Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Kateryna Stepanenko
August 31, 2025, 6:30pm ETÂ
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on August 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Kremlin is pursuing a multi-pronged informational effort aimed at deterring Western support for Ukraine and undermining European participation in the peace process. The Kremlin has recently been intensifying three rhetorical lines aimed at influencing Western decision-making in the Kremlin’s favor: accusing European states of prolonging the war in Ukraine, levying nuclear threats against Western states, and claiming that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Kremlin officials, most notably Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev, implied that European states seek to prolong the war in Ukraine in an effort to reinject this long-held Russian narrative back into the Western information space to undermine US trust in European governments.[1] The Kremlin often leverages Dmitriev to advocate for Russia’s interests in the West, particularly involving the peace process in Ukraine and sanctions, on English-language platforms and media outlets.[2] Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev criticized French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on August 31, regarding France’s and Germany’s involvement in US efforts to end the war in Ukraine.[3] Medvedev claimed that Merz and Macron have “forgotten the lessons” of the Second World War and that “things could end up like they did in 1945 – [Macron and Merz] too may end up being identified by their teeth.” Medvedev is evoking the memory of US atomic bombs to threaten France and Germany for supporting Ukraine in the peace process. Medvedev also claimed that Russian advances are “bad news” for Macron and Merz. These various rhetorical lines seek to bolster the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s recently intensified effort to falsely portray Russian victory in Ukraine as inevitable.[4] The MoD attempted to use large amounts of qualitative data to make claims about Russian advances – data and claims which ISW assesses are inflated.
Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for exaggerating its battlefield successes. Russian milbloggers heavily criticized Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s August 30 claims that Russian forces seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025 and rejected Gerasimov’s claim that Russian forces have seized half of Kupyansk.[5] The milbloggers characterized Gerasimov’s figures as a “very big exaggeration” and asked which elements of the Russian military command structure are feeding false reports to the Russian high command. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces had gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and seized 130 settlements between March 1 and August 30.[6]
The Kremlin is intensifying these information efforts because its territorial gains remain disproportionately limited and slow relative to the high losses incurred. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Russian forces incurred 210,000 personnel casualties in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts from January to August 2025, an average of 26,250 casualties per month.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered a total of 290,000 personnel casualties throughout the entire theater from January to August 2025, an average of 36,250 casualties per month. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona reported on August 29 that data from the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) suggests that at least 93,000 Russian military personnel died in 2024 — almost twice as many as in 2023 (about 50,000), and estimated using a predictive model that at least 56,000 Russian soldiers have died since the start of 2025.[8] Russia’s gains have been largely gradual and creeping for many months, and Russia’s rate of advance is incredibly slow under the norms of modern mechanized warfare.[9] Any assessment of Russia’s battlefield performance and strength must examine both the tempo of advance and the resulting losses to make those gains.
Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin is pursuing a multi-pronged informational effort aimed at deterring Western support for Ukraine and undermining European participation in the peace process.Â
Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for exaggerating its battlefield successes.
The Kremlin is intensifying these information efforts because its territorial gains remain disproportionately limited and slow relative to the high losses incurred.
Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk.
 
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Â
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 31 but did not advance.
 
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky, and in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 30 and 31.[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachnye.[11]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 31 that elements of the Russian 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Eastern Military District [EMD]) fighting near Sadky are taking heavy losses and struggling to evacuate wounded personnel.[12] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Airborne Division) will reinforce or replace Russian forces fighting in Yunakivka. The Russian milblogger claimed that elements of Chechen Akhmat forces recently conducted a failed assault near Varachyne and are preparing for a new assault alongside elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and with support from the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up).[13] The milblogger indicated that the Chechen forces likely hope to consolidate positions that elements of the 22nd and 1443rd motorized rifle regiments aim to seize in an effort to avoid participating in any significant combat. The milblogger expressed surprise that Chechen forces participated in an assault and reiterated longstanding claims that Chechen forces only film propaganda videos and do not participate in actual combat.
The Russian milblogger also claimed that North Korean sappers will reportedly soon operate in the Sudzha and Guyevo areas in Kursk Oblast.[14] The milblogger claimed that Russian commanders received an order to notify their subordinates of the North Korean deployment in the coming days to prevent friendly fire incidents or other “misunderstandings” that may arise from the language barrier. The milblogger assessed that North Korean forces are unlikely to conduct assaults against Ukraine and will likely conduct tasks in the rear, including cooks and cleaners, to free up the Russian rear personnel for infantry assaults.
Order of Battle: Elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in the Sumy direction.[15]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 31 but did not make confirmed advances.
 
