Borshchevskaya said Moscow has already provided intelligence and other assistance to the Iran-backed group, making the Houthis the clearest example of how Russia could help sustain parts of Tehran’s regional network if Iranian resources come under greater strain.
“With the Houthis in particular, there were reports in previous years that Russia also provided them with intelligence… details aside, it’s clear that Russia has been supporting the Houthis,” she told Iran International.
The Houthis reached the strategic island of Perim on Friday after Yemeni government forces withdrew, while the group also took the nearby mainland town of Dhubab, tightening its grip on a vital shipping route as disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz.
Since late 2023, the group has repeatedly attacked shipping in the Red Sea, while previous reporting has indicated that Russia provided targeting data and satellite intelligence used in attacks on Western vessels.
Iran has also brokered secret talks between Russia and the Houthis over the possible transfer of advanced anti-ship missiles, while Russian actors have reportedly explored weapons sales to the group.
Asked whether Iran could effectively delegate some of the burden of sustaining its regional network to Russia if its own resources were depleted, Borshchevskaya said: “Yes, and that’s not just in Syria; that’s in other parts of the Middle East.”
She argued that Moscow could provide a lifeline without crossing what remains an important Russian red line: direct military confrontation with the United States.
“Russia would do a lot to support this regime. I don’t think they would go far enough to risk a direct military clash with the United States… But they’re not going to sit idly by either.”
A weakened network
Iran’s regional network faces some of its most severe pressure in years. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 deprived Tehran of a key regional ally and ended its overt military presence in Syria.
Hezbollah has also suffered heavy losses in its conflict with Israel, which said on Thursday it had destroyed a major underground Hezbollah complex in southern Lebanon.
Iran itself is meanwhile under mounting military and economic pressure from the United States, raising questions about how much support it can continue to provide allied armed groups across the region.
The Houthis stand out in that landscape. Their latest offensive has brought them to the Bab el-Mandeb, on the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula from Hormuz, potentially giving Iran and its allies leverage over another of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
For Borshchevskaya, Russia’s previous assistance to the group provides a model for how Moscow could help keep an Iranian ally operational even if Tehran’s own resources diminish.
“I think we can count on Russia to continue to provide this type of support to Iran—that is, support that stops short of putting Russia in a direct military confrontation with the United States.”
A broader Russia-Iran partnership
The relationship with the Houthis sits within a broader pattern of military and technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran has supplied Shahed drones and production know-how to Moscow, while Russia has provided Iran with military technology and equipment.
More recently, Russia has secretly helped Iran develop supersonic cruise missile technology that could give Tehran another means of threatening US naval vessels in the Middle East.
Borshchevskaya said the partnership is driven by a broader convergence of interests, particularly their shared desire to reduce US influence.
For Moscow, she argued, the worst outcome would be an Iran that moved decisively toward the West, depriving Russia of an important partner in its wider confrontation with Washington.
That does not mean Russia would assume responsibility for Iran’s regional strategy wholesale. But it gives Moscow a strong incentive to prevent Tehran and its allies from being weakened beyond recovery.
Syria shows limits—and opportunities
Syria illustrates both the limits of Iranian influence and Russia’s ability to preserve its own position after a major regional upheaval.
Iran lost its overt military presence after Assad’s fall, while Moscow has maintained relations with the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa and negotiated to preserve a reduced Russian footprint.
“There are no Iranian bases. There are no open talks with the Iranian government the way there are with Russia,” Borshchevskaya said, while cautioning that Iran’s exclusion should not necessarily be assumed to be permanent.
Whether Moscow might eventually use its remaining position in Syria to assist Iranian-linked groups is, she said, “an open question.”
For now, the Houthis provide a more concrete test. Their advance around the Bab el-Mandeb comes as Iran is struggling to maintain pressure around Hormuz and its other regional allies face growing military pressure.
There is little evidence so far that Moscow is assuming the financial burden of Iran’s regional network wholesale. But Borshchevskaya argues that the support already provided to the Houthis offers a model for how Russia could help keep parts of that network operational if Tehran’s resources diminish.
Any such support could complicate Washington’s efforts to weaken Iran by squeezing its ability to finance and supply its regional allies.