The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on September 3 that its 36th Division had cleared Hezbollah personnel from two underground routes beneath south Lebanon’s Ali al Taher Ridge, the site of a strategic underground installation built by the group, and achieved “operational control” above and below ground. The reported takeover occurred despite a lull in the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah that has been in effect since June 19.
The IDF said the Ali al Taher installation had been built over two decades with Iranian financing and planning. The underground complex was massive — allegedly containing command and weapons rooms, generators, living quarters, showers, and a kitchen — and took weeks to clear, with some Hezbollah personnel being killed and others fleeing.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 4 that the ridge no longer threatened Israel. Defense Minister Israel Katz said that capturing Ali al Taher completed Israel’s effort to establish control over its self-declared south Lebanon security zone and that Israeli troops would remain there until Hezbollah was disarmed. An IDF source later reportedly told Maariv that troops found 15 bodies inside the tunnels — but neither the report nor the IDF identified them or provided evidence.
Israeli claims remain independently unconfirmed. A retired Lebanese general told Reuters on September 3 that an Israeli “ring of fire” prevented the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or others from reaching the ridge. On September 4, an Associated Press photographer viewing it from nearby Kfar Rumman saw no visible Israeli military presence there. An LAF official then told Reuters that Israel had seized the tunnels’ southern entrances and monitored their northern approaches with drones but said it was unclear how deeply Israeli troops had penetrated the installation or whether Hezbollah fighters remained inside.
Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance, meanwhile, claimed that the ridge remained free of Israeli troops and that its fighters were still deployed there. Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance bloc MP Ihab Hamadeh questioned Israel’s claim to have taken the installation, citing the absence of imagery proving entry, while simultaneously arguing that even Israeli control “is neither a disaster in military terms, nor the end of the road.” On September 4, the IDF said Hezbollah launched an explosive drone toward Israeli troops and that Israel responded with strikes against Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure, including around Ali al Taher.
Control of Ali al Taher is strategically significant. The roughly 600-meter-high ridge overlooks Nabatieh, Iqlim al Tuffah, surrounding valleys, and routes linking the Israel-Lebanon frontier to Hezbollah positions farther north. Israeli assessments describe the underground complex as a command hub for Hezbollah’s Badr Unit, responsible for the area from Nabatieh toward Sidon and the Awali River.
Israel began focusing heavily on the ridge during fighting with Hezbollah in June 2026. Operations around Ali al Taher and nearby Kfar Tebnit proved costly. Four Israeli soldiers were killed on June 19 when their tank was struck, most likely by an anti-tank missile and/or an explosive drone. Another soldier was killed, and 13 were wounded the following day in Hezbollah rocket-and-drone attacks.
The US-mediated June 26 Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement halted major IDF-Hezbollah fighting before Israel destroyed the entire underground complex at Ali al Taher. Israel then sought to isolate the remaining tunnels, striking, it said, Hezbollah personnel trying to escape or bring reinforcements. On July 29, the IDF accused Hezbollah of another explosive-drone attack there, which Hezbollah did not claim and an unnamed Hezbollah source implicitly denied. Israeli reporting said the incident prompted renewed discussion of storming the complex.
By mid-August, Hezbollah was publicly declaring that it would hold Ali al Taher and resist any Israeli attempt to seize it. MP Hassan Ezzedine, dismissing the June Framework as “stillborn,” called the installation “one of the basic positions of the resistance” on August 18, said that Hezbollah would not relinquish it, welcomed possible Iranian assistance, and said that Tehran “may draw a new equation regarding Ali al Taher.” On August 22, Hezbollah Political Council deputy chairman Mahmoud Qmati said Hezbollah would give the political process time and was “studying all options,” while holding the position and resisting any Israeli advance. Qmati also denied that Iranian fighters were embedded with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon after claims emerged of Iranian personnel at Ali al Taher. A senior Israeli official later said no Iranian advisers or officers were found inside the cleared tunnels.
Iran nevertheless entered the dispute. Three officials briefed on a mid-August message told Reuters that Tehran warned Washington, through Oman, that a “full-fledged Israeli offensive” on Ali al Taher would trigger a “large-scale Iranian attack.” Two regional officials briefed by Tehran said that more than a dozen Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel, including at least two senior officers, were with Hezbollah fighters at the ridge. Reuters did not establish whether they were inside the tunnels or fighting. One source said that US pressure caused Israel to postpone storming the ridge. A White House official called the account “not accurate,” and Israeli officials later denied that outside pressure halted the operation. Washington, however, has previously pressed Israel for restraint in Lebanon: President Donald Trump intervened on June 2 to halt planned strikes in Beirut and on June 17 urged Netanyahu to use a “softer touch” against Hezbollah.
Iran had previously treated attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon as grounds for direct retaliation. After Israel’s April 8 strikes in Lebanon, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared Lebanon and the “resistance front” part of the regional ceasefire demanded by Tehran and warned of “costs and strong responses.” Following Israel’s June 7 strikes in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Iran fired missiles at Israel — which the IRGC and Ghalibaf described as a retaliatory action. Iran also formally justified its October 1, 2024 missile attack partly as retaliation for Israel’s September 27 killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and IRGC Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan in Beirut. Iran has yet to retaliate over the latest developments in Ali al Taher.
