Iran Update Special Report, April 6, 2026

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates focus on US and Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s response to the strikes. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period. 

NOTE: ISW-CTP will no longer publish morning updates covering the war with Iran. ISW-CTP will instead publish threads on its social media channels in the morning that cover the latest developments in the war and include relevant maps.

Key Takeaways

Iran rejected a ceasefire agreement with the United States to pause the war and “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz on April 6. Iran’s rejection of the latest ceasefire proposal reduces the likelihood that the United States and Iran will reach an agreement by US President Donald Trump’s April 7 deadline. Trump has maintained his threat to strike Iranian energy infrastructure and bridges if Iran does not agree to a deal by April 7.

Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis appear to have coordinated an attack targeting Israel on April 6, possibly to try to maximize the psychological effects of Iran’s limited ability to conduct large-scale attacks against Israel. The timing of these attacks suggests that the attacks were coordinated to some degree, given the vastly different travel times of the munitions fired at Israel by Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed on April 6 that it has struck Iran’s two largest petrochemical facilities in the past week that account for 85 percent of Iranian petrochemical exports. The IDF reported that the South Pars Complex contained infrastructure to produce explosives and propellant for ballistic missiles.

Toplines

Iran rejected a ceasefire agreement with the United States to pause the war and “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz on April 6.[1] Iran’s rejection of the latest ceasefire proposal reduces the likelihood that the United States and Iran will reach an agreement by US President Donald Trump’s April 7 deadline. The Pakistani-brokered proposal called for an immediate ceasefire followed by several weeks of negotiations to broker a lasting ceasefire and agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[2] Iran seeks a permanent end to the war rather than a temporary ceasefire, however.[3] Iranian state media reported that Iran’s counterproposal included 10 demands, including a lasting ceasefire in the “region,” a “protocol for safe passage” through the Strait of Hormuz, support for Iran’s reconstruction, and the lifting of sanctions.[4] Trump rejected Iran’s counterproposal as “not good enough” on April 6.[5] A US official similarly described Iran’s demands as “maximalist” to an Axios journalist on April 6.[6] Iran’s demand for a ceasefire across the “region” presumably refers to a ceasefire that also ends Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is unclear what Iran is referring to when it calls for a “protocol for safe passage” through the Strait of Hormuz, but it may refer to a mechanism that would enable Iran to regulate traffic through the strait. This demand suggests that Iran is using the strait as a point of leverage to attempt to extract concessions and secure a favorable post-war agreement with the United States.

Trump stated that the Iranian regime seeks to reach a ceasefire with the United States despite the regime’s rejection of the latest ceasefire proposal. Trump characterized Iranian negotiators as “active, willing participant[s]” and said that they “would like to be able to make a deal.”[7] Trump has twice moved his deadline for Iran to reach a deal — including once at the request of Iranian officials—in order to continue talks.[8] Iranian officials have continued to engage with mediators and countries involved in the talks. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who is involved in the talks, spoke with his Turkish and Qatari counterparts on April 6.[9] Both Turkey and Qatar are potential mediators for future talks.[10]

President Trump has maintained his threat to strike Iranian energy infrastructure and bridges if Iran does not agree to a deal by April 7.[11] Trump said in an April 6 White House press conference that the United States has a plan to render every bridge in Iran “decimated” and put every Iranian power plant “out of business” by midnight on April 8 if Iran does not agree to a deal.[12] US officials said that US forces are preparing to strike Iranian energy infrastructure on April 7 if President Trump orders them to do so.[13] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that the United States would conduct its largest volume of strikes on April 6 since the war began and will conduct even more strikes on April 7.[14]

Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis appear to have coordinated an attack targeting Israel on April 6, possibly to try to maximize the psychological effects of Iran’s limited ability to conduct large-scale attacks against Israel. The three attacks triggered Israeli sirens across northern, central, and southern Israel within a roughly ten-minute period and the munitions used in the attacks appeared to reach Israeli airspace around the same time:[15]

Iran launched two ballistic missiles targeting central Israel.[16] Shrapnel fell in central Israel.[17] Initial military assessments indicated that at least one of the missiles contained a cluster munition warhead.[18]

