It has been almost three years since Hamas kicked off a regional war when its cadres and members of other Palestinian extremist groups slaughtered about 1,200 Israelis. In the endless Middle East news cycles since, there has been extensive coverage of Gaza, Israel, Hamas, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Syria, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Houthis, but very little about Egypt. In some ways, it is curious, because Egypt is the most populous Arab country, boasts the region’s biggest military, and is supposed to be the most influential state among members of the Arab League. In other ways, Egypt’s practical invisibility in the past few years makes sense. Egypt is far afield from the region’s battle zones—except for the Gaza Strip—and in the power shift underway in the region, influence has moved eastward from Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha.
That does not mean that Egypt has been able to sit out the wars entirely. As these conflicts have dragged on, events have forced President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi into awkward strategic positions and ungainly diplomatic postures. Yet it is not at all clear that this is the result of ineptitude. Egypt is maneuvering between competing and contradictory demands.
It has been almost three years since Hamas kicked off a regional war when its cadres and members of other Palestinian extremist groups slaughtered about 1,200 Israelis. In the endless Middle East news cycles since, there has been extensive coverage of Gaza, Israel, Hamas, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Syria, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the Houthis, but very little about Egypt. In some ways, it is curious, because Egypt is the most populous Arab country, boasts the region’s biggest military, and is supposed to be the most influential state among members of the Arab League. In other ways, Egypt’s practical invisibility in the past few years makes sense. Egypt is far afield from the region’s battle zones—except for the Gaza Strip—and in the power shift underway in the region, influence has moved eastward from Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha.
That does not mean that Egypt has been able to sit out the wars entirely. As these conflicts have dragged on, events have forced President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi into awkward strategic positions and ungainly diplomatic postures. Yet it is not at all clear that this is the result of ineptitude. Egypt is maneuvering between competing and contradictory demands.
Cairo’s approach to Gaza is a good example. Almost as soon as the extent of the bloodshed of Oct. 7, 2023, became clear, the Egyptians were playing angles. Sisi seemed to calibrate his response to Gaza in a way that took into account the broad support that Palestinians have among Egyptians but also the robust security partnerships that Egypt has with Israel and the United States.
The Egyptian Foreign Ministry warned against escalation “in the wake of a series of assaults against Palestinian cities” while only alluding elliptically to Hamas’s attack, called for the protection of Palestinian civilians, and advocated a return to the peace process. In May 2024, Egypt joined South Africa’s case in the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide.
As the conflict in Gaza continued, Sisi ordered a significant deployment of Egyptian military forces into the Sinai Peninsula (in what some Israelis maintain is a violation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979) and maintained the blockade of Gaza. This served two purposes: It made the Egyptians look like they were being tough and ensured that Sinai could not be used to resettle Gazans. The Egyptian president is no doubt mindful of his population’s overwhelming support for the Palestinian cause and antipathy toward Israel. He must also know that the activism that helped overthrow the Mubarak regime in 2011 had its roots in the pro-Palestine solidarity groups that popped up in Egypt during the Second Intifada.
At the same time, a significant role for the Egyptians in the Israel-U.S.-Egypt triangular relationship is keeping tabs on Hamas in Gaza and, when necessary, turning the screws on the group. The Egyptians played their part when they warned Israel ahead of Oct. 7 that Hamas was planning an assault. They deserve credit for that. And during the worst of the fighting, Egyptian intelligence officials continued to coordinate with their Israeli counterparts on Gaza, with several reciprocal visits made to Cairo and Tel Aviv.
Taken altogether, Egypt’s approach to Gaza amounted to a broad effort on the part of Sisi to dance in between the raindrops—to balance his public’s demands for action on behalf of Gazans and Palestinians more generally while maintaining ties with Israel and the United States. The result was long on symbolism and short of efficacy.
