Executive summary

The U.S.-Israel war on Iran is reshaping global energy markets, shipping routes, and foreign policy attention in ways that carry significant and underappreciated consequences for U.S.-Africa relations. The direct economic shocks to Africa are real, but the United States itself faces great risks of getting strategically distracted at the precise moment when competition for minerals, trade, and alliances with African countries is most intense. China, France, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and India are accelerating their engagement on the continent, meaning any retraction or stall in U.S.-Africa engagement will come with a high geopolitical opportunity cost.

Background

High uncertainty about U.S. commitment will accelerate African governments’ existing efforts to diversify partnerships. France’s recent Africa trade summit resulted in an announcement of $27 billion in investments, while Russia has expanded its security footprint in the Sahel. The UAE has dramatically surged its investment in Africa, reaching $97 billion, triple China’s total, in 2022 and 2023, while China remains dominant in infrastructure and minerals and has expanded zero-tariff trade access to all 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic ties. Together, these relationships give African countries strong alternatives to U.S. engagement.

While the United States has recently made promising moves, including the Corporate Council on Africa’s U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Luanda and a newly appointed assistant secretary of state for Africa, history suggests that when crises pull American attention elsewhere, Africa pays the price in slower progress and weakened commitments. Early concerns in 2003 that the war in Iraq would hamper progress on the just-launched New Partnership for Africa’s Development proved prescient. In addition to the risks to African countries, the Iran war also poses long-term costs for U.S. interests on the continent.

Analysis

Prior to the start of the war, U.S. engagement in Africa was showing positive momentum, from the $2.5 billion in commercial deals generated at the 17th U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Luanda, Angola, to the new National Security Strategy’s brief section on Africa. Though narrow and relegated to the final page, the section nonetheless signaled a commitment to trade, investment, energy, and engagement on critical minerals. More recently, an assistant secretary of state for Africa was appointed, suggesting the administration is intent on increasing engagement with the continent. What does the war in the Middle East mean for U.S.-Africa relations?

Direct economic shock

The direct economic shock of the war on African countries is real but uneven. The International Monetary Fund downgraded its forecast for Sub-Saharan African growth by 0.3 percentage points and predicts regional inflation to rise sharply from 3.4% in 2025 to 5% by the end of 2026. Rising oil prices hit net food importers the hardest. The poorest people in these countries, who spend a greater percentage of their income on food, are particularly vulnerable. Six countries in the world face the double insecurity of existing food crises and high dependence on food imports, and three of these—Central African Republic, Somalia, and South Sudan—are in Africa. The oil price increases are also trickling down into higher fertilizer costs, which will extend the impact to the next harvest season. Some oil exporting countries such as Nigeria, Angola, or Algeria could see short-term revenue gains, but these will likely not lead to structural development without governance investment and reform. While the threat of food insecurity is real and costly, overall, Africa is more resilient than often portrayed, meaning the continent as a whole might not face direct catastrophe from the war, but effects will likely concentrate in already fragile states.

Strategic distraction at a critical moment

The larger and perhaps longer-lasting risk is that the war serves as a strategic distraction from engaging with the African continent at a critical moment. The war is pulling finite U.S. foreign policy bandwidth, including attention, senior leadership time, diplomatic capital, and likely budget, away from Africa.

The assistant secretary also only recently took his post, meaning he has barely had time to establish relationships. At the same time, as of August 21, 2026, 19 months into President Donald Trump’s second term, 37 U.S. ambassador posts covering 40 African countries were vacant, including posts for which the Trump administration had nominated candidates who had not yet been confirmed by the Senate. The number of visa-processing U.S. embassies was also reduced from 50 to 20. This diplomatic regression makes it even more difficult for African governments and businesspeople to engage with the United States.

Critical minerals are the clearest vulnerability when it comes to this strategic distraction. The United States identified 50 minerals as critical in 2024 and remains 100% import-dependent for 12 of them and more than 50% net import reliant for another 28, representing a serious economic and security concern. Yet only 4% of the United States’ foreign direct investment in Africa was for critical mineral projects in 2023, despite Africa holding 30% of the world’s critical mineral reserves. Comparatively, Chinese companies control up to 80% of critical mineral production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with much of the output processed in China. As Washington concentrates its energies on war with Iran and other global crises, continued U.S. underinvestment in Africa risks widening China’s lead across the critical minerals value chain and weakening U.S. access to the supply chains, partnerships, and influence that will shape the future global economy.