The Houthis launched “several” drones targeting Eilat, southern Israel, which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted.[19] The Houthis also claimed to fire cruise missiles, though these missiles do not appear to have reached Israel.[20]

Hezbollah rocket fire triggered sirens in Margaliot and Manara along the Israel-Lebanon border.[21]

The timing of these attacks suggests that the attacks were coordinated to some degree, given the vastly different travel times of the munitions fired at Israel by Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis. Ballistic missiles launched from Iran take about 12 minutes to reach Israel, whereas Houthi drones take several hours to reach Israel once launched from Yemen.[22] Israelis living along the Lebanon-Israel border only receive a 15- to 30-second warning of an imminent Hezbollah rocket attack, in contrast.[23] The Houthis also claimed to conduct an attack coordinated with the IRGC and Hezbollah on April 1.[24]

Coordinated attacks between Iran and its Axis partners may aim to impose psychological effects on Israeli civilians by threatening multiple areas across Israel near-simultaneously. The volume and types of munitions used in the attack suggest that this attack was not necessarily intended to overwhelm Israeli air defenses. Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis may be unable to conduct a coordinated large-scale attack large enough to achieve this effect. Iran has struggled to conduct large-scale missile and drone attacks targeting Israel since the war began and is instead likely opting for a strategy designed to maximize the effects of its limited fire, including using cluster munitions and firing barrages throughout the day to increase the number of times per day that Israeli civilians must seek shelter. Near-simultaneous attacks from multiple fronts may seek to invoke the feeling among Israeli civilians of being “encircled” by Iran and the Axis of Resistance and thereby terrorize Israeli civilians.

Several social media users have falsely attributed data from the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) on Iranian missile impact rates to ISW-CTP. ISW-CTP has not published an independent figure for Iranian missile impact rates in Israel. A recent JP Morgan report cited data from JINSA that missile impact rates in Israel rose from three percent during the first two weeks of the war to 27 percent in later weeks.[25] The 27 percent impact rate likely includes cluster munition impacts, which Iran started using at a greater scale starting in the second week of the war. Cluster munitions disperse over a wide area to maximize damage. Cluster munitions from one warhead can lead to over 30 individual impact sites, as seen on April 6 in central Israel. Many of the Iranian missile attacks that have caused damage and casualties in Israel have involved missiles with cluster munition warheads.

US and Israeli Air Campaign

The combined force continued to strike Iranian missile sites and airbases. An Israeli journalist reported on April 6 that the combined force struck a missile depot in Bushehr City, Bushehr Province.[26] An Israeli analyst, citing the IDF, separately reported that the IDF recently struck the Abyek Missile Base in Ziyaran, Ghazvin Province.[27] This base has at least five tunnel entrances to underground facilities that store missiles and missile launchers.[28] Iran stores missiles and missile launchers in underground bases underneath mountains and in tunnels to conceal them and make it difficult for airstrikes to damage them.[29]

The IDF stated on April 5 that it struck unspecified targets at three airports in Tehran Province: Mehrabad International Airport, Sepehr International Airport, and Shahid Aryafor Airport.[30] The 1st Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase is co-located with Mehrabad Airport.[31] It is unclear what the IDF struck at the Sepehr and Shahid Aryafor airports. Anti-regime media separately reported on April 5 that the combined force likely struck the 7th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase in Shiraz, Fars Province, which is co-located with Shiraz International Airport.[32] The combined force has likely struck this airbase at least six times since the beginning of the war.[33]

The combined force continued to strike Iranian defense industrial sites. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) accounts on X reported on April 6 that the combined force struck Shiraz Electronics Industries in Shiraz, Fars Province.[34] The combined force has struck Shiraz Electronics Industries multiple times during the war.[35] Shiraz Electronics Industries is subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). The United States sanctioned Shiraz Electronics Industries in September 2008 for producing electronic equipment for the Iranian armed forces.[36] OSINT accounts on X reported on April 6 that the combined force also struck the electronics research center at Sharif University of Tehran.[37] This center has been involved in missile guidance system research.[38] The United States sanctioned Sharif University in 2019 for supporting Iranian ballistic missile production and procurement.[39] An OSINT account on X reported on April 6 that the combined force struck two unspecified shipbuilding companies at the Shahid Mousavi site in Khorramshahr, Khuzestan Province.[40] The account was likely referring to the Shahid Mousavi Offshore Industries, which builds ships for the Iranian Defense Industries-affiliated Marine Industries Group.[41] 

