The change bloc is in turmoil. On one side is Gadi Eisenkot, who believes that rallying around a single agreed-upon candidate for prime minister – presumably himself – could generate momentum by presenting voters with a clear alternative government.
Yair Golan appears to agree that a direct Eisenkot-Netanyahu contest would be more effective. On the other side are Avigdor Liberman and Naftali Bennett, who believe that fielding multiple candidates for prime minister could expand the bloc’s potential pool of voters.
Both theories have merit. But the continuing argument is destructive. It looks terrible, and the polls reflect it.
Eisenkot is not wrong to think that a powerful dynamic can take hold when the public begins to see one person as the next prime minister. We saw something similar this year with Peter Magyar in Hungary, who defeated that country’s Netanyahu-like veteran incumbent. A sense that victory is possible can attract voters; growing strength can create momentum; momentum can generate further gains, and so on.
Liberman and Bennett are also right that there may be voters who will support Yisrael Beytenu or Bennett’s party because they want that party’s leader to become prime minister – but only if that possibility exists, however dimly.
Former prime minister Naftali Bennett attends an election campaign event for his B’Yachad party, in Ramat Hasharon, August 20, 2026 (credit: GILI YAARI/FLASH90)
It may be dispiriting that political preferences can be so fragile, but in some cases they are. A genuine candidacy for prime minister gives such voters enough reason to turn out – or to abandon the by-now-disgraceful Likud.
Multiple candidates can appeal to different constituencies, with each potentially bringing into the bloc voters who feel that he represents both them and their choice for prime minister. It makes sense. It is mathematical.
It is strategic. But it also projects an unattractive weakness. It is a classic defensive strategy, one that tells voters that the bloc does not entirely trust them – perhaps even fears them. It is how England lost to Argentina in the World Cup after taking the lead and seeming not to believe it had happened.
That is no way to project strength.
It is not obvious who is right. What is obvious is that there is a deadlock.
And Bennett, being Bennett, has an answer: After the election, “we’ll know how to sit in a room and reach an agreement.”
Under this approach, the public can vote for any of the parties, each leader can campaign as a candidate for prime minister, and once the results are known, the bloc’s leaders will convene, negotiate, and emerge with an agreed-upon candidate – like cardinals gathering at the Vatican. All that would be missing is the white smoke. And one other small thing: respect for the voter.
Because there is something condescending about this proposition. The public supplies the votes; the closed room supplies the prime minister. We, the voters, are the small fry. They are the big shots – a little like the system employed by the haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties.
While the opposition bickers and argues, the political picture has moved in precisely the opposite direction from the momentum it needs.
A few months ago, polls put it at around 60 seats, even without the Arab parties. Today, it is hovering around 52-54. The trend is clear and significant: Instead of expanding as the election approaches, the bloc has contracted.
Some of that decline has technical explanations. Ofer Winter’s entry into politics has provided Netanyahu with a Trojan horse capable of drawing back disillusioned voters who fail to understand that a vote for Winter is effectively a vote for Netanyahu and the haredi parties. Sadly, these are many.
The alliance between Bezalel Smotrich and Moshe Feiglin has helped the Religious Zionist list clear the electoral threshold in polls. The reunification of the Arab factions has increased their combined strength, changing the distribution of the Knesset’s 120 seats among the remaining parties.
Each of these developments explains part of the shift. But even after accounting for them, the bloc appears to have suffered a net loss of several seats. The precise number is debatable; the direction is much less so.
This is the opposite of the dynamic the change bloc needs. It must create a clear sense that political power is moving in its direction – as Ehud Barak managed to do in 1999, the last campaign in which Netanyahu faced an opponent visibly hungry for the fight.
The basic conclusion should be that something about this campaign needs to change. Probably more than one thing.
The change bloc is conducting much of its campaign as a personal struggle against Netanyahu. That’s understandable, but in doing so it devotes far too little attention to the responsibility and records of the other ministers in his government – nearly all of whom have failed, with some becoming outright embarrassments.
It could also focus much more intensely on an issue where its positions overlap with those of large parts of the Israeli public: the relationship between the state and the haredi community, particularly military conscription, equality in sharing the national burden, and public funding.
These are issues that could allow the bloc to reach voters who have never considered themselves part of the Center-Left. Instead, we have an argument over who should lead, continuing uncertainty, and Bennett’s “don’t worry” approach.
Who should become prime minister?
There is a better model, and it is remarkably simple. If the three musketeers want to continue running separately for prime minister, let them. If each believes he can attract voters the others cannot, let him try. But instead of telling us that everything will somehow work itself out, they should agree in advance on one simple rule: The leader of the largest party in the bloc becomes prime minister.
Every party in the bloc would commit to recommending that person to the president. No tricks, no post-election maneuvering, and no room full of burekas. It would happen automatically.
Bennett could run for prime minister and ask voters to make his party the largest – and perhaps even pull it off with the help of Yair Lapid’s formidable election day operation inherited from Yesh Atid, the largest opposition party in the Knesset by far. Eisenkot could stand his ground and try to preserve his lead. Liberman could make the case for his considerable experience.
Each would enter Election Day as a genuine candidate for prime minister, and every voter would know exactly what to do to advance his or her preferred candidate: vote for that candidate’s party.
The advantage Liberman and Bennett describe would be preserved: Each could appeal to different constituencies and try to expand the bloc. At the same time, a voter who chooses the Democrats could strengthen the wing that is unafraid to speak directly and act decisively.
The contest would remain open until the last ballot is cast – but everyone would know the rules before the first one is. And by the closing bell, the public would have a pretty good idea of what’s likely to occur.
Just as importantly, such an agreement would reassure voters that the bloc really is a bloc, and that there is no possibility their votes could somehow end up helping Netanyahu remain in power.
For those who enjoy closed rooms, there will still be plenty to discuss behind closed doors on the morning after the election. That is where the parties should negotiate over security, the economy, religion and state, and foreign policy. That is where they should distribute cabinet portfolios, establish the government’s basic guidelines, resolve disagreements and draft a coalition agreement.
That is the work of politicians. But the identity of the prime minister can – and should – be decided by the voter at the ballot box.
The writer is a former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press. He served as chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem and authored two books about Israel.