On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched a coordinated aerial attack on Iran. The Iranian response included not only the use of force against Israeli and US targets, but also against the territories of several States which were not directly involved in the attacks conducted by the US and Israel. Consequently, the whole region was embroiled in the ensuing hostilities which lasted until the (fragile) ceasefire of 8 April 2026.

Experts and international lawyers seem to agree that the initial US/Israeli attacks were contrary to the rules restricting the use of interstate force, or jus ad bellum (see, for example, here, here and here). Several experts also concluded that the Iranian response was contrary to jus ad bellum (see, for example, here and here). Yet there are many more state condemnations of the Iranian response as a violation of jus ad bellum than condemnations of the attacks made by Israel and the US. What legal meaning, if any, can we draw from this uneven pattern of responses?

The Asymmetry in Condemnation

Notwithstanding statements by President Trump that he does not need international law, and the apparent failure of international law to constrain other geopolitical developments, international law and jus ad bellum remained prominent in states’ analysis of these events. UNSC Resolution 2817, submitted by 135 UN Member States (for a full list, see UNSCM 10119, p. 3), used jus ad bellum terms such as ‘territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence; Furthermore, Resolution 2817 stated that Iran performed armed attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan; and affirmed their right of self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter.

Jus ad bellum considerations were also prevalent in debates before the Security Council. Other than the US, Israel and Iran (UNSCM 10112, pp. 15, 19-21, 25), no State has either endorsed or acknowledged the legality of the force that each of these States used. The US and Israel justified the attacks as a continuous use of force and an exercise of self-defence during an ongoing armed conflict (UNSCM 10112, p. 25 by the US (and further elaborated here) and implied in UNSCM 10112, p. 15 by Israel, in line with its previous position concerning the June 2025 hostilities with Iran). Iran, in turn, argued that it used force in self-defence, as a response to aggression by the US and Israel (UNSCM 10112, p. 19-20). Iran admitted that part of its response included the territory of States that had not initially used force against it. However, Iran insisted that such territory was used by the US to plan and execute the attacks and so these measures were permitted under jus ad bellum (UNSCM 10112, p. 20).

In response to the arguments made by the US and Israel, Iran and Russia declared that the attacks violated jus ad bellum (UNSCM 10112, pp. 7, 18). Pakistan, China and Colombia, stated more broadly that these events violated the purposes and principles of the UN Charter or international law (UNSCM 10112, p. 13; UNSCM 10119, pp. 9, 11). The Arab League only referred to Israeli ‘military aggression’ in Iran, without mentioning the US (UNSCM 10112, p. 14). Somalia, which spoke on behalf of Liberia and the DRC, also alluded to the illegality of the attacks, referring to them as a ‘perilous and deeply troubling escalation’ and calling on all Members to comply with the prohibition on the use of force (UNSCM 10112, p. 10). Outside the Security Council, Spain, France and Canada either implicitly or explicitly referred to the attacks by the US and Israel as illegal. Conversely, there was widespread condemnation of the Iranian response, demonstrated by the support for Security Council Resolution 2817 (which included 135 UN Members who endorsed the resolution). Even Russia and China, the only UNSC Members that abstained from voting for the resolution, later acknowledged that they respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the region, including the Gulf States (UNSCM 10130, pp. 15, 18). This suggested that, despite their condemnation of the attacks by the US and Israel directly, their support for the Iranian response was not absolute.

Overall, the condemnation of the Iranian response was far more robust than the condemnation of  the initial attacks by the US and Israel on Iran. This led Iran to complain that the UNSC reversed the roles of victims and aggressors (UNSCM 10119, p. 21), while China and Russia abstained from Resolution 2817 and vetoed another draft resolution in a subsequent meeting for being too one-sided by ignoring the US/Israeli attacks at the commencement of the hostilities (UNSCM 10119, pp. 9-10, 15; UNSCM 10130, pp. 15-16, 19). However, even the condemnation of the Iranian response was not complete, since Iran also used force outside the areas specifically mentioned in Resolution 2817, for example in Israel. Except for the US and Israel these aspects of the Iranian response were not condemned as a jus ad bellum violation by any participant in the UNSC sessions.