The combined force continued to strike Iranian internal security sites. OSINT accounts on X claimed on April 5 that US forces struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces 2nd Imam Sajjad Special Forces Brigade in Kazeroun, Fars Province.[42] The Imam Sajjad Brigade operates under the Madinah ol Munawarah Operational Base in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[43] Anti-regime media separately reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the “Sarallah Barracks” in Tehran.[44] It is unclear whether this report was referring to the Sarallah Operational Base, which is responsible for coordinating internal security and protest suppression efforts in Tehran.[45] An OSINT account on X reported on April 5 that the combined force struck the Artesh 92nd Armored Division in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[46] The combined force previously struck the 92nd Armored Division on March 12.[47] An OSINT account on X claimed on April 6 that the combined force also struck the Shahid Tondgouyan Basij headquarters in Ahvaz.[48]

The IDF confirmed on April 6 that it has struck Iran’s two largest petrochemical facilities in the past week that account for 85 percent of Iranian petrochemical exports.[49] The IDF announced on April 6 that it struck the South Pars Complex in Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province.[50] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that South Pars accounts for 50 percent of Iran’s petrochemical production.[51] Katz added that the IDF struck Iran’s “second main [petrochemical] facility” last week.[52] Katz was likely referring to the IDF’s strikes on the Bandar Imam Petrochemical Complex in Khuzestan Province on April 4.[53] The IDF reported that the South Pars Complex contained infrastructure to produce explosives and propellant for ballistic missiles.[54] Iranian media reported on April 6 that the IDF struck the Mobin and Damavand facilities at South Pars and stated that these facilities produced electricity, water, and oxygen.[55] All of these components can be used in the production of liquid and solid missile propellant.[56] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Mobin’s owner, the Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Company, in 2022 for selling tens of millions of US dollars’ worth of petroleum and petrochemical products on behalf of the IRGC Khatam ol Anbia Construction Headquarters.[57] An OSINT account identified damage to at least three gas turbines in footage of a fire at the Damavand petrochemical facility.[58] The Damavand Petrochemical Company provides and sells petrochemical products to the Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Companyand the Iranian Armed Forces Social Security Organization.[59] Anti-regime media separately reported airstrikes at the Zagros petrochemical facility, which is also located at the South Pars Complex.[60] The Zagros Petrochemical Company produces methanol, which can be used in missile propellant.[61]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) did not sustain damage after a projectile landed near the facility’s premises for the fourth time since the start of the war.[62] The IAEA confirmed that a projectile landed 75 meters from the BNPP’s perimeter, citing April 5 satellite imagery.[63] The IAEA did not detect an increase in radiation near the BNPP.[64] Iran claimed that a projectile fragment killed one member of the site’s physical protection staff and that shockwaves and projectile fragments “affected” a building at the site.[65]

The combined force has continued to degrade Iran’s internal and external security apparatuses by targeting high-ranking commanders and low-ranking security personnel. The IDF confirmed that it killed IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Major General Majid Khademi in an airstrike in Tehran.[66] Khademi had held this role since June 2025, when the IDF killed his predecessor, Mohammad Kazemi.[67] The IDF also killed IRGC Quds Force Special Operations Unit 840 Commander Ashar Bagheri.[68] Unit 840 is responsible for conducting clandestine and terrorist activities against Israelis inside and outside of Israel.[69] Bagheri and his deputy, Mohammad Reza Ansari, facilitated attacks against IDF forces operating in the Israeli buffer zone in Syria using Syrian operatives who previously served in the Syrian Arab Army.[70] Bagheri also directed efforts to smuggle weapons from Iran into Israeli territory.[71] Local Iranian officials separately reported on April 5 that a combined force airstrike in Qods County, Tehran Province, killed eight Basij members.[72]

