.[56] The IDF stated that debris from a missile interception hit the refinery.[57] Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen said that the attack did not cause “significant damage” to the refinery.[58] 

Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks targeting the Gulf states and Gulf energy infrastructure on March 18 and 19. An Iranian drone hit the SAMREF Refinery in Saudi Arabia on March 19.[59] Unspecified sources told Reuters on March 19 that the attack caused a temporary halt to oil loadings at the nearby Yanbu Port.[60] Iranian regime media previously threatened on March 18 that Iran would target the SAMREF Refinery.[61] The Qatari Defense Ministry reported that two Iranian missiles hit the Ras Laffan Industrial City on March 18.[62] Iran conducted three missile attacks on the Ras Laffan Industrial City within several hours on March 18.[63] Qatar intercepted several of the missiles that Iran fired at the site. QatarEnergy CEO Saad al Kaabi said that the missiles damaged two liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains and one gas-to-liquid facility, reducing Qatar’s LNG export capacity by 17 percent.[64] Saadi added that repairs will take up to five years.[65] Qatar is the third-largest LNG exporter.[66] Qatar declared several Iranian diplomats as personae non gratae on March 18 in response to the missile attacks.[67] Kuwait’s national oil company also said on March 19 that two Iranian drones hit the Mina al Ahmadi and Mina Abdullah refineries, causing small fires at operation units at both facilities.[68]

US President Donald Trump threatened on March 18 to “blow up the entirety of the South Pars Gas Field” if Iran launches another drone or missile attack targeting Qatar following Iran’s missile attacks targeting the Ras Laffan Industrial City.[69] Trump stated that the US Government “knew nothing about” Israel’s attack on the South Pars Gas Field on March 18 and stated that Israel will not conduct further attacks on the gas field if Iran does not attack Qatar.[70]

Gulf air defense systems have continued to intercept most Iranian projectiles. The Emirati Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted seven Iranian missiles and 15 drones on March 19.[71] The Abu Dhabi Media Office reported on March 18 that debris from intercepted Iranian missiles that were targeting the Habshan gas facilities and Bab oil field caused unspecified “incidents” but no injuries.[72]  The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry reported that it intercepted 18 Iranian drones on March 19.[73] The Saudi Defense Ministry said that it intercepted seven Iranian missiles and 34 drones on March 19.[74]  The Bahrain Defense Force reported that it intercepted two Iranian missiles and four drones on March 19.[75]

UKMTO reported that an unknown projectile struck and caused a fire on an unspecified vessel 11 nautical miles east of Khawar Fakkan, United Arab Emirates (UAE), on March 18.[76] The vessel may have been struck by debris from missile interceptions, given that it was close to the UAE coast. CTP-ISW did not observe reports of attacks on infrastructure near Khawar Fakkan on March 18, however. Iran did not claim any attacks on commercial vessels on March 18.

Debris from missile interceptions also likely struck a vessel off the coast of Qatar.[77] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that an unknown projectile struck an unspecified vessel four nautical miles east of Ras Laffan, Qatar, on March 18.

India, Pakistan, Iraq, Malaysia, and China are negotiating with Iran to allow their vessels to transit through an IRGC-managed “safe corridor” in the Strait of Hormuz, according to sources “with direct knowledge of the transits” speaking to UK-based shipping intelligence firm Lloyd’s List on March 18.[78] Nine vessels have reportedly used this corridor so far, including two Indian-flagged liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tankers, six unspecified bulk carriers, a Pakistani-flagged oil tanker, and three US-sanctioned LPG tankers.[79] Lloyd’s List reported that, in one instance, a vessel paid $2 million USD to transit the Strait of Hormuz.  Ships are required to submit detailed ownership and cargo data through IRGC-linked intermediaries before being approved to transit through the “safe corridor.”[80] Lloyd’s List also identified IRGC naval activity on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz, where vessels are being diverted around, on satellite imagery.[81]  Lloyd’s List reported that overall traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped sharply, with only 15 transits taking place between March 15 and 17. Ninety percent of these transits involved Iranian-linked vessels.[82] UKMTO has recorded 21 maritime attacks and incidents since March 1, but the last confirmed Iranian attack on a commercial vessel took place on March 11.[83]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response

Hezbollah claimed 40 attacks targeting Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 3:00 PM ET on March 18 and 3:00 PM ET on March 19.[84] The majority of Hezbollah’s attacks targeted Israeli towns.[85] A Hezbollah rocket attack targeting Kiryat Shmona in northern Israel injured four individuals.[86] Hezbollah is likely continuing to attempt to displace northern Israeli residents from their homes by targeting northern Israeli towns in order to increase political pressure on the Israeli government to halt its war effort.  

