(Oct. 5, 2026 / JNS)

Did Egyptian intelligence tell Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that a major Hamas attack was imminent before Oct. 7?

Two waves of reporting have revived this question.

In October 2023, just days after the massacre, Smadar Perry reported in the Yediot Achranot Israeli daily newspaper that Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel had warned Netanyahu 10 days earlier of “something terrible” about to emanate from the Gaza Strip. An Egyptian intelligence official told the Associated Press that Cairo told Israel about “something big.” Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), then-chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that Egypt had warned Israel three days before the attack.

This month, The Atlantic reported that Kamel flew to Israel on Sept. 26, 2023. The Wall Street Journal added that he phoned Netanyahu days before Oct. 7 and that Egypt kept warning Israel until 48 hours before the attack.

Netanyahu’s office has denied any prior warning, and so has former National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi. In 2023, based on intelligence sources, the Egyptian media also cast doubt on the claims. Given this, I will rely exclusively on logic and probability in assessing the story.

First, it is important to separate what is documented from what is claimed. Kamel’s plane landed at Ben-Gurion International Airport, per airport records and flight-tracking data. Reports of what he said are based on statements from officials briefed after the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7. Every version of the warning traces back to the Egyptian side or people relaying it, so several outlets repeating one account are not several confirmations. Even McCaul said the question was “at what level” the warning was received, which is not a claim that the warning reached the prime minister.

Second, there is the content of the supposed warning. Every account concedes that the warnings contained no date, no scale and no specifics. “Gaza is going to blow up in your faces” is how a mediator presses for concessions, and The Atlantic says Kamel urged taking economic measures. He had visited Israel before, in May and August 2021, around the previous Gaza war. A warning of instability is not a warning of an attack.

Third, how would Egypt know the attack was imminent? The reports point to the late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s changed tone and frequent Hamas-Islamic Jihad meetings. That is an inference from behavior, not information from a source. Hamas’s leader reportedly kept his plan even from Hezbollah and Iran for fear of leaks. An intelligence service with a real source in Sinwar’s circle would have had specifics and might have acted on them itself.

Fourth, the language drifts. The 2023 accounts say “terrible” and “big,” while the 2026 ones say “volatile” and “blow up.” Each new report adds another alleged Egypt-Israel contact without adding any content to the nature of the warnings.

So, here are some possible scenarios:

Egypt had concrete intelligence of the Oct. 7 plan and delivered it. This is extremely unlikely. No version of the story states that the warning contained specific information. The Journal says Egypt and the United Arab Emirates also shared their assessments with the United States, which did not act either, suggesting none of the three intelligence services saw them as actionable. A chief holding real intelligence would not settle for a one-hour stopover and a pitch for economic measures.

A general warning of escalation risk, delivered in Egypt’s mediator role, but not to Netanyahu. This is likely. It fits the details of every account, Egypt’s role and Kamel’s visits to Israel. It is also the only version consistent with both Kamel’s reported request for economic measures to counter the threat and the absence of specific information. Nor is it clear to whom the warning was delivered: The Atlantic says it is uncertain which Israeli officials Kamel met with. Nonetheless, this was not a specific warning of what was slated to occur on Oct. 7, and Israel had heard similar things from Cairo before.

A warning enlarged after the fact. This is plausible, but not certain. After the massacre, Egyptian officials presumably would have had reason to show that Cairo had not been asleep, and Israeli critics would be willing to cite them. Moreover, the renewed reports arrive weeks before an Israeli election, which guarantees attention. None of this makes the reports false, but it is a good reason to discount phrases that sound prophetic only in hindsight.

A clear, precise warning that was ignored. This is very unlikely, for the reasons cited above.

The strongest counterpoint is that an intelligence chief’s personal visit is unusual. A former Israeli official told The Atlantic that “the messenger was the message.” That shows urgency, but urgency about what? Kamel had made such trips before, and his reported message was about concessions.

What survives is more modest than the headlines suggest. Egypt likely warned Israel that Gaza was nearing an “explosion” and urged economic concessions—the standard mediator’s approach. Claiming that this was a specific warning of the Oct. 7 attacks requires hindsight, since the warning, according to every source, lacked the necessary dates, scale and certainty.

Unless officials provide specific evidence, such as documents or exact dates, claims of a precise Egyptian warning should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.