Iran continues to selectively regulate commercial maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran reportedly forced two vessels, the Marshall Islands-flagged Rasheed and Bahamas-flagged Al Dayeen, that were carrying Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) bound for the People’s Republic of China to turn back before transiting the strait on April 6.[73] This action is part of Iran’s effort to impose economic costs on the Gulf states to coerce them to pressure the United States and Israel to end their campaign against Iran. An Indian government official separately stated that Iran has prevented 16 Indian‑flagged vessels, some of which were carrying oil and gas, from passing through the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the war.[74] Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with his Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on April 6, likely in part to discuss the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.[75]

Iranian Response

Iran has fired at least seven missiles targeting Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on April 5.[76] At least three of the missiles contained cluster munitions.[77] Cluster munitions impacted in at least 10 locations in Haifa and around 30 other locations in central Israel.[78] A missile fragment separately impacted a building in Haifa and killed four people.[79]

Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states. Iran fired two cruise missiles at both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see below).[80] ISW-CTP previously noted on April 5 that Iran appears to have slightly altered its strike packages against the Gulf states to include more cruise missiles.[81] An Iranian drone also targeted an Emirati telecommunications company building in Fujairah, the UAE.[82]

Iran launched three drones and one missile at Jordan on April 6.[83] The Jordanian Armed Forces reported that it intercepted two drones, but that the missile and the third drone impacted in Jordanian territory.[84]    Iran conducted an unspecified number of drone attacks targeting Iranian Kurdish anti‑regime groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan. An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel claimed on April 5 that Iran attacked the office of Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) leader Hossein Yazdan Panah.[85] PAK stated on X on April 6 that Iran launched four waves of drones and missiles at its bases near Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, but reported no casualties.[86] Anti‑regime media additionally reported Iranian drone strikes against the Komala Party’s headquarters in Bakhtiari neighborhood in Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan.[87] The Iranian regime has historically been concerned about these groups attempting to infiltrate Iran and launch operations against the regime.[88] Iranian Kurdish opposition factions announced the formation of a new coalition to advance Kurdish self-determination inside Iran in February 2026.[89]

Israeli Campaign Against Hezbollah and Hezbollah Response 

Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 33 attacks against Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and northern and central Israel between 2:00 PM ET on April 5 and 2:00 PM ET on April 6.[90] Hezbollah claimed several drone and rocket attacks targeting IDF positions and Israeli towns in northern Israel.[91] Hezbollah claimed that it attacked the IDF Northern Command’s Givat Olga Base in central Israel on April 6.[92] An Israeli military correspondent reported on April 6 that Hezbollah fired over 100 rockets at Israeli targets in southern Lebanon and Israel in the past 24 hours.[93] Forty-five Hezbollah rockets targeted Israeli territory, 17 of which fell in open areas.[94]

Hezbollah has used first-person view (FPV) drones in multiple attacks in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah published footage on April 5 that Hezbollah claimed shows an FPV drone attack against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon on March 28.[95] Hezbollah also published footage on April 6 that Hezbollah claimed shows an FPV drone attack against an Israeli Merkava tank and an armored vehicle in Rachaf, southern Lebanon, on March 30.[96] The FPV drones used in these two attacks do not appear to be fiber-optic FPV drones. Hezbollah claimed six FPV drone attacks against IDF armored vehicles between March 25 and April 3.[97]

The Israeli Air Force killed a senior Lebanese Forces Party official in an airstrike near Beirut on April 5. The Israeli Air Force intended to assassinate a Hezbollah operative in the strike. The Lebanese Forces Party is a Lebanese political party that opposes Hezbollah and has continuously blamed Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into the current war.[98] The IDF stated that the strike failed to kill the intended Hezbollah target and noted that it “regrets the harm” to civilians.[99]

The IDF has continued to conduct airstrikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon. The IDF struck Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons depots across Lebanon, including in Beirut, on April 6 as part of its effort to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and “strengthen the front line of defense.”[100] The IDF killed several Imam Hussein Brigade officials, including Artillery Commander Kamal Melhem, and destroyed the brigade’s artillery headquarters on April 5.[101] The Imam Hussein Brigade is a military force that the Iranian IRGC Quds Force uses to bolster Iran’s Axis of Resistance and employ forces against Israel.[102] The brigade also serves as a significant military unit for Hezbollah, comprising thousands of fighters, and has launched operations against Israel from Lebanon.[103] IDF Spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin stated on April 6 that the IDF has killed approximately 1,100 Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon since Israel began its campaign in Lebanon on March 2.[104]