Hezbollah also claimed several drone, mortar, rocket, and missile attacks targeting IDF positions and forces along both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.[87] Hezbollah conducted eight attacks and clashed with IDF forces in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District.[88] Hezbollah claimed that it launched rockets targeting the Yodfat Military Industries Company north of Haifa, northern Israel, on March 18.[89] Yodfat Military Industries Company is an Israeli missile production facility operated by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, which is an Israeli state-owned organization that develops weapons for the IDF.[90] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has launched approximately 700 rockets, missiles, and drones at Israel from areas south of the Litani River since it joined the war on March 2.[91] Israeli media noted that Hezbollah has increased the number of projectiles it has fired at Israel in recent days from approximately 100 rockets to 150 rockets per day, 60 percent of which have fallen in Israeli territory.[92]

Israeli media reported that Hezbollah conducted a long-range missile attack targeting southern Israel, marking the group’s longest-range attack since the group was founded.[93] The attack triggered sirens in Ashkelon and several areas near the Gaza Strip, which is located approximately 200 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border.[94] The missiles impacted open areas in southern Israel.[95] Hezbollah has several long-range missiles, including the Fateh-110, Scud, and Zelzal-2, that it could have used in this attack. The Fateh-110 ballistic missile is an Iranian-made missile with a range of 250 to 300 kilometers and a payload of 450 to 500 kilograms.[96] Scud missiles are Russian-made, liquid-fueled ballistic missiles that have a range of 300 to 550 kilometers with a payload of 600 to 985 kilograms.[97] The Zelzal-2 is an Iranian variant of the Soviet FROG 7 artillery ballistic missile, which has a range of 210 kilometers and a payload of 600 kilograms.[98] Hezbollah has not claimed this attack at the time of this writing.

The rate of Hezbollah attacks targeting Israel has varied since the group joined the war on March 1, as illustrated below.  

Hezbollah has employed a variety of weapons in its attacks against Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon (see below).  

Israeli media reported on March 18 that Hezbollah is employing new tactics that make its rockets harder to track and its Radwan unit more elusive.[99] Israeli media reported that Hezbollah is dispersing its short-range rockets across Lebanon, which makes them more difficult for Israeli intelligence agencies to track.[100] The IDF has noted that this Hezbollah tactic has diminished the group’s ability to launch large rocket barrages.[101] The IDF also estimates that Hezbollah has hundreds of Radwan Force fighters operating in small cells in approximately 200 villages south of the Litani River.[102] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s elite special operations unit that Hezbollah, with Iranian support, built to conduct major ground attacks into Israel.[103] Israeli media, citing the IDF, noted that Hezbollah fighters are not engaging in close combat with the IDF and are rather dispersed among Lebanese villages and launching attacks on Israeli forces from these villages.[104] Hezbollah’s claimed attacks are consistent with this Israeli media report. Hezbollah’s claimed direct engagements with Israeli forces suggest that Hezbollah fighters are only directly engaging Israeli forces after Israeli forces attempt to advance.[105]

