The war between the United States, Iran, Israel and other countries has stretched into its sixth month.
Thousands of Iranian civilians have been killed since the first strikes were launched in late February. At least 18 U.S. servicemembers have also been killed — including one from the Sacramento area — and hundreds more injured.
The war has been broadly unpopular with the American public, who have faced economic impacts like rising gas prices as the fighting continues.
Over the weekend President Donald Trump said he called off new attacks on Iran and claimed that a new deal may be imminent, though Iran’s government denied it had any plans to talk with Washington, D.C.
This came after an earlier agreement was reached in June to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and stop fighting, but attacks resumed just days later.
Sahar Razavi is the Director of Iranian and Middle Eastern Studies at Sacramento State. She spoke with Insight Host Vicki Gonzalez about how the conflict has played out so far, and the challenges standing in the way of future negotiations.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Interview highlights
You joined us right when this war started in February. Is it a surprise that it has gone on so long?
The short answer is no; it’s not a surprise, although many people were hopeful that it would not carry on for a long time because wars are very destructive. At the same time, those of us who know the structural realities of the Iranian armed forces, and the regional and strategic considerations that would come into play, are not particularly shocked that it has lasted this long.
This image provided by U.S. Central Command shows the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) firing a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) in support of Operation Epic Fury, on Saturday, Feb. 28, 2026.U.S. Navy via AP
Iran has been preparing for a war like this for 20+ years since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They know very well what the pressure points are in U.S. politics and in the global economy. So it makes sense that they would have been less, in Trump’s words, “desperate” to end it than Trump himself presented to the American public.
There were earlier ceasefires and agreements reached between the United States and Iran, but bombings and missile strikes later resumed. Why didn’t those deals last?
I think there are two primary issues preventing any ceasefire or MOU [memorandum of understanding] from being durable. The first is that any kind of agreement in order for it to be durable, it has to have Israel’s buy-in. And the war is very, I don’t want to say popular, but there is a lot of support in the Israeli public. So it makes sense to me, as a political scientist, that the Israeli government would not be particularly eager to end it, knowing that the Israeli public is very in favor of it. So an MOU which requires attacks on Lebanon to cease as its very first point, while simultaneously Israel is telling the entire world that they have absolutely no intention of withdrawing troops from Southern Lebanon and they intend to stay there in perpetuity — why would that be a durable MOU?
The second sticking point is that there is, I believe, a fundamental mismatch between the U.S.’s understanding of Iran’s strategic position, and Iran’s own understanding of its own strategic position in the region. Iran has spent a lot of years and a lot of resources controversially at expanding its network of influence across the Middle East and North Africa. It’s pragmatic for Iran; that they are expanding a network that allows it to keep its adversaries like the United States and Israel bogged down in Syria, in Lebanon, in Israel itself rather than bringing the fight directly to Iran, which doesn’t always work. But it does provide to a relative degree a buffer that has helped it.
All of that the Trump Administration has not understood very well, and the administration has really made a lot of very erroneous assumptions about what would be motivating the Iranian government to make a deal, and what kind of deal they would be prepared to accept.
What stands out to you about how the Trump Administration and the U.S. has approached fighting this war?
The Trump Administration, they’re after easy wins and good optics. Donald Trump does not like to be mired in a long-term conflict that makes him look bad. He wants to have a quick win like what he had in Venezuela with the kidnapping of Maduro, who is currently sitting in a U.S. prison. That’s what I believe they expected.
A U.S. Army carry team places the transfer case with the remains of U.S. Army Sgt. Benjamin N. Pennington, 26, of Glendale, Ky. in the the transfer vehicle during a dignified transfer Monday, March 9, 2026, at Dover Air Force Base.AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson
The main point of advantage for Iran, it knows this about the Trump Administration and it knows how to exploit that vulnerability and those blind spots.
Has the Iranian government’s position and posturing toward the United States evolved since the conflict began?
Absolutely it has. Prior to the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whose son is now the Supreme Leader, there was a general sense in the Iranian government [that] the leadership that the United States couldn’t be trusted. But Khamenei said, “if you have to, if you really really want to, I won’t stop you from talking to the U.S.” That’s why the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to limit Iran’s nuclear program] was reached in 2015.