Multiple IDF divisions are continuing ground operations across southern Lebanon. The IDF 933rd (Nahal) Infantry Brigade (162nd Division) killed Hezbollah fighters in close combat and destroyed Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure in southern Lebanon on April 6.[105] The IDF 1st (Golani) Infantry Brigade (36th Armored Division) has destroyed over 300 Hezbollah sites, including weapons depots, killed dozens of Hezbollah fighters, and located over 10 underground tunnels and hundreds of Hezbollah weapons in southern Lebanon since it started its ground operations.[106] The IDF 769th Territorial Infantry Brigade (91st Territorial Division) located an underground Hezbollah shelter and several Hezbollah weapons depots in southern Lebanon on April 6.[107] The depots contained military vests, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), explosives, Kalashnikov rifles, sniper rifles, and other military equipment.[108] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz noted that the IDF is “demilitarizing” southern Lebanon up to the Litani River while retaining “full freedom of action” in Lebanon.[109] The IDF called on Lebanese residents in over 40 southern Lebanese villages to evacuate north of the Zahrani River on April 6.[110]

Other Axis of Resistance Response

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and militia front groups continue to claim attacks against US targets in Iraq and the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, claimed on April 6 that it conducted 21 drone attacks against US bases in Iraq and the region.[111] Likely front group Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed on April 5 that it conducted three one-way drone attacks targeting the Ali al Salem Airbase in Kuwait, the Muwaffaq al Salti Airbase in Jordan, and a US base in Qasrak, Syria.[112] Likely front group Jaysh al Ghadab separately claimed a drone attack targeting Sheikh Isa Airbase in Bahrain on April 5.[113] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched at least four drones targeting the US Consulate in Erbil on April 6.[114]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continued to target Baghdad International Airport on April 6. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff–run media claimed on April 6 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted Camp Victory, a former US military base located at Baghdad International Airport.[115] A security source told Iraqi media on April 6 that unknown actors fired an unspecified projectile at the logistics support headquarters at Baghdad International Airport.[116] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continuously targeted Baghdad International Airport and its co-located facilities, including Camp Victory, since the war began.[117]

Senior Houthi official Mohammad Ali al Houthi told Western media on April 6 that the group will refrain from attacking Saudi Arabia so long as the Saudi government “adheres to de-escalation.”[118] This statement is likely an attempt to deter Saudi Arabia from joining the US-Israeli campaign against Iran.