Lebanon’s handling of Ali al Taher, meanwhile, exposed a gap between Beirut’s formal obligations to restrain and disarm Hezbollah and its willingness to enforce them. On March 2, the Council of Ministers of Lebanon banned Hezbollah military and security activity, ordered the group to surrender its weapons, instructed security services to arrest violators, and directed the LAF to begin “immediately and firmly” implementing its disarmament plan north of the Litani River.
However, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam simultaneously said Beirut was “not seek[ing] confrontation with Hezbollah.” On March 7, LAF Commander Rodolphe Haykal effectively refused to disarm Hezbollah coercively. In the LAF’s official statement, Haykal said LAF command decisions would prioritize preserving Lebanese national unity, while the solution to Hezbollah’s arms was “not military only.” President Joseph Aoun likewise insisted that implementing the state’s exclusive control over arms should proceed through bilateral dialogue with Hezbollah “away from force,” while civil peace — effectively avoiding confrontation with Hezbollah — was a red line.
However, the June 26 Trilateral Framework conditions progressive Israeli withdrawal on demonstrated Lebanese sovereign control, verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, and dismantlement of these groups’ military infrastructure across Lebanon. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, likewise requires exclusive Lebanese state authority and disarmament of armed groups throughout Lebanon. The November 27, 2024, ceasefire agreement similarly requires Lebanon to restrain Hezbollah’s military capabilities as a prelude to its total disarmament.
Ali al Taher tested Lebanon’s commitments, and bargaining had begun well before the August crisis. In early July, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that Lebanese-US contacts had explored an LAF entry into Ali al Taher in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal south of the Litani. Israel reportedly accepted the proposal, but Hezbollah rejected it after proposing that the Lebanese Army deploy around the site without entering its underground facility.
By mid-August, Washington and Beirut were again pressing Hezbollah to evacuate the ridge completely before an LAF deployment. Asharq Al-Awsat reported that Hezbollah’s complete evacuation was considered necessary to advance the framework and expand its pilot zones. These bounded areas, such as Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar Al Gharbiyeh, were intended to test Hezbollah’s disarmament, the dismantlement of its infrastructure, sole LAF operational control, and third-party verification. Hezbollah refused. Rather than impose state authority by force, Beirut pursued a negotiated handover.
On August 19, American Task Force for Lebanon President Ed Gabriel said after meeting Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament Nabih Berri that Berri would personally press Hezbollah to relinquish Ali al Taher if Israel accepted an LAF takeover rather than assaulting the ridge. Separately, in the broader south-of-the-Litani track, Berri demanded that Washington compel Israel to halt its attacks and withdraw to the international border before he would guarantee an immediate LAF deployment there.
Hezbollah’s own reported proposal dovetailed with Beirut’s approach. On August 20, a Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International source said that Hezbollah, as its ability to hold the ridge deteriorated, offered to transfer the strategic area to the LAF—but only after recovering its personnel and equipment. Israel rejected the arrangement. Several Hezbollah MPs then denied that any offer had been made and said the group’s fighters would remain. Two local sources separately rejected the Western source’s account.
By August 21, the negotiated approach had become broader Lebanese policy. Al Binaa, citing a “reliable source,” reported that Lebanese authorities were relaying US messages to Hezbollah and seeking a compromise under which the group would hand Ali al Taher to the LAF. The same account said that the Lebanese Army refused to take the ridge by force without a state-Hezbollah agreement and guarantees that Israeli attacks would stop and Israel would withdraw from the south.
Lebanon was also bargaining for LAF control of Ali al Taher in exchange for an Israeli territorial concession. That same day, Al Jadeed reported that US coordinator Joseph Clearfield was mediating a transfer of the facility to the LAF in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from Khiam or another position “of comparable importance.” On August 22, Al-Liwaa reported that the LAF would take control only with clear guarantees that Israeli forces would not subsequently enter the ridge.
By August 24, President Aoun himself was pursuing the negotiated handover. The New Arab reported that Aoun had contacted Washington seeking an arrangement under which Hezbollah personnel would withdraw before the LAF entered and had informed Berri of the proposal. The LAF, meanwhile, sought US guarantees that Israel would halt operations on and around Ali al Taher and withdraw completely before Lebanese troops deployed there.
If the LBCI account was accurate, Hezbollah was prepared to relinquish Ali al Taher only after extracting its personnel and materiel. Beirut’s separately developed approach likewise sought a negotiated Hezbollah withdrawal before the LAF entered, rather than having state forces assert their authority with or without Hezbollah’s prior consent — in line with the March 2 decision and June Framework.
Israel ultimately resolved the impasse militarily.
After Israel announced operational control of Ali al Taher on September 3, Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance claimed that its fighters remained in control. Al Manar’s September 4 evening broadcast insisted, “The battle of Ali Al Taher has not ended,” citing continued Israeli strikes on the ridge as evidence that Israel had not secured it.
David Daoud is Senior Fellow at at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs.