While security forces appear to have suppressed large-scale street protests for now, developments since late December point to a deeper breakdown in political legitimacy, elite cohesion, and state capacity.
Javad Emam, a prominent reformist politician and spokesperson for Iran’s Reform Front, wrote on January 25 that the status quo “can no longer be defended or justified,” adding that current conditions bear “no resemblance” to the political system reformists once believed could reconcile republicanism and Islam.
A day earlier, Hassan Younesi—an attorney and the son of a former intelligence minister—issued an even starker repudiation.
In a public statement, he said he was “repulsed” by a system that ordered the killings, by a government that enabled them, and by reformism itself for having justified the violence.
Such statements may not amount to a unified political alternative, but suggest that narratives centred on reform, justification, or gradual correction from within are losing traction among former insiders.
Unprecedented killing
On December 28, a strike by shopkeepers in Tehran’s markets triggered protests that rapidly spread far beyond their original setting.
Nearly a month later, estimates suggest that at least 36,500 people may have been killed in clashes and crackdowns across more