Welcome to The Times of Israel’s Daily Briefing, your 20-minute audio update on what’s happening in Israel, the Middle East and the Jewish world.

Diplomatic correspondent Lazar Berman joins host Amanda Borschel-Dan for today’s episode.

WATCH the full episode here:

US President Donald Trump on Saturday announced that the framework for a peace deal with Iran that would end the months-long conflict was scheduled to be signed on Sunday and that the key Strait of Hormuz waterway would then be immediately “open to all.” Iran has denied the signing will take place so soon. Berman breaks down what could be part of any potential deal and assesses the feasibility of it being inked imminently.

As fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in south Lebanon continues, the government has instructed the Israel Defense Forces to avoid actions that could endanger the emerging deal between the US and Iran, Kan news reported Friday. Berman explores how else Israel is being restrained in light of the ongoing negotiations with Iran — and how any deal may tighten those fetters.

Some international media outlets are discussing the theory that Israel will soon turn its gaze to Syria — where it holds a buffer zone — and fight a proxy war there with Turkey, which also holds territory. Berman weighs in.

Check out The Times of Israel’s ongoing liveblog for more updates.

For further reading:

Trump says US-Iran deal to be signed Sunday, contradicting Tehran

Government reported to restrain IDF action in Lebanon to avoid derailing US-Iran talks

Iran MOU would cap self-defeating ceasefire for Trump, marks huge problem for Israel

Subscribe to The Times of Israel Daily Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts. Yitzhak Ledee filmed and edited this episode.

Check out yesterday’s episode here:

Today’s Transcript:

Amanda Borschel-Dan: Welcome to The Times of Israel’s The Daily Briefing. Today is Sunday, June 14. I’m Amanda Borschel-Dan here in our Jerusalem studio, joined again by our diplomatic correspondent, Lazar Berman. Lazar, I missed you. Thank you so much for joining me.

Lazar Berman: I missed you as well. Happy to be here.

Borschel-Dan: It is always a pleasure to host you. And today, we are going to drill into what is happening in terms of any kind of potential deal between the United States and Iran. US President Donald Trump announced yesterday that within 24 hours, there would be a signing of a deal. So Lazar will explain to us what he knows about this deal, how it affects Israel, what is happening in terms of Lebanon, and how the Gulf states are reacting. So all of this and much more when we’re back.

And we’re back. I’m Amanda Borschel-Dan here with our diplomatic correspondent, Lazar Berman. Lazar, after US President Donald Trump’s announcement yesterday that, within 24 hours, give or take, I guess, there will be a signing of some kind of deal, CNN counted how many times US President Donald Trump has said something similar, and they got to, I think it was 38 times. So, Lazar, what do you think the chances are that this time it actually will happen?

Potential signing of Iran deal and terms of the MOU

Berman: It’s a good question. It seems like the signing of — it’s not a comprehensive deal— extending the ceasefire for another 60 days is likely to happen, I would say. I don’t think it’s going to happen within that 24-hour time period because we have no details on where and when that would take place. And Iran is saying that it’s not ready yet.

Borschel-Dan: Aren’t we hearing, though, Lazar, that it could be some kind of virtual signing, meaning there won’t be this like summit picture moment, but Pakistan is somehow organizing this?

Berman: That’s likely what’s going to happen. There was a desire to have some in-person ceremony included in Islamabad, Pakistan. The Iranians don’t want it because they’re in the driver’s seat. They’re the ones who are not desperate for a deal. The US is the one that’s desperate for a deal, as are the Gulf countries. So Iran gets to play, “Yeah, we can do it, but we’re not going to run after, we’re not going to give you any photo ops.” So it could be a Zoom thing, but with Iran continuing to say it’s not finished yet, it might be in the coming days. Those details don’t really matter. What matters here is that it makes perfect sense for Iran to extend the ceasefire for another 60 days. What do they have to give up? Nothing really. They remove their blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which was the case before the war, but of course, they can reimpose it whenever they want. They have to agree that in a second subsequent deal, all the nuclear issues will be dealt with. There’ll be some limitations; the 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium will be dealt with.