An Iranian-affiliated group conducted cyberattacks targeting Lebanese government websites and Lebanese media outlets. Lebanese media reported that an Iranian-affiliated group briefly hacked the Lebanese foreign affairs and information ministries’ websites on March 18.[106] The Fatemiyoun Electronic Team claimed responsibility for the hacks.[107] The Fatemiyoun Electronic Team is a pro-Iranian hacktivist group that is reportedly controlled by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and has previously conducted cyberattacks in support of Iran.[108] The Fatemiyoun Electronic Team claimed responsibility for a March 15 cyberattack on the website of Lebanese television station MTV Lebanon.[109] These cyberattacks came shortly after the hacked entities took action against Hezbollah and Iran. Information Minister Paul Morcos instructed Lebanese state-run media outlets on March 16 to stop using the term “resistance,” which commonly refers to Hezbollah.[110] Lebanese Foreign Minister Joe Rajji recently summoned the Iranian Charge d’Affaires in Lebanon.[111] MTV Lebanon separately broadcast the alleged locations of Hezbollah detention centers in Beirut’s southern suburbs shortly before it was hacked.[112] The IDF reportedly struck the detention centers after MTV Lebanon’s broadcast.[113]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon. The IDF reported that it has struck approximately 2,000 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, including 100 high-value targets and 220 time-sensitive targets, with over 2,200 munitions and 1,000 sorties since March 2.[114] The IDF has also killed at least 500 Hezbollah fighters since March 2.[115] The IDF reportedly struck a building in Beirut that was owned by al Boyan CEO Hussein Ali Salah al Moussawi on March 18.[116] Al Boyan for Engineering and Contracting Company is one of Hezbollah’s construction organizations.[117] The IDF reportedly struck the Qannayat bridge in southern Lebanon on March 19. The IDF previously struck the bridge on March 18.[118] The IDF stated on March 18 that Hezbollah used the bridge to move fighters from northern to southern Lebanon to fight against Israeli forces.[119] Lebanon’s state electricity provider, Electricite du Liban (EDL), reported that Israeli strikes struck its main power transmission network in Sultaniyeh, Bint Jbeil District, which put the station “completely out of service.”[120] This strike marks the first time that the IDF has struck national Lebanese energy infrastructure.

The IDF reported that the IDF 36th Division has killed more than 20 Hezbollah fighters and destroyed dozens of Hezbollah sites in southern Lebanon in the past 24 hours.[121] The IDF reported that the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade identified two separate Hezbollah cells in southern Lebanon, one of which IDF forces engaged.[122] IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir ordered the IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade to move from the Southern Command to the Northern Command on March 11.[123] The IDF also reported that Israeli forces found and confiscated large quantities of weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank guided missiles, ammunition, a hunting rifle, and other military equipment.[124]

Israeli forces have recently attempted to advance into Marjaayoun District in southeastern Lebanon.[125] A geospatial intelligence analyst reported on March 18 that the IDF continues to advance deeper into Khiam and is advancing toward the town’s northernmost neighborhood.[126] The analyst’s report of Israeli advances through Khiam is consistent with claimed Hezbollah attacks on March 17 targeting Israeli forces near the Khiam Detention Center, which is located on the highest hill in southern Khiam.[127] Israeli forces would presumably seek to take control of the town’s high points before advancing further. Lebanese residents told the New York Times on March 16 that Israeli forces had not completely seized Khiam and noted that Israeli forces have faced resistance from Hezbollah fighters.[128]

Hezbollah is attempting to defend against Israeli advances into Khiam. Hezbollah has claimed several attacks targeting advancing Israeli forces in recent days and claimed on March 18 that it clashed with Israeli forces in Khiam.[129] Hezbollah previously conducted defensive operations against Israeli forces in Khiam during the Fall 2024 Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[130] Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah can fire into northern Israel.[131] Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it can observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee Panhandle.[132] Hezbollah attacked Metula—likely from southern Khiam and Kfar Kila, based on Hezbollah footage—with more rockets and anti-tank guided missiles than any other town in northern Israel between October 2023 and November 2024 and caused extensive damage in the town.[133] This fire almost completely stopped once the IDF began operations in the area in Fall 2024.[134] Khiam also sits along main roads that connect towns in central Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, which makes it a key hub for moving forces and transporting supplies across Lebanon.[135]Kuwaiti authorities arrested 10 Hezbollah-affiliated individuals in Kuwait on March 18.[136] The Kuwaiti Interior Ministry stated that the 10 Kuwaiti nationals had provided coordinates for various sites in Kuwait to foreign operatives.[137] The ministry noted that the individuals had trained in Hezbollah camps abroad.[138] Kuwaiti authorities previously arrested a 16-member Hezbollah cell and seized various weapons in Kuwait on March 16.[139] Hezbollah issued a statement on March 17 in which it claimed that it has no cells, members, or networks in Kuwait.[140]

Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah offered on March 18 to temporarily and conditionally halt attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad, likely in response to recent combined force strikes that targeted senior Kataib Hezbollah leaders.[141] Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Mujahid Aasaf stated on March 18 that Kataib Hezbollah would cease its attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad for five days if Israel stops striking the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiyeh in southern Beirut, Lebanon, the combined force ceases strikes on Iranian-backed militias in residential areas of Iraq, and CIA officers across Iraq withdraw from their stations to the US Embassy in Baghdad.[142] Kataib Hezbollah threatened to resume attacks if the combined force fails to meet these conditions.[143] The timing of the proposal suggests that it is a response to recent strikes that targeted senior militia figures, including a March 16 strike that killed Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson and security head Abu Ali al Askari and a March 13 strike in Baghdad that reportedly nearly killed the group’s leader, Abu Hussein al Hamidawi.[144] A separate strike on March 16 targeted the residence of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leader Abu Alaa al Walaei and reportedly killed six individuals, but it is unclear if Walaei was present at his residence at the time of the strike.[145]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri said on March 19 that combined force strikes have killed more than 60 Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters and wounded over 100 more.[146] The combined force has conducted several airstrikes targeting PMF positions across Iraq since 3:00 PM ET on March 18. The combined force struck the Badr Organization-affiliated 30th PMF Brigade base in Khazna Tapa village, Ninewa Province, on March 19. The attack killed one PMF fighter and wounded three others, according to Iraqi media.[147] The combined force also conducted two airstrikes targeting the Badr Organization-affiliated 63rd PMF Brigade base in Tuz Khurmatu, Salah al Din Province, on March 19.[148] A likely combined force airstrike targeted the PMF Ninewa Operations Command headquarters in Mosul on March 19.[149] The commander of the Ninewa Operations Command is affiliated with the Badr Organization.[150]

An Iraq-focused OSINT analyst reported that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) arrested several PMF members on March 18. Unspecified militia leaders subsequently met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to try to secure their release.[151]Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to conduct drone attacks targeting US forces and interests in Iraq and the region. Saraya Awliya al Dam, which is considered a front group for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, claimed that it launched drones targeting an unspecified US base in Jordan.[152] The group also claimed that it conducted six “qualitative operations” against US bases in and outside of Iraq but provided no evidence of the “operations.”[153] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias were likely responsible for launching four drones at the Umm Qasr Naval Base in Basra Province on March 19.[154] The drones landed in the vicinity of the base but did not cause significant material damage, according to Iraqi media.[155] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also likely launched three drones from Basra Province targeting an observation post in Kuwait.[156] Kuwaiti diplomats previously said on March 9 that Iranian-backed militia attacks on Kuwait “threaten relations” between Iraq and Kuwait.[157] US aircraft separately intercepted a likely Iranian-backed militia drone that targeted the Baghdad Airport on March 19.[158] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on March 18 that it had conducted 29 operations using dozens of missiles and drones targeting US bases in Iraq and the region in the past 24 hours. IRI did not provide evidence for this claim.[159]

Iranian Internal Security

The Iranian regime is continuing to take steps to securitize Iranian society. Iranian authorities arrested dozens of individuals across multiple provinces on March 18 and 19 for allegedly spying for Israel and engaging in other anti-regime activities.[160] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry and IRGC Intelligence Organization claimed that they have arrested over 200 individuals since the start of the war.[161] Security forces in Sistan and Baluchistan Province arrested 13 individuals reportedly linked to anti-regime militant groups on March 19.[162] Iranian authorities claimed that the arrested individuals were collecting intelligence on military movements, security facilities, and air defense sites, and were preparing to conduct “terrorist attacks.”[163] The regime separately executed three individuals in Qom Province on March 19 who had participated in the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[164] The Iranian regime has sustained its internet shutdown and continued to seize Starlink devices to restrict the flow of information.[165]

Endnotes

[1]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfouze3HUL-8feh2OYJ3vyCLHivIH–ob8ZtQHZJ0QzwNDA556bwf_P46MWqKs%3D&gaa_ts=69bc7652&gaa_sig=62oeA4q2Ty2pF2LbZct5V0nC6usny4txSCNSCkM0zwjwtazKHJ9u9GU4vqUeS3jiPtqZBJe_Ha-DsAhjmPc2OQ%3D%3D ;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-it-struck-basij-checkpoints-tehran-2026-03-12/

[2] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-hit-soldiers-of-irans-basij-force-at-more-than-10-tehran-checkpoints/ ;
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdm7xJRMlrPp3atTjwFW64d4CuCoxa2RvuPC6G7hlFSIsa7XotIx-Bv&gaa_ts=69bc5368&gaa_sig=lnYeWncCy-qXXOweBf9StS18TssrYUte41qhKCgDKBWe2vWTTYas6iFfHL_Qx8S_-NBSBY0nVfJpnY0-k8n6wg%3D%3D
[3] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdm7xJRMlrPp3atTjwFW64d4CuCoxa2RvuPC6G7hlFSIsa7XotIx-Bv&gaa_ts=69bc5368&gaa_sig=lnYeWncCy-qXXOweBf9StS18TssrYUte41qhKCgDKBWe2vWTTYas6iFfHL_Qx8S_-NBSBY0nVfJpnY0-k8n6wg%3D%3D
[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-leadership-528c6114?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdm7xJRMlrPp3atTjwFW64d4CuCoxa2RvuPC6G7hlFSIsa7XotIx-Bv&gaa_ts=69bc5368&gaa_sig=lnYeWncCy-qXXOweBf9StS18TssrYUte41qhKCgDKBWe2vWTTYas6iFfHL_Qx8S_-NBSBY0nVfJpnY0-k8n6wg%3D%3D
[5] https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2033909811260039646?s=20
[6] https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/2033909811260039646?s=20
[7] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2034633053776097504?s=20 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2034633086281949237?s=20
[8] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/2034351013340106945; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2034631232898613492?s=20

[9] https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-us-israel-trump-march-19-2026-52e94398f2432b3aba9b02b51fbe5000
[10] https://iranwire.com/en/news/150641-anzali-governor-customs-ports-and-shipping-organization-offices-targeted/
[11] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2034635043260211264?s=20
[12] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-tamjidi-offshore-industries; https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/defense-industries-organization-dio
[13] https://www.mako dot co.il/pzm-soldiers/Article-2eae2aaae860d91026.htm; https://x.com/shailevy6/status/2034682284175942071?s=20
[14] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034428419031625742
[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/09/world/europe/iran-russia-drone-factory.html?smid=url-share; https://ports.marinelink.com/ports/port/amirabad
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-15-2026/; https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/15/world/video/gps-0315-zelensky-on-iran-drones
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-15-2026/; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/09/world/europe/iran-russia-drone-factory.html?smid=nytcore-android-share; https://www.ft.com/content/3135edf7-2b80-4df4-9923-b96382d2fee5; https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/08/europe/russia-drone-factory-iran-intl; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/

[18] https://www.ft.com/content/d034cc1a-f5fb-494e-a3c1-466e8e80ed82
[19] https://t.me/BenTzionM/7159
[20] https://x.com/sam_lair/status/2030425360198984111
[21] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/2034641310376943710 ; https://x.com/davidnewschool/status/2034487442548334832
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-11-2026/
[23] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034701334864122195
[24] https://x.com/rasuyab/status/1774830645522387307 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus164-Nadimi-v2.pdf
[25] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2034661177469317188
[26] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2034661177469317188
[27] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2034411258854727840?s=20
[28] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034688761347346879
[29] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
[30] https://x.com/chawshin_83/status/2027638923095097405 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2027640244346994705 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2029177812872020353 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2029950062470516979 ; https://x.com/IAFsite/status/2030279812816765152
[31] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/19/politics/f-35-damage-iran-war
[32] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/19/politics/f-35-damage-iran-war
[33] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/2034661177469317188
[34] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2034384805685563486?s=20 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034386840384401654 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2032515419844600112?s=20
[35] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shiraz-electronics-industries-sei ;
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145
[36] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2034625701635067984?s=20 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2034655481784885426?s=20
[37] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2034373907357270106?s=20
[38] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2029620521051082814?s=20
[39] https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2034574980835393597
[40] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-destroys-16-iranian-mine-boats-strait-hormuz-oil-showdown-escalates ; https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/us-apache-pilots-drones/
[41] https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/us-apache-pilots-drones/
[42] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2031489675760640370?s=20
[43] https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4438252/hegseth-draws-distinction-between-epic-fury-previous-conflicts/
[44] https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/us-apache-pilots-drones/
[45] https://taskandpurpose.com/news/military-apache-iraq-militias/
[46] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2034306777614065834 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/projectile-hits-near-irans-bushehr-nuclear-plant-no-damage-or-injuries-reported-2026-03-18/
[47] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2034306777614065834
[48] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/impact-site-identified-near-the-iranian-bushehr-nuclear-power-plant
[49] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran-20-june-2025
[50] https://apnews.com/article/iran-bushehr-nuclear-power-plant-war-us-israel-38ad4e7ae4c934a499cae9c0b16f8fd2
[51] https://apnews.com/article/iran-bushehr-nuclear-power-plant-war-us-israel-38ad4e7ae4c934a499cae9c0b16f8fd2
[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034360271725371688 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034382324452749811 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034438066694443304 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034466879067046328; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034470224167149974 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034492838935671052 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034507209552322793 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034552914610438281 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034565409945309432 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034641191799599511 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034672997542359177 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034704433679147263

[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034391612827312225 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034402202668708228 ;
https://www.timesofisrael dot com/iranian-cluster-bombs-kill-foreign-worker-in-central-israel-3-west-bank-palestinians

[54] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2034374028568199607
[55] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/pregnant-palestinian-woman-dies-of-wounds-from-yesterdays-iranian-missile-strike-in-west-bank-taking-toll-to-4/
[56] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2034656814982181162 ; https://x.com/Faytuks/status/2034646493684969951
[57] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-haifa-refinery-impact-caused-by-falling-fragments-minister-no-major-damage-caused/
[58] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-attack-hits-israeli-oil-refinery-haifa-some-damage-reported-2026-03-19/
[59] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034546154902352232
[60] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-port-yanbu-resumes-oil-loadings-two-sources-say-2026-03-19/
[61] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-18-2026/ ; https://t.me/mehrnews/361622
[62] https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2034432881045520612 ; https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2034344764594672041
[63] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034361054130475039 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034452654768705970 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034450925679517927 ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2034462792405627065
[64] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-attack-damage-wipes-out-17-qatars-lng-capacity-three-five-years-qatarenergy-2026-03-19/
[65] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-attack-damage-wipes-out-17-qatars-lng-capacity-three-five-years-qatarenergy-2026-03-19/
[66] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/19/world/middleeast/qatar-natural-gas-attacks-ras-laffan.html
[67] https://x.com/MofaQatar_AR/status/2034364546844926368
[68] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/gulf/2026/03/19/kuwait-extinguishes-fire-at-two-refineries-after-drone-attacks-
[69] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116253388303392718; https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2034432881045520612
[70] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116253388303392718
[71] https://x.com/modgovae/status/2034579598223225020
[72] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-us-israel-war-news-2026/card/abu-dhabi-intercepts-missiles-targeting-habshan-gas-facilities-bab-field-SxvgOzAs1lR3Hb33zaEP?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdsb4fJvoA0kWjgcPcr0qC0307p3vA31RUD8jQ51pBvz3oqNNXY8-tY&gaa_ts=69bc3841&gaa_sig=Ri6OErit2sKoPGt67Spccxd-CsbkCnr52g975hZYNNQI6E23ta5MMllzbuSJerm0AKwxFI9B3w_xTD-LYWrh6g%3D%3D ; https://x.com/ADMediaOffice/status/2034392167133937789?s=20
[73] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2034656971664904443
[74] https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034354590200578543 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034357905076416843 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034360298203652365 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034368793565171914 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034386372891398571 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034390187237671337 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034397299766427704 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034432061692682547 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034442176268992670 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034457368633684332 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034525866273706309 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034527569207349320 ; https://x.com/modgovksa/status/2034545798956851477

[75] https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2034370072634966241?s=20 ; https://x.com/BDF_Bahrain/status/2034555365749080273?s=20
[76] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2034415015327871091?s=20; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2034476385993974164?s=20
[77] https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2034432881045520612 ; https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2034344764594672041; https://x.com/ADMediaOffice/status/2034392167133937789?s=20
[78] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156656/Iran-establishes-safe-shipping-corridor-for-approved-and-paid-for-transits
[79] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156656/Iran-establishes-safe-shipping-corridor-for-approved-and-paid-for-transits
[80] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156656/Iran-establishes-safe-shipping-corridor-for-approved-and-paid-for-transits
[81] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156656/Iran-establishes-safe-shipping-corridor-for-approved-and-paid-for-transits
[82] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156656/Iran-establishes-safe-shipping-corridor-for-approved-and-paid-for-transits
[83] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156656/Iran-establishes-safe-shipping-corridor-for-approved-and-paid-for-transits ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2031887648730517834?s=20
[84] Data available upon request
[85] Data available upon request
[86] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/injury-count-from-hezbollah-rocket-attack-on-kiryat-shmona-raised-to-4/
[87] https://t.me/mmirleb/11533 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11536 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11575 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11572 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11581 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11584
[88] https://t.me/mmirleb/11592 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11587 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11584 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11581 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11560 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11551 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11548 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11648
[89] https://t.me/mmirleb/11536
[90] https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2033195075388199414 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-ramp-up-cross-border-attacks-as-war-moves-closer-19f6bfff?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1 ; https://www.iafastro.org/membership/all-members/rafael-advanced-defense-systems-ltd.html ; https://caat.org.uk/data/companies/rafael/
[91] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034694195479203974
[92] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/sjxvprdc11x#google_vignette
[93] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/no-injuries-reported-in-hezbollah-fire-targeting-gaza-border-area/#:~:text=No%20injuries%20reported%20in%20Hezbollah,conditions%20to%20cover%20this%20conflict
[94] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/no-injuries-reported-in-hezbollah-fire-targeting-gaza-border-area/#:~:text=No%20injuries%20reported%20in%20Hezbollah,conditions%20to%20cover%20this%20conflict
[95] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/no-injuries-reported-in-hezbollah-fire-targeting-gaza-border-area/#:~:text=No%20injuries%20reported%20in%20Hezbollah,conditions%20to%20cover%20this%20conflict
[96] https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/
[97] https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/scud/
[98] https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/
[99] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/sjxvprdc11x#google_vignette
[100] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/sjxvprdc11x#google_vignette
[101] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/sjxvprdc11x#google_vignette
[102] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/sjxvprdc11x#google_vignette
[103] https://israel-alma dot org/the-threat-posed-by-hezbollahs-comando-unit-radwan-unit-to-the-state-of-israel/ ; https://www.ajc.org/news/hamas-october-7-massacre-plan-was-inspired-by-hezbollahs-radwan-heres-what-to-know-about-the ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/20/world/middleeast/hezbollah-radwan-ibrahim-aqeel.html
[104] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/sjxvprdc11x#google_vignette
[105] https://t.me/mmirleb/11592 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11489
[106] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1499971/cyberattacks-briefly-target-websites-of-foreign-affairs-and-information-ministries.html
[107] https://en.annahar dot com/en/business-tech/289510/coordinated-cyberattacks-hit-lebanese-state-raising-alarms-over-sovereignty-and-internal-security
[108] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-fatemiyoun-electronic-squad
[109] https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/2033330867792200053
[110] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1499971/cyberattacks-briefly-target-websites-of-foreign-affairs-and-information-ministries.html
[111] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1499971/cyberattacks-briefly-target-websites-of-foreign-affairs-and-information-ministries.html
[112] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1499971/cyberattacks-briefly-target-websites-of-foreign-affairs-and-information-ministries.html
[113] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1499971/cyberattacks-briefly-target-websites-of-foreign-affairs-and-information-ministries.html
[114] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034694195479203974
[115] https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-us-israel-trump-march-19-2026-52e94398f2432b3aba9b02b51fbe5000
[116] https://x.com/jonathan_elk/status/2034272881241121159?s=46
[117] https://www.ifmat.org/07/06/hizballah-al-bonyan-for-engineering-and-contracting-company/ ; https://x.com/jonathan_elk/status/2034272881241121159?s=46
[118] https://x.com/lorienttoday/status/2034614744338874482?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2034614744338874482%7Ctwgr%5E568f039697dd89b8cfce615b969b85ff276b916b%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftoday.lorientlejour.com%2Farticle%2F1499903%2Fintense-fighting-between-hezbollah-and-israeli-troops-in-taybeh-4-kms-from-blue-line-live.html ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034311197634289924
[119] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2034311197634289924
[120] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1499903/intense-fighting-between-hezbollah-and-israeli-troops-in-taybeh-4-kms-from-blue-line-live.html ; https://x.com/Clair_officiel/status/2034728657340535175 ; https://x.com/InfoSudLiban/status/2034661172968837261
[121] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034519664437424562
[122] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034519664437424562
[123] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031654107245650189
[124] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2034519664437424562
[125] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2034434858080936281
[126] https://x.com/ThetiMapping/status/2034434858080936281
[127] https://t.me/mmirleb/11433
[128] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/16/world/middleeast/lebanon-strategic-town-khiam.html
[129] https://t.me/mmirleb/11489 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11355 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11366 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/11326
[130] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-7-2024/
[131] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-7-2024/
[132] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-7-2024/
[133] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/bjvhbyj11ke; https://t.me/mmirleb/5076; https://t.me/mmirleb/5027; https://t.me/mmirleb/4717
[134] See author for data.
[135] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/16/world/middleeast/lebanon-strategic-town-khiam.html
[136] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-18/kuwait-says-more-suspects-linked-to-hezbollah-have-been-arrested ; https://x.com/Moi_kuw/status/2034361515198091729
[137] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-18/kuwait-says-more-suspects-linked-to-hezbollah-have-been-arrested
[138] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-18/kuwait-says-more-suspects-linked-to-hezbollah-have-been-arrested
[139] https://x.com/Moi_kuw/status/2033638750169764252
[140] https://t.me/mmirleb/11372
[141] https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/4
[142] https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/4
[143] https://t.me/AbumujahidAlasaf/4
[144] https://t.me/centerkaf/5595 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2034419663858278888 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2032773359159714237 ; https://x.com/Mustafa_salimb/status/2033192823416148438
[145] https://x.com/Mustafa_salimb/status/2033733377900351568
[146] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88-160-%D8%B6%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9

