With the Republicans losing control of both the House and the Senate in the Nov. 3 US midterm elections, many observers saw the outcome as a broad public rejection of the war with Iran. The conflict had come home to American voters through higher fuel prices, a rising cost of living and persistent inflation. Low-income families felt it most. Many voters, Republicans among them, switched to the Democrats. President Donald Trump implicitly conceded as much. Vice President J.D. Vance said it outright.
Tehran hailed the result as a political win. It saw the vote as proof that it had made Trump pay at the polls for the war launched against Iran. That helps explain why the regime dragged its feet in negotiations until Election Day. It also explains why prominent figures, including Parliament Speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, kept stressing how much the war was costing ordinary Americans, the same costs that ultimately hurt the Republicans.
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, however, sounded a note of caution. In a message marking the anniversary of the 1979 takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, he warned against relying on “partisan and factional shifts” in Washington. Believing that American hostility could be ended through concessions, he said, would be a “grave mistake.”
This message matters for two reasons: it comes from the highest authority in the Islamic Republic and it lays bare Tehran’s approach to Washington. It restates a long-held doctrine of the Iranian leadership: strategic security decisions are not shaped by US election results, even ones that go against Trump. Instead, Tehran seeks to create facts on the ground that force Washington into tangible concessions. Behind this lies a deep distrust and Khamenei’s view of the US as the “Great Satan” bent on toppling the Islamic system.
By casting the result as a reward for resilience, it helps the ruling establishment justify the steep price of confronting the US
Hassan Al-Mustafa
Others in the establishment were less restrained. Qalibaf declared that Americans had “said no to war,” whether out of conscience or because of the cost of living. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, claimed that Iran had dealt Trump “a heavy political defeat in Washington” after inflicting “a defeat on the battlefield.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei said American voters had “sent a clear message to their administration.”
These officials do not always agree, even on talks with Washington. On this, though, they speak with one voice: Trump lost and Iran won. The narrative serves a domestic purpose. By casting the Republican defeat as a reward for resilience, it helps the ruling establishment justify the steep price of confronting the Trump administration.
Iranian society is far from united. Most Iranians firmly oppose US and Israeli military action. Yet many also blame their own political and security leaders for the soaring cost of living and the dangers the country has been exposed to.
Videos on social media showed people celebrating “Trump’s defeat” and handing out sweets in the streets. Some of these scenes were spontaneous. Others may have been orchestrated by hard-liners. Either way, the public mood is better judged over time than through passing moments of jubilation.
The election has opened a wider, if cautious, window for diplomacy. It has not, so far, changed the facts on the ground
Hassan Al-Mustafa
A Nov. 5 report by Amwaj.media pointed to divisions within society and among political and intellectual elites over the US results. Analyst Ehsan Taghaddosi said the Republican defeat would make a prolonged war harder to finance but would not stop Trump from ordering limited strikes. Writer Mostafa Najafi argued that the higher political cost of war had not eliminated the risk of renewed fighting. An unnamed senior Iranian political source told the outlet that “Tehran remains on alert,” a clear sign that the euphoria in some quarters does not rule out a return to war, possibly on a larger scale.
In my view, having followed the thinking of some Iranian power centers, especially hard-liners whose outlook blends revolutionary ideology with religious conviction, the real danger is that the political reading of the midterms hardens into rigidity. It could leave little room for flexibility or load the results with more meaning than they can carry.
If Tehran concludes that Trump can no longer use force, it may raise its demands, stall on its commitments and treat Qatar’s mediation as a way to run down the clock until Democrats take over Congress in January 2027.
That would be a miscalculation. The new Democratic majority will be able to tighten oversight, shape spending and hold the administration to account. It cannot, on its own, halt military operations overnight. And opposing Trump’s methods is not the same as backing Iran’s demands.
Further intransigence could convince Washington that Tehran is betting on wearing it down. That would strengthen the hand of those pushing for military pressure and could bring a strike closer, just as Qatari mediators, backed by regional powers led by Saudi Arabia, work toward a durable diplomatic settlement.
The election has opened a wider, if cautious, window for diplomacy. It has not, so far, changed the facts on the ground. Tehran must separate the Republicans’ unpopularity from Trump’s ability to wage a new war. Confusing the two would shrink the prospects for Qatar’s mediation despite Doha’s tireless efforts. Iran should build on those efforts, not undermine them, and that requires a genuine, practical and timely response from Tehran, matched by acceptance from Washington.
Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse, and relations between Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran.
X: @Halmustafa
Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse and the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran. Twitter: @Halmustafa