Tehran is 1,200 miles from Cairo. When U.S. President Donald Trump launched Operation Epic Fury along with Israel in late February, geography alone indicated that Egypt would have little to do with the conflict. Add to this the gradual and cautious improvement of relations between Egypt and Iran in recent years, and it becomes clear why the Egyptian leadership chose once again to contort itself in ways that tried to cover all of its bases. Throughout the most intense combat in Iran, Egypt was part of a group that included Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan and sought a diplomatic solution to the crisis.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty is no doubt a talented diplomat, but there was not much that he could bring to the table, especially in comparison to his counterparts. The other countries all have more influence with Iran and the United States than Egypt, which made them superior interlocutors and go-betweens.
It was almost as if including the Egyptians in the coordinating phone calls with the Saudi, Turkish, Qatari, and Pakistani foreign ministers, plus the occasional meetings among them, was a courtesy to an old friend. It was a sign of respect for Egypt rather than an indication of Cairo’s diplomatic heft. That likely didn’t matter much for Sisi. It was likely just enough for Abdelatty to be seen taking part, creating the impression of Egypt’s regional sway and prestige.
It worked until the Emiratis called Sisi’s bluff. The Egyptians have received copious amounts of UAE largesse since Sisi ended Egypt’s experiment in Islamist-led government in July 2013. When rounds of Iranian drones and missiles slammed into Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the Egyptians were generous in the statements of solidarity with their brotherly Emiratis but miserly when it came to actual help.
It seems clear that the Emiratis suggested that they might not be no longer be inclined to float the Egyptian economy. This prompted Sisi to deploy a squadron of Rafale fighters to the UAE and pay a visit to President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed. The two had lunch at an Abu Dhabi shopping mall. Like with Gaza, the Egyptians were tapping their way around and in between their competing interests.
Of all the region’s theaters of conflict, Yemen and the Red Sea are the most consequential for Egypt—and yet Cairo has not been all that active in trying to find a solution. Since 2023, when the Houthis ramped up attacks on Red Sea shipping, the Egyptians have lost an estimated $10 billion– $11 billion in Suez Canal tolls. That is a lot for a poor country.
After the Houthis recently fought their way into areas around the Bab el-Mandeb, where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden, Cairo allegedly warned them about interfering with shipping and the dedicated revenue stream it affords Egypt. Yet when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman went to Cairo to ask for Egyptian help against the Houthi threat to the kingdom and its shipping, he got little of substance: words of solidarity, promises of maritime security cooperation (which already exists), and possible help with air defense. You have to give the Egyptians credit for perfecting the artful dodge. The crown prince, who really is a big player in the region, came home from Cairo with next to nothing.
It is true that the ghosts of Egypt’s fallen soldiers from its ill-fated 1960s-era intervention in Yemen haunt Egyptians. The situation seems radically different now, however. When Gamal Abdel Nasser sent forces to Yemen 64 years ago, it was a war of choice. He was supporting a like-minded new regime. Today, the Houthis are directly interfering in Egypt’s economic well-being, and yet the Egyptian government is not offering much besides kind words to the Saudis. No one is suggesting that the Egyptians go to war, but maritime security? Maybe some air defense help?
In case anyone has missed it, the Houthis want to press their advantage against the Saudis. Maybe that is OK with the Egyptians, at least for a little while. Never underestimate the complexity of the Saudi-Egyptian relationship. The Saudi-Houthi conflict is taking the Saudis down a peg or two, which is not the worst thing in the world from Cairo’s vantage point. Sisi is used to asking Saudi Arabia for help—financial or otherwise. Now that the tables are turned, it must be sweet for the Egyptian leader. The Houthis, in the meantime, have promised to target only Saudi-linked shipping. The Egyptians may very well be calculating that with no cavalry coming, the Saudis will sue for peace and find a diplomatic agreement.
It is easy to write off the Egyptians as incompetent boobs. The evidence does not support it. There is currently no one in the Middle East who is better at threading the needle than Sisi. He has nothing to bring to the table, but Egypt is always at it.