The United States has shown explicit interest in putting energy into partnerships with Africa on critical minerals, as seen through the 2025 National Security Strategy’s focus on them. However, securing those partnerships requires sustained, high-level engagement, which the war in the Middle East is eroding. Similarly, while the African Growth and Opportunity Act was renewed until December 2026, the lack of a long-term renewal continues to increase uncertainty for investors and governments alike, with every month of delay providing more time for China, the European Union, the Gulf states, and other investors to continue filling the gap and deepening their partnerships.  

The Iran war’s disruption of global energy and mineral supplies also further elevates Africa’s strategic value as an alternative energy supplier. With concerted thought and action, the crisis could accelerate the case for deeper U.S.-Africa engagement. 

Policy recommendations

To ensure that this war does not lead to a further erosion of U.S. engagement in Africa, the United States should consider the following recommendations.

Institutionalize high-level U.S.-Africa engagement to avoid strategic distraction and advance mutual economic and security interests. The 2025 National Security Strategy and comments from the new assistant secretary of state for Africa signal African countries’ importance for U.S. economic and security interests. Yet protecting priorities on the continent depends on more than rhetoric. Just as President Barack Obama’s “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific region was undermined by conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, the current war with Iran jeopardizes attempts at a new Africa policy. Leveraging the important role of the assistant secretary of state for Africa is one way to ensure these efforts stay on the front burner. As the top diplomat to Africa in the administration, the assistant secretary of state for Africa can advance U.S. interests by traveling to lead senior discussions with African leaders and by protecting the agency’s budget for Africa-related activities. The administration should also consider holding another U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, of the sort held in 2022 and 2014, preferably within the coming year. In the past, these summits have led to millions of dollars in investments, and a renewed summit would build on Trump’s recent engagement with selected African leaders in 2025. The administration should also double down on implementing the December 2025 peace accords between the DRC and Rwanda and ensure robust participation in the rescheduled Corporate Council on Africa’s U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Mauritius in December 2026. Together, these efforts would reinforce U.S. credibility, sustain high-level engagement, and demonstrate that strategic commitments to Africa remain a priority despite competing geopolitical crises.

Turn the Iran crisis into an opportunity to accelerate U.S.-Africa investments in critical minerals and energy security partnerships amid intensifying competition with China. While the United States does not depend on Persian Gulf oil for most of its energy needs, many of its allies in Asia do. The United States can support these allies by building long-term resilience through alternative energy solutions, positioning investment in African critical minerals as a key component of these alternatives. More directly, the United States must also think about the need for critical minerals in replacing its stock of military equipment depleted in the Iran war. A long-term renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, including a new addendum on critical minerals, would open new markets for importing these materials. Over time, using U.S. financing and technical knowledge to enhance the processing capabilities of resource-rich African countries could further reduce dependence on China, particularly for cobalt and rare earth elements.

Develop a coordinated U.S.-Africa strategy and action plan backed by an effective whole-of-government coordination and implementation mechanism. The 2025 National Security Strategy correctly identifies the need for greater emphasis on trade and investment and critical mineral partnerships, but the United States needs an action plan for how, in terms of ways and means, it will successfully deliver. The first Trump administration created the Prosper Africa initiative to drive two-way trade and investment. Although it was later terminated in early 2025 as part of the second Trump administration’s foreign aid cuts, the initiative was a successful coordinating mechanism for 17 U.S. agencies to streamline and accelerate the United States’ commercial ties with African countries. Going forward, the administration should clarify what the coordinating mechanism will be among institutions engaged in Africa—including the Development Finance Corporation, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Small Business Administration, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and others—and include this in the action plan. A specific action plan with an effective implementation mechanism will help prevent the United States from reneging on commitments when an external shock occurs and will signal genuine commitment to African governments.

Conclusion

The Iran war’s greatest risk for U.S.-Africa relations is the strategic distraction that hands competitors a window to deepen their foothold on the continent. The cost of repeating the early-2000s mistake of losing momentum in U.S.-Africa engagement would be much higher today, given the global challenges, uptick in geopolitical competition, and alternatives for African countries. The supply chain disruptions caused by the Iran war actually strengthen the strategic case for U.S.-Africa critical minerals partnerships if Washington has the focus to act on it, which will require a doubling down on the engagement agenda and matching it with sufficient action and resources.