Endnotes

[1] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/trump-vows-hell-iran-if-strait-stays-shut-says-deal-is-possible-2026-04-06; https://t.me/irna_1313/398227
[2] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/trump-vows-hell-iran-if-strait-stays-shut-says-deal-is-possible-2026-04-06; https://www.axios.com/2026/04/06/iran-war-us-tehran-ceasefire-talks
[3] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/06/iran-trump-peace-plan-ceasefire
[4] https://t.me/irna_1313/398227
[5] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/trump-vows-hell-iran-if-strait-stays-shut-says-deal-is-possible-2026-04-06/
[6] https://www.axios.com/2026/04/06/iran-trump-peace-plan-ceasefire
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/04/06/world/iran-war-trump-israel/75ab73f7-eab4-5c5a-8203-841249f75bca?smid=url-share
[8] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116297295543838717; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-5-2026/
[9] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/192614; https://x.com/PHREUTERS/status/2041150531117392291?s=20
[10] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604031740 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/report-mediators-are-pushing-phased-iran-ceasefire-starting-with-confidence-building-steps/
[11] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/trump-vows-hell-iran-if-strait-stays-shut-says-deal-is-possible-2026-04-06/
[12] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/04/06/world/iran-war-trump-israel/heres-the-latest?smid=url-share
[13] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-war-latest-news-updates-2026/card/u-s-military-planning-for-potential-strikes-on-iranian-energy-targets-Cp1KB7IZCaUYbxg8i4b9
[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-iran-could-be-taken-out-tuesday-night-2026-04-06/
[15] https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041136262128505085; https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041137558684418248; https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041137963384426778
[16] https://t.me/manniefabian/57530 ; https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041135451201777769
[17] https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041143501627248771
[18] https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041136750228128145
[19] https://t.me/manniefabian/57530; https://t.me/manniefabian/57526
[20] https://t.me/manniefabian/57530
[21] https://t.me/manniefabian/57530; https://t.me/manniefabian/57524 ; https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041137420112928791
[22] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/6/16/israel-iran-conflict-how-ballistic-missiles-work-and-where-can-they-reach
[23] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041188962094510575
[24] https://t.me/army21ye/3506
[25] https://assets.jpmprivatebank.com/content/dam/jpm-pb-aem/global/en/documents/eotm/salems-lot.pdf
[26] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/2041143663040868717?s=20
[27] https://t.me/BenTzionM/7356
[28] https://t.me/BenTzionM/7356
[29] https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/03/29/iran-ballistic-missile-sites/
[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041150818921889822
[31] https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
[32] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2040883751375294901?s=20
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-20-2026/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-26-2026
[34] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2041119437344923830 ; https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041112090220298700
[35] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-4-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-7-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-evening-special-report-february-28-2026
[36] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1145
[37] https://x.com/Osint613/status/2041088825166790956?s=20 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2041085034069717001
[38] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/sharif-university-technology#:~:text=U.N.%2DEU%20Sanctions%20Tally,Nations%20and%20the%20European%20Union.
[39] https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-nxBVUwhmE8JFVPkiVzKVaS/ ; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=15098 ; https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/subjects/7195
[40] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2041214767587590654?s=20
[41] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-mousavi-offshore-industries
[42] https://x.com/Mitch_Ulrich/status/2040949807594762752 ; https://x.com/BabakTaghvaee1/status/2040927673799631007 ; https://www.instagram.com/p/DWzE9PQjDPk/
[43] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/20200121-Report-Iran%E2%80%99s-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf
[44] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2040883751375294901?s=20
[45] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sites/default/files/FINAL%20-%20The%20Tharallah%20Headquarters%20Unveiled%20JAN%2026.pdf
[46] https://x.com/Vahid/status/2040898591376515262
[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-morning-special-report-march-12-2026 ; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2031962464925917668?s=20
[48] https://x.com/hey_itsmyturn/status/2041101592351412396
[49] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041182298662465605?s=20
[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041182298662465605?s=20
[51] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041111988843999366?s=20
[52] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041111988843999366?s=20
[53] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2040488574756270570?s=20; https://x.com/acceladealer/status/2040359680573120669?s=20; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-4-2026/; https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/04/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-mahshahr-iran-oil.html)

[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041182298662465605?s=20
[55] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/amp/news/1154410; https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1365588

[56] https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/rocket/TRCRocket/practical_rocketry.html
[57] https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-PRSL4tFHtourUqQDdwJWyb/;
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0901
[58] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2041159211338371490?s=20
[59] https://www.gem.wiki/Damavand_Petrochemical_power_station#Ownership_Tree; https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2020-06652.pdf?1585658731
[60] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2041142981260927298?s=20
[61] https://www.offshore-technology.com/data-insights/zagros-petrochemical-company-assaluyeh-complex-iran/?cf-view ; https://www.solventsandpetroleum.com/methanol-methyl-alcohol.html#:~:text=Methanol%20is%20a%20high%2Doctane%2C%20clean%2Dburning%20fuel%20that,render%20industrial%20ethyl%20alcohol%20unfit%20to%20drink.
[62] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2040360500047819000?s=20; https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2041109442553352609?s=20 ; https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2034306777614065834; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-25-2026/; https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2036536815809618185; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-4-2026/; https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2040360500047819000
[63] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2041109442553352609?s=20
[64] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2040360500047819000?s=20
[65] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2040360500047819000?s=20
[66] https://x.com/IDF/status/2041079326276309076
[67] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-evening-edition/ ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6505140; https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1934282731044667400 ; https://x.com/NoamIhmels/status/1934294717782544805
[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041116589135708318
[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041116589135708318; https://israel-alma dot org/iranian-special-operations-commander-eliminated/
[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041116589135708318
[71] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041116589135708318
[72] https://x.com/AlArabiya_Eng/status/2040754303099429062?s=20
[73] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/06/world/live-news/iran-war-us-trump-oil?post-id=cmnn2ehbd00003j6rkoweq7sl ; “Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Available by subscription at https://www.starboardintelligence.com/
[74] https://timesofindia dot indiatimes.com/business/india-business/hormuz-transit-update-2-indian-lpg-tankers-cross-strait-16-vessels-remain-stranded-in-gulf/articleshow/130062800.cms

