That could effectively give Iran insurance that Israel would not strike (with or without the United States) its nuclear and ballistic-missile facilities, as well as other targets that aid its fomenting of international terrorism. That would likely also extend to any action to ensure that Hezbollah isn’t able to re-establish its ability to threaten northern Israel, which was largely eliminated by the current government’s victories won during the course of the war that ensued after the catastrophe of Oct. 7, 2023.
And it might also be exactly what Hamas needs to ensure that it can get away with its refusal to abide by the terms of the October 2025 ceasefire agreement with the United States, and both disarm and surrender governance of the approximate 30% of the Gaza Strip it still controls.
That is why the precedent of Mansour Abbas’s participation in the government led by Bennett and his colleague Yair Lapid from June 2021 to December 2022 isn’t a reason to try such a scheme again.
Israelis may have patted themselves on the back during those 18 months for demonstrating to the world anew that it was a democracy in which Arabs as well as Jews could govern. While that fact didn’t convince any of its critics to stop libeling it as an “apartheid state,” it also took place in a time when Israel wasn’t at war.
During the period before the Hamas-led Palestinian Arab orgy of mass murder, torture, rape and kidnapping that took place on Oct. 7, the entire Israeli military, intelligence and political establishments, including both Netanyahu and those who opposed him in the current election, were convinced that Hamas wasn’t really a threat. Few understood the gravity of their country’s security predicament as Iran put in place the forces that would launch a multi-front war on the Jewish state.
In the aftermath of that disaster and the costly war Israel was forced to fight against foes who amply demonstrated their genocidal intent, it’s all well and good to second-guess Netanyahu and blame him for it happening on his watch. But it is equally apparent that refraining from inviting into the cabinet parties that are against ensuring the elimination of the ability of Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran to again call into question Israel’s existence is not an irrational or bigoted perspective. It’s simply common sense.
And that is not even taking into account the argument that in the remaining two years of President Donald Trump’s second term, Israel has a unique window of opportunity to ensure its security. That window is likely to close once he leaves office and is replaced by either a Democrat or a Republican like Vice President JD Vance, who would, at best, be less interested in Israel’s strategic dilemmas and might be hostile to Jerusalem.
Even if we assume that Eisenkot would wish to follow in Netanyahu’s footsteps and form a partnership with Trump on these issues—an assumption that may be unfounded—the idea that an Israel governed by a coalition dependent on the goodwill of the Joint List, let alone Ra’am, could pursue such necessary policies is pure fantasy.