[147] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/مقتل-و-صابة-4-منتسبين-من-الحشد-بقصف-شرقي-نينوى
[148] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/استهداف-مقر-للحشد-الشعبي-بضربتين-جويتين-في-صلاح-الدين
[149] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84 https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2034642594941084018 https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2034646124087148942 https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2034668995346043246
[150] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/The20Leadership20and20Purpose20of20IraqE28099s20Popular20Mobilization20Forces.pdf
[151] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/2034394657170346347
[152] https://t.me/awlialdm/295 ; https://x.com/LizHurra/status/2033841863354892748
[153] https://t.me/awlialdm/294
[154] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-بطيران-مسي-ر-يستهدف-قاعدة-م-قصر-البحرية-في-البصرة

[155] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-بطيران-مسي-ر-يستهدف-قاعدة-م-قصر-البحرية-في-البصرة
[156]https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/قصف-بطيران-مسي-ر-على-برج-مراقبة-كويتي-قرب-الحدود-العراقية
[157] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Kuwait-complains-to-Iraq-over-attacks-from-Iraqi-territory
[158] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/صاروخ-من-طا-رة-ميركية-يحبط-هجوما-مسي-را-على-مركز-الدعم-اللوجستي
[159] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1596
[160] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/18/world/middleeast/iran-internet-shutdown.html ;
https://x.com/hra_news/status/2034344769527099683 ;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/52634 ; https://t.me/mehrnews/361950

[161] https://t.me/mehrnews/361950 ;
https://t.me/defapress_ir/52634
[162] https://t.me/defapress_ir/52634
[163] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/398480
[164] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2034480707750219798?s=20
[165] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/398452 ;
https://x.com/netblocks/status/2034532701999354333?s=20