But Ali Khamenei was much more concerned about preventing a war with the United States than the current leadership is. The shift in Iran right now over the last six months has been, relative to [before] the war, the now more hardline leadership is less willing to talk to the United States and more tolerant of a war with the United States. They say “clearly, talking means nothing. If anything, it hurts us because the United States uses negotiations as diplomatic cover to then attack us in the middle of negotiations.” Which they did more than one in a span of just a few months.
Just prior to the start of the war, there were major anti-government protests in Iran in January. But after the U.S. and others launched their first attacks just weeks later, has there been a change in how Iranians are viewing their government?
Yes and in fact this is one of the major points of concern for observers, especially in the diaspora, that any kind of fracture that [resulted] from pressure was internal. There was elite fracture and other kinds of political fragmentation, but that was a result of bottom-up pressure from the Iranian public, especially since the Mahsa Amini movement started in 2022. The people of Iran had gained some ground; they had secured some formal and informal concessions from the Iranian government that were then almost entirely rolled back by the foreign attacks.
Now what has happened is a securitization of the public sphere. Executions are proceeding at a rapid, alarming clip. The government is using this attack, just like it has with other attacks and foreign interference in Iran, as an excuse to ramp up prosecution and persecution of minority communities.
A woman walks past a pro-government mural in downtown Tehran, Iran, Sunday, May 17, 2026.AP Photo/Vahid Salemi
What we’ve seen now is a more “rallying around the flag” effect where there are portions of the Iranian public [which] have for now set aside their grievances with the government, because they are prioritizing defense of Iran against foreign attack over whatever problems they have internally with the Iranian system, which remain quite strongly. They can’t be prioritized at a time of war when bombs are dropping, civilians are dying, infrastructure is being destroyed. All of that does not send the message to the Iranian public that “your government is the target.”
There is a large Iranian diaspora here in California with many different viewpoints. There were demonstrations across the state at the start of the war. But in the following months, what has stuck out to you about how those attitudes have evolved or shifted?
What I [saw] is at the beginning of this war there was a sense of possibility that facilitated a lot of hope among the diaspora, even among people who were not thrilled that there was a war. There was a greater prevalence of this sense of possibility, that something could change. There were people who were against it 100% from the beginning and there were people who were in favor of it 100% from the beginning, but the majority in the middle [had] that sense.
Anti-Iranian regime demonstrators protest outside of the World Cup Group G soccer match between Belgium and Iran in Inglewood, Calif., near Los Angeles, Sunday, June 21, 2026.AP Photo/Ty Oneil
What I’m seeing now is this shift [where] there is more anger among a lot of people for the scale of damage to Iran, and especially Iranian civilian structures and infrastructure. In the more extreme sides of the continuum of politics, there is a deeper entrenchment. People that already were in favor of some particular system — whether that’s monarchy, constitutional republic or the existing Islamic Republic or whatever — they have become much more deeply committed to what they already believe. But a lot of people in the middle have moved around in their ideas.
What does life look like for Iranian civilians right now?
The economic situation is even worse now than it was before. If we’re just looking at the people who are not in immediate danger physically, their lives have [still] become much more difficult… especially those who are already in the middle and lower classes.
For people right now, the assault is on the south of Iran. In addition to the economic impact there are electricity shortages at a time of extreme heat in the thick of the summer, which is dangerous for the people who are already most vulnerable. There’s also the bombings. Infrastructure isn’t all that’s being hit, but even if it were that would be enough that it endangers a lot of people. There are civilians being killed.
People generally are on edge; even when they don’t feel that they are in immediate physical danger, they’re also in some ways nervous about the government’s response. As I said, the securitization of the public sphere, even more than it was before, is a very serious problem. It means a contraction of civil society, an atmosphere of at the very least self-censorship, if not outright fear.
A recent poll from the Associated Press shows almost two-thirds of Americans say this war isn’t worth fighting. What kind of weight does that hold, especially since we’re coming up on the midterm election?
I think it holds quite a bit of weight. I think that Donald Trump is more concerned than anything else right now about the GOP doing well in the midterm elections. He and his top aides have said many times in the last few months that if they don’t win the midterm, they are exposed to many different types of vulnerabilities, including possibly impeachment or criminal liabilities.
I think it matters quite a lot, and as we get closer to the midterms we are going to see that matter more and more.