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Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 100 meters along the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River within Vovchansk and 500 to 600 meters in the forests west of Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[16]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Hlyboke and toward Synelnykove on August 30 and 31.[17]Â
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 31.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 31 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, Synkivka, and Kranse Pershe, and toward Novovasylivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and west of Kupyansk toward Solobika on August 30 and 31.[18]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[19]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 31 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka and Olhivka on August 30 and 31.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Novomykhailivka.[21]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[22]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske, Zarichne, and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 30 and 31.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shandryholove and Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[24]
Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from some positions in the Serebryanske forest area.[25] An officer of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces continue only to field motorcycles and are not deploying armored vehicles.[26] The officer stated that only one or two Russian motorcycles out of 15 motorcycles participating in an assault will break through, after which Russian forces will attempt to accumulate additional forces at the new position.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
 
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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 31 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on August 30 and 31.[27] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces regularly counterattack near Serebryanka.[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 31 but did not advance.Â
Russian forces attacked near the west of Chasiv Yar toward Podilske and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 30 and 31.[29]
Russian milbloggers claimed that western Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar) is a contested “gray zone” and that Ukrainian forces often counterattack in the settlement.[30]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[31]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
 
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Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 31 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Rusyn Yar and advanced southeast of Sofiivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[32]
Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shulytne; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Kleban Byk, Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, Katerynivka, Sofiivka, and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 30 and 31.[33]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka and acknowledged that Ukrainian civilians remain in the city.[34]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 31 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within southern Pokrovsk and northwest of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[36]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Vilne, Shakhove, Fedorivka, Mayak, Zapovidne, Nove Shakhove, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Volodymyrivka, Krasnyi Lyman, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Myrolyubivka, and Promin and toward Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Chunyshyne, and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Leontovychi on August 30 and 31.[37]
Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Ukrainian forces are clearing the remaining Russian forces in the Russian penetration near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).[38] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces have cut off these Russian forces from the main force grouping in the area. Trehubov stated that small Russian infantry groups are attempting to infiltrate into Pokrovsk from multiple directions, particularly from the southwest. Trehubov stated that Russian forces accumulated roughly 110,000 personnel near Pokrovsk in the beginning of Summer 2025 but that this number has since decreased slightly.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb and Shahed (Geran) drone strikes against Ukrainian forward positions near Shakhove and credited Russian glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian strongholds with contributing to Russian forces’ ability to penetrate into the Ukrainian near rear in the Pokrovsk direction – likely referring to the recent penetration near Dobropillya.[40] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Novoekonomichne is a contested “gray zone.”[41]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[42] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Volodymyrivka and Shakhove.[43]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
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Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage from the Ukrainian General Staff published on August 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Dachne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[44]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[45]
Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filya and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on August 30 and 31.[46]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 31 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Komyshuvkha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[48]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone, Maliivka, Komyshuvkha, and Shevchenko on August 30 and 31.[49]
A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues for Komyshuvakha, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) claim on August 30 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[50]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Komyshuvakha.[51] Drone operators of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka.[52]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City.Â
Russian forces attacked in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole on August 30 and 31 but did not advance.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31 but did not make confirmed advances.
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Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[54]
Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on August 30 and 31.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky (all southwest to west of Orikhiv).[56]
A Russian milblogger claimed that the area north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv) is a contested “gray zone.”[57] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Orikhiv direction are struggling to advance in the open terrain between windbreaks.[58]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone and artillery elements of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[59]
Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 31 but did not advance.
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Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted air, drone, and artillery strikes against a railway station in Kherson City.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an airstrike against Karantynnyy Island (southwest of Kherson City).[61]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[62]
Ukrainian forces recently conducted drone and missile strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on August 31 that sources in occupied Crimea stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Simferopol International Airport in occupied Aeroflotskyi, Crimea, on August 30 and that at least two drones struck the airport.[63] Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed a Mi-8 helicopter. Satellite imagery collected on August 30 shows a fire in the area where Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were located.[64] Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows smoke near the Simferopol International Airport.[65]
Astra reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted a Neptune missile strike against a Russian border post near occupied Voloshyne, Crimea, on August 30.[66] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck military barracks, damaged six hovercraft, and killed a Russian servicemember. Satellite imagery collected on August 31 shows damage to a building at the border post and debris in the water nearby.[67]