[75] https://t.me/Nournews_ir/345807
[76] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040989997491195941?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041001886728265739?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041019578566783358?s=20; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041104701714767879?s=20; https://x.com/ILRedAlert/status/2041135451201777769; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041137026292953313?s=20

[77] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040989997491195941?s=20; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041001886728265739?s=20 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041104701714767879?s=20
[78] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2040989997491195941?s=20 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/four-members-of-the-gershovitz-family-identified-as-victims-of-haifa-missile-attack ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/2041109574661341347?s=20
[79] https://t.me/moriahdoron/29564; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/four-members-of-the-gershovitz-family-identified-as-victims-of-haifa-missile-attack/
[80] https://x.com/KuwaitArmyGHQ/status/2041165307595604372 ; https://x.com/modgovae/status/2041110848295621018
[81] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-5-2026/
[82] https://www.wam dot ae/en/article/175otv1-authorities-fujairah-respond-incident-targeting-du
[83] https://www.facebook.com/100064836425191/posts/1373087161529152/#
[84] https://www.facebook.com/100064836425191/posts/1373087161529152/#
[85] https://t.me/sepah_pasdaran/192338
[86] https://x.com/PAKenglishh/status/2041150905311977915; https://x.com/PAKenglishh/status/2041156802411188615?s=20; https://x.com/PAKenglishh/status/2041160333218210279
[87]
https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2040954600061120899?s=20 ; https://x.com/bbcpersian/status/2041165970165690831
[88] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/exiled-iranian-kurds-in-iraq-say-they-will-return-only-if-irans-theocracy-falls
[89] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-25-2026/
[90] https://t.me/mmirleb/14381 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14379 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14377 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14371 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14369 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14367 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14361 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14359 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14357 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14355 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14353 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14351 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14349 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14347 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14346 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14341 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14339 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14337 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14335 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14333 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14331 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14323 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14319 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14317 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14312 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14310 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14308
[91] https://t.me/mmirleb/14359 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14308 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14317 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14323 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14331 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14333 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14335
[92] https://t.me/mmirleb/14359
[93] https://t.me/moriahdoron/29564
[94] https://t.me/moriahdoron/29564
[95] https://t.me/mmirleb/14344
[96] https://t.me/mmirleb/14374
[97] https://t.me/mmirleb/13881 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13822 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13710 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/13720 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14281 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/14214
[98] https://www.arabnews.com/node/2638914/middle-east
[99] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-failed-assassination-attempt-on-hezbollah-operative-instead-killed-opposition-official/
[100] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041034637846163623 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041073490330092020?s=20
[101] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041083080648032754
[102] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026/
[103] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026/
[104] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-has-killed-1100-hezbollah-operatives-since-start-of-war/
[105] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041056740481917424
[106] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2041128126223179911
[107] https://www.idf dot il/336823 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041174106964394404
[108] https://www.idf dot il/336823 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041174106964394404
[109] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-chief-said-to-tell-netanyahu-hezbollah-is-weak-after-anger-over-claim-group-was-underestimated/
[110] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041188929802580420
[111] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1630
[112] https://t.me/awlialdm/346
[113] https://t.me/Jaysh_AlGhadab/204
[114] https://shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/اعتراض-هجوم-بطا-رات-مسيرة-فوق-مطار-ربيل-الدولي

[115] https://t.me/defapress_ir/55044
[116] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/استهداف-مقر-الدعم-اللوجستي-في-مطار-بغداد
[117] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-30-2026/ ; https://t.me/awlialdm/281 ; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2011/12/2/us-hands-over-main-base-in-iraq ; https://t.me/Extremedistress/879 ; https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/2032963872693563531?s=20 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-23-2026/
[118] https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/06/world/live-news/iran-war-us-trump-oil?post-id=cmnn4ywsq00003b6owi4c3tvs