The question is therefore what might be the legal value of this asymmetric condemnation in determining the correct interpretation of jus ad bellum? More precisely, could the lack of condemnation of the attacks by Israel and the US be interpreted to mean that most participants viewed these attacks as lawful due to an expansion of the availability of the right of self-defence during an ongoing armed conflict? If the same is also true for Iranian attacks in Israel, does this mean that if a State is using force in self-defence, it is not continuously bound by jus ad bellum restrictions, such as the principles of necessity and proportionality?

The Weight of Silence?

The declarations of States (or international actors that act on States’ behalf) in international forums may be relevant for treaty interpretation (as subsequent practice, according to VCLT Art. 31(3)(b)) or for establishing the opinio juris element in custom (as inferred, for example, by the ICJ ‘with all due caution’ from UNGA Resolution 2625 in Nicaragua, para. 188, and which would also be relevant for treaty interpretation according to VCLT Art. 31(3)(c)). Indeed, explicit endorsements or condemnations of State conduct undoubtedly have legal value and have been utilised heavily in jus ad bellum scholarship.

However, the way we treat the failure to condemn certain conduct is equally, if not more, important, because of the careful manner in which international actors routinely express their positions. In the context of jus ad bellum, Danae Azaria has argued that, at least when it comes to the expansion of the right of self-defence, State silence should be considered as acceptance of the legality of State conduct only when coupled with ‘weighty evidence’. This is due to, among other things, the principle whereby exceptions must be interpreted narrowly and the jus cogens status of the prohibition of the use of force.

Notwithstanding the above, the Quantum of Silence report found that ‘in practice, where scholars in this field invoke silence as legally significant, those invocations are more often than not offered in favour of relatively wide claims to resort to force’. For example, as Dapo Akande noted, some scholars have maintained that the failure to condemn the US/UK/French attacks in Syria in response to the use of chemical weapons by Syria meant that jus ad bellum rules are developing in a more permissive direction.

This trend ignores the fact that there could be numerous reasons for international actors to refrain from directly condemning the use of interstate force before a political organ such as the UNSC. According to Azaria, ‘State silence may be part of a wider diplomatic strategy or it may be motivated by economic factors or considerations of domestic politics.’ State declarations may therefore be shaped by alliances, rivalries, the geopolitical position of the State whose conduct is under scrutiny, the particular legal, economic and political situation of the reviewing State,  delays or inequalities in access to information on which judgments are based and so forth. Because much of the interaction between State representatives is not transparent, particularly when it comes to the careful negotiation and drafting process of UNSC resolutions and State declarations, it is difficult to derive legal significance from presumed motivations underlying State silence. Under these circumstances, in order to distinguish between mere silence and acceptance, it is crucial to take into account the context in which the relevant conduct takes place. Such context includes, among other things, the identity and geopolitical position of the States involved, the scale and consequences of the force used, and whether States that remained silent have taken clearer positions in comparable situations.

Silence and the 2026 Hostilities

As mentioned above, in the context of the 2026 hostilities, most international actors were silent with regard to at least two instances of uses of force:

The use of force by the US and Israel, which was less widely condemned compared to the Iranian response; and
Some aspects of the Iranian response, particularly its use of force outside of States explicitly mentioned in Resolution 2817, including against Israel.

Importantly, interpreting silence as acceptance of the legality of State conduct in both of these instances could potentially create tension. If silence is perceived as acceptance of the legality of the US and Israeli strikes, then this acceptance tends to suggest that Iran’s use of force in response would be unlawful, self-defence not being available against a lawful use of force. For this reason, if a State was silent in relation to both of the aforementioned instances, it would be difficult to argue that in both cases it concluded that force was lawfully used.