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage and reported on August 31 that GUR elements destroyed a Utes-T radar, a RT-70 radio telescope, a GLONASS satellite navigation system, MP-10M1E and “Mys-M1E” coastal radar stations, and a 96L6-AP radar station from an S-400 air defense system in unspecified areas of occupied Crimea at an unspecified time.[68] Geolocations of GUR’s footage indicate that the GUR conducted drone strikes northwest and west of occupied Yevpatoriya.[69]Â
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 142 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 126 drones over northern, southern, and eastern Ukraine; that 16 drones hit 10 locations; and that debris fell on six locations. Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported that Russian strikes damaged a civilian critical infrastructure facility in Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast and left over 30,000 households without electricity.[71] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that Russian strikes targeted four energy infrastructure facilities in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast and left over 29,000 energy customers without electricity.[72]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) began its annual military exercises in Belarus on August 31. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the start of the “Interaction-2025,” “Search-2025,” and “Echelon-2025” exercises at the Lepelsky training ground in Vitebsk, Belarus.[73] Forces from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Belarus are participating in the exercises.[74] The exercises will continue until September 6 and reportedly include more than 2,000 military personnel; 450 pieces of weapons and equipment, including nine aircraft and helicopters; and over 70 drones.[75] Belarusian Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko stated on August 31 that the ongoing CSTO multilateral exercises and the upcoming Zapad-2025 bilateral Russian-Belarusian military exercises will plan and practice the use of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons.[76]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/334489; https://t.me/kadmitriev/249; https://t.me/kadmitriev/250; https://t.me/tass_agency/334581; https://t.me/tass_agency/334582 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4269; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1961876053548224667
[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare
[3] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1962146935562756338
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025
[5] https://newsland dot com/post/7899748-na-stol-verhovnomu-legla-sensaciya-podolyaka-ulichil-gerasimova-v-bolshom-preuvelichenii-fantazii-rozhdalis-i-podavalis-naverh; https://t.me/dva_majors/78527
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025
[7] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28465 ; https://suspilne dot media/1103376-sprobi-vidati-bazane-za-dijsne-u-genstabi-zsu-prokomentuvali-pidsumki-rosijskoi-vesnano-litnoi-kampanii-v-ukraini/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/08/29/2000-chelovek-v-nedelyu-stolko-teryala-rossiya-na-pike-svoego-nastupleniya-v-donbasse
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025
[10] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/rusich_army/25476; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33203
[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/rusich_army/25476
[12] https://t.me/severnnyi/4981
[13] https://t.me/severnnyi/4982
[14] https://t.me/severnnyi/4983
[15] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98794; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33203
[16] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33199; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33199
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41642
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779
[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33199
[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41625 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32307 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98790 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[25] https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1103066-tam-castkovo-rosiani-potisnili-castkovo-nasi-vidijsli-osuv-dnipro-pro-situaciu-u-serebranskomu-lisnictvi/
[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/zatyshshya-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okrim-motoczykliv-okupanty-atakuyut-dezinformacziyeyu/
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33199; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779
[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/334501
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449
[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41627; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33206
[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33203
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9906; https://t.me/nichnavarta/95
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41629; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33206
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33206
[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/334575
[36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41641; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41651
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41648; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1103368-roboti-tam-se-e-ci-vdalos-silam-oboroni-povnistu-zacistiti-vistup-pid-dobropillam-poasnenna-vid-osuv-dnipro/
[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/okupanty-ne-mayut-suttyevyh-uspihiv-poblyzu-pokrovska-popry-110-tysyachne-ugrupovannya/
[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/24504
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33237
[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98792; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41633
[43] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14238
[44] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1962184396854657258; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28479
[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9903; https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/967
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779
[47] https://t.me/voin_dv/16689
[48] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98825
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28478; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16779; https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41629
[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/16686
[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/16690
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449
[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28449; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41655
[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/28901
[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41655
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/78542
[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98807; https://t.me/dva_majors/78542
[60] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28693 ; https://t.me/bpla_roy/287 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28689
[61] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28702; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28698
[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/78523
[63] https://t.me/astrapress/91099
[64] https://x.com/avivector/status/1961921723046977605?s=46&t=V5G3pSNwULQR20yvLLN2lA
[65] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025
[66] https://t.me/astrapress/91099
[67] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/1962130347098857927
[68] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6774
[69] https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1962158563658531327
[70] https://t.me/kpszsu/41401
[71] https://www.facebook.com/Chaus.Viacheslav/posts/pfbid0PKytNwhKynbrqo9ZDAUygmeEfA7Pr4VUDcr8vFwJPX7B2XCiSRcNLtQuBxkwgvDXl
[72] https://t.me/odeskaODA/11104 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1103304-rf-atakuvala-dronami-cornomorsk-postrazdala-odna-ludina-2/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/31/odeskyj-rajon-zaznav-masovanoyi-ataky-udarnymy-bpla/ ;
[73] https://t.me/modmilby/49922; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/31/v-belarusi-startovali-ucheniya-odkb-na-nih-otrabotayut-planirovanie-primeneniya-yadernogo-oruzhiya; https://ria dot ru/20250831/ucheniya-2038639496.html
[74] https://t.me/modmilby/49932; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/31/v-belarusi-startovali-ucheniya-odkb-na-nih-otrabotayut-planirovanie-primeneniya-yadernogo-oruzhiya; https://ria dot ru/20250831/ucheniya-2038639496.html
[75] https://ria dot ru/20250831/ucheniya-2038639496.html
[76] https://t.me/modmilby/49935; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/31/v-belarusi-startovali-ucheniya-odkb-na-nih-otrabotayut-planirovanie-primeneniya-yadernogo-oruzhiya