It seems like it’s not going to leave Iran. It’ll be diluted and stay in Iran, but nothing will actually happen until a second deal. The big question is how much money will go into Iran during this 60-day MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]. It seems like some assets will be unfrozen, which will be billions of dollars going into Iran. So basically, the big picture is that just around this MOU, Iran doesn’t have to give up anything that really matters. They’re going to get not necessarily sanctions relief, but unfrozen assets. And of course, they’ll be able to sell their oil again, which is hundreds of millions of dollars a day. So none of this adds up to anything very good for Israel. I think if we can go bigger picture, we understand that the US, or Donald Trump specifically, has given up on what he said and what [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu said at the beginning of the war, that there are are multiple goals beyond the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program, Iran’s ability to support proxies, and of course, if we’re talking about the stability of the regime.

Now, Trump doesn’t talk about those anymore. This is strictly a nuclear deal, and anything that Iran is going to make concessions on, they’re going to demand something in return. This is not the situation where it could have been if things had been fought differently and there hadn’t been this ceasefire, which Trump announced on April 8, that Iran is going to give concessions in order to stop being attacked. We’re way past that. Now it’s like the situation it was in the talks in 2015, or the talks that were going on before this war, that in order to get anything from Iran — and Iran has made its red lines clear and it’s not moving on them — then it is going to take sanctions relief, and it’s going to take all sorts of other things that it wants. Also worryingly, Iran has succeeded, and Trump has gone along with it, tying the Lebanon front into this. So, where Hezbollah was pretty badly beaten, and Israel was able to strike across Lebanon before this war, including in Dahieh, including in the north, killing hundreds of its terrorists, now Israel is very limited.

And of course, Iran will be able to say that if it doesn’t like what Israel does in Lebanon, then it is going to undermine any agreement or potential agreement in the Persian Gulf, and — they’re betting on this, and it seems like a pretty good bet — that will bring pressure from Trump on Israel. So, anyway you look at this, not a good development from where we were a couple of months ago, and it has been Trump’s strategy to unilaterally call a ceasefire for two weeks, and here we are on day 67 of the ceasefire, and things have only gotten worse and worse for the anti-Iranian side.

Borschel-Dan: I was contemplating the other day where we were a year plus ago, after the first Iran-Israel exchange of fire. Number one, that was mind-blowingly unprecedented. And who would have thought that we would be engaging in even tit-for-tat strikes between each other? As a matter of course, last week there was a warlet. Who would have thought that that would be something that would be kind of normalized, at least at this point? And it appears to me that the war that broke out on February 28 did not improve anything in terms of Israel’s standing in the region. But even if you look previously, back to the other strikes, I can’t see how we’re in a better position than we were in the first strike on Iran and Iran’s strike back.

Lack of political improvements from Israel-Iran war

Berman: In terms of what Iran is able to do, you’re right. Because Iran feels like it is able to hit Israel and Israel won’t hit it back in any way that is too costly for it. So it’s not deterred from striking us if it wants to. It certainly feels like it can hit all sorts of Arab countries, and they’re not going to hit back. That doesn’t mean it had to end this way. Imagine if the war had continued for 67 days. Iran could be in a very, very, very different position. It could have been much more badly degraded, and the regime could have cracked. Instead, we had 67 days of the economy not improving because the blockades were in place. So the Strait of Hormuz was open, right? So it’s not like the US taxpayer is getting relief from this lack of fighting. And America’s position, Israel’s position wasn’t improving. It’s not like Iran was making any concessions. All you had was Trump making these threats. Those threats became less and less credible. He made threats every day. Did anyone really think America was going to take Kharg Island last week?

Borschel-Dan: Nope.

Berman: No, not at all. He just says these things, and now you have this, not even a deal. It just stretches these talks on. And let’s not forget, the US midterms are coming up in early November. Iran, I think they believe the closer they get to it, the less likely it is that even if they stop talking to Trump, he’s going to attack. So this would stretch it to mid-August, and then you’re really in campaign season. So there’s really not much to boast about. Trump is going to continue to say that this is a great deal. This is so different than the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] that [former president Barack] Obama signed in 2015. I mean, there’s no final deal yet, that’s for sure. And a deal in itself is not the goal. The goal is to create a better peace or a better strategic situation for us and a worse one for Iran. And I do not think that’s the case. The only hope that we have here, because it’s not like Israel is going to undertake this again with Trump in office if he’s not on board, is that indeed the Iranian people inevitably will protest again.

It’s been every couple of years, so that’ll happen again. And perhaps this time it’ll be different. That’s really the only hope right now.

Tomorrow’s G7 Summit

Borschel-Dan: Do you think that the timing of this announcement has anything to do with the G7 summit coming up tomorrow?

Berman: No, no, I don’t. I don’t see why that would affect anything between the two sides. It’s been the product of talking and concessions on the part of the US. Iran doesn’t care that there’s a G7 summit. They just want to get a deal that’s good for them, and they know is bad for the US, in place, and to start getting some relief and get the US blockade lifted. That’s always been the case. I think it’s notable about the G7 that Trump will meet with G7 leaders, obviously not Israel, and also with Qatar and Pakistan there. So you see, there are all these theories that Israel controls US foreign policy. Obviously, that’s not true, but you see how far Israel is from even influencing US policy as an ally. Other countries do influence foreign policy.

There were phone calls from Gulf countries, and there were phone calls from Turkey to stop doing something with the Kurds during the war. Netanyahu is not in these conversations. What’s happening around this MOU, obviously, he’s not involved in. He talks directly with Trump, but Israel is not one of the mediating countries.

And before the war, Trump and Netanyahu were meeting every two months. They haven’t met since February. It seems like they have a lot to talk about. I’ve not picked up on any plans for another meeting. So Israel is really out of the core countries that are influencing Trump’s decision-making, even though they talk, we’re not seeing any real practical effect on what the US does.

Borschel-Dan: Let’s go to a short break.

And we’re back. I’m Amanda Borschel-Dan here in our Jerusalem Studio with diplomatic correspondent Lazar Berman. Lazar, you mentioned Turkey briefly right before we went to break. And there are those who are saying, along the narrative that Israel is a warmongering state and will turn its eye to any other country to continue the war. But there are those who are saying that Israel and Turkey will very soon fight a proxy war in Syria. This is something that I heard on the way into the office this morning, even. Do you have any thoughts about this theory?

Whispers of a proxy war in Syria between Israel and Turkey 

Berman: So it doesn’t serve anyone’s interest, not Israel’s or Turkey’s, to be in any sort of, certainly not a direct military engagement. Turkey is a very powerful military, a member of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], a very big country, and Israel also has a very powerful military. So it doesn’t help either side. In terms of a proxy war, Israel’s interests are much closer to the border. It’s protecting its own border and protecting the Druze, who are in the south. Turkey has concerns about its own border and making sure the Kurds aren’t able to organize along its border and influence what happens in Turkey. There’s a pretty decently sized country in between. That doesn’t mean there won’t be tension between the two sides. It’s not like Israel has real proxy forces like Turkey does in Syria. It has people that it talks to, especially the Druze, but that’s mostly around its own border. There will be tensions, but that’s not the main source of tension between the two sides. Turkey is certainly a problem. It’s certainly a hostile actor. It’s certainly a backer of Hamas. But the main, or at least what [President of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan uses as the reason for the hostility from Turkey, is the Palestinian issue.

That will continue to be the case. I think there are deeper reasons why he chooses to use that in terms of support from his own country and his desire to reestablish leadership of the Middle East. It was interesting, he said that what happens in Beirut and Damascus has an effect on Turkish foreign policy, and therefore, what Israel is doing is unacceptable. That sounds very much like this view that Turkey is the hegemon of the Middle East, and going back to an Ottoman orientation, that’s certainly not going to be well received by Arabs in the region. But I don’t think there’s potential for an actual clash between the two sides. There’s way too much working against that. If anything, Israel always keeps — and we’ve seen this in the past — a door open for a rapprochement with Turkey. That’s what you always see. It doesn’t recognize the Armenian genocide for that reason. It keeps diplomats in Turkey. There are trade relationships. So whenever Turkey decides that it wants to make up with Israel, Israel is always ready for that. Will it happen again? I don’t know. But that has always been something that has been driving Israeli foreign policy toward Turkey.

Borschel-Dan: So let’s talk a little bit more about the Gulf states and the reverberations of this war in terms of the diplomatic side of things. Prior to the war, there have been rumors forever that, eventually, potentially, Saudi Arabia would join the Abraham Accords. And during the war, we did see some kind of benefit to the United Arab Emirates for having joined the Abraham Accords. I’m talking about the Iron Dome battery being taken out there, and some forces we’re hearing as well were helping the United Arab Emirates. So how do you see the ripple effect of this war in terms of Israel’s relationship with the Gulf states, first of all?

Diplomatic impacts of the Iran war for the Gulf states

Berman: Sure. I’m sure there are countries that are looking at the UAE and saying, well, they were the country that was most heavily targeted by Iran. So why on earth? And they’re obviously Israel’s closest ally in the region. And therefore, it just made them get targeted more, and the US couldn’t really defend them. And why do we want to be in that situation? I mean, these countries are cowards.