In addition, there could be a difference between the absolute silence of most international actors with respect to the US and Israeli strikes and the selective condemnation of the Iranian conduct. Arguably, the latter is a different form of silence because States already provided their opinion regarding the Iranian conduct, condemning it with respect to specific areas but refraining from providing an opinion regarding others. As demonstrated below, the fact that States have already provided an opinion regarding some of the Iranian conduct may feed into the analysis of their silence concerning other aspects of the Iranian response. In any event, for both the Israeli/US attacks and the Iranian response, there are reasons to suggest that the silence of States should not be interpreted as acceptance of the lawfulness of either State conduct or the principles that justify such conduct.

Regarding the US and Israeli strikes, several States, including longstanding US allies, either deliberately distanced themselves from or rejected the legality of these attacks, suggesting that they did not accept the validity of pre-emptive self-defence during ongoing armed conflicts. The failure to fully condemn the Iranian response may also, in itself, serve as contrary evidence for a supposed unconditional endorsement of the legality of the attacks by the US and Israel. Part of the debate in the UNSC revolved around whether US bases in the States mentioned in Resolution 2817 were actually used in the attacks (see, for example, UNSCM 10130, p. 25). The direction of this discussion may suggest that States thought that, if these bases had been used, then Iran could be permitted to attack them. Moreover, the arguments presented by the US and Israel, regarding the use of force during ongoing armed conflicts have met strong resistance from States and scholars (for context and criticism of the ‘ongoing armed conflict’ rationale, see here, here and here). Acceptance of the US and Israeli arguments would essentially permit States to freely use force just because they have clashed in the past, an interpretation which could potentially greatly undermine jus ad bellum in circumstances in which it is most needed.

In a similar vein, there is little to suggest that States’ silence about less-discussed aspects of the Iranian response, such as the Iranian attacks in Israeli territory, reflects acceptance of the legality of Iran’s conduct. Resolution 2817 condemned Iranian attacks for being indiscriminate. Yet, it is accepted as a matter of fact that at least some of the Iranian attacks in Israel were also indiscriminate and that Iran used cluster munitions against populated areas in Israel. Contemporary scholarship regarding the continuous assessment of the requirements of necessity and proportionality when force is used in self-defence is quite clear in emphasising that the choice of targets and the means and methods of attack are relevant not only to jus in bello, but also to jus ad bellum legality (see, e.g. O’Meara, pp. 31; Green and Waters, pp. 9-13). Yet, in light of the explicit condemnation of similar acts in Resolution 2817, it would be difficult to treat the lack of condemnation of the Iranian response in Israel as acceptance of the legality of Iranian conduct. Likewise, such lack of condemnation cannot support the broader implications of the acceptance of the legality of Iranian conduct that, as a matter of jus ad bellum, States are permitted to respond to armed attacks without being continuously bound by the principles of necessity and proportionality. This ‘static’ reading of these requirements, arguing that they only operate at the commencement stage of an armed conflict, has been put forward by the US as justification for the initial strikes, but it is equally untenable to support the legality of the Iranian response.

Future Reflections

As a cornerstone of the current international order, jus ad bellum remains at the forefront of debates concerning the legality of the use of interstate force. However, the sensitivity of jus ad bellum related issues often disincentivises international actors from clearly pronouncing their legal position with respect to specific instances in which force was used and many prefer to remain silent.

These ambiguities might be detrimental for international law, especially if we continue to interpret silence as acceptance of legality that could potentially erode jus ad bellum into nothingness. Some States, such as Mexico, have pushed for enhancing the transparency around States’ legal and factual bases for using interstate force. This could be a welcome development and there are various ways to support these initiatives, including by highlighting the importance of such proposals and promoting them to the forefront of the agenda of the international community, or by bringing these issues for discussion in other international forums, such as the ICJ and the ILC.

Yet, so long as international actors continue to provide ambiguous and selective declarations, we must remain mindful of the environment in which such declarations are made. This, in turn, requires us to be very suspicious and cautious when it comes to the interpretation of State silence as endorsement of the legality of State conduct and the underlying principles justifying such conduct.


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