That’s what I’ll say outright. They were getting hit by their archenemy, and they didn’t attack back. And even the UAE has restored talks with Iran. They’re talking to Iran again. That’s how they want to deal with this threat. They’re the ones who pushed for this war to end because they were getting somewhat hit. It’s not like they were getting devastated, but it certainly disrupted their image that they’re trying to sell to the world of stability, of safety, of a good place for investment. So they certainly are not happy with that outcome, and the Iranian regime is still there, their big enemy is still there, and it is quite strong. Big picture, all the things that Trump promised, that there will be this big peace accord throughout the region, including Saudi Arabia, and Israel will be integrated in the region, and not to mention a new Gaza, disarmament of Hezbollah, nothing will happen once this deal with Iran is signed. Everything that was going to happen was basically predicated on the idea that Iran would be badly weakened or the regime would fall. Why would anyone sign a deal now with Israel with Iran strengthened, knowing that Iran will target it if it wants to, and that the regime will survive?

None of Trump’s plans for the region will come to pass if, indeed, as it looks like, a deal between the US and Iran moves forward. Just listen to the way Trump is talking about Iran. He’s talking to them as a partner. We’re going to have a different relationship with Iran. He’s not talking about them as America’s greatest enemy in the Middle East and one of the worst enemies in the world. Not at all. And of course, Iran is not going to be a partner in any of these initiatives that Israel has been banking on Trump to see through. And now we’re getting toward the halfway point of Trump’s presidency. We don’t know who’s going to be the next prime minister, but I think none of those things will happen. All of those big dreams that Netanyahu has been talking about, has been promising, I don’t think they’re going to come to pass anytime in the near future.

Borschel-Dan: Right. You mentioned we don’t know who’s going to be the next prime minister. We, too, are in an election year, and there’s huge blowback already in the country over this potential Iran deal. We still don’t see it realized, so until the fat lady sings— and I’m not singing anytime soon— without exactly knowing it’s going to happen. Just kidding, Lazar. In any case, I do wonder if you have a quick analysis to end with, between the potential memorandum of understanding that we’re hearing about now and the deal, the Obama deal that Trump left, are there any improvements in terms of the conditions, if you’re thinking as an American?

Current MOU compared to 2015 JCPOA

Berman: Well, the MOU doesn’t actually say what’s going to happen with the nuclear file. So, there’s nothing to compare really. The Strait of Hormuz, again, it was open before. So to reopen it, great, we’re at the status quo ante. We can say if the highly enriched uranium is taken out of the country, of course, that was enriched after the JCPOA, so it’s not something you can compare, but Iran is saying it’s not going to be taken out of the country, it’ll just be diluted. The issue of the centrifuges, if centrifuges could be shut down, destroyed, mothballed, that would be great, but I haven’t heard that that’s on the table. And so I don’t see any sort of restrictions. There will be restrictions on how much they can enrich, and the JCPOA is 3.67, which I believe is 60% of the work toward highly enriched uranium, enough for a nuclear weapon. So even though it sounds like very little, the next stages are easier and easier. If indeed we go back to that, okay, that’ll be the same as the JCPOA, but I don’t see anything that’s materially different.

We’ll have to see what the sunset clauses are and how long this will last. There will be another Iranian promise not to get nuclear weapons, but that’s been the case already. So I don’t see why there’s going to be anything that will be significantly better than the JCPOA. Of course, a big thing will be how much sanctions relief they get. If there’s less sanctions relief, that’ll be a good thing for the anti-Iranian side, and how much of the frozen assets they receive. There’s not going to be any restrictions on ballistic missiles, and there wasn’t in the JCPOA. There won’t be any restrictions either on their support for terrorism. Of course, there was not on the JCPOA either. This will be a strictly nuclear deal for sanctions relief, which is really the same outlines of the JCPOA, just many years later. And with Iran having enriched in recent years.

Borschel-Dan: So much more to get updated on. And I hope we’ll speak with Lazar again sometime this week. But in the meantime, please check out our live blog for current headlines. Thank you so much for joining me today, Lazar.

Berman: Thanks for having me.

Borschel-Dan: Thanks for listening to the Times of Israel’s Daily Briefing. Please check out another installment tomorrow. This episode was produced and edited with care by Yitzchak Ledee. If you have any questions or comments, please drop us an email to podcast@timesofisrael.com. Until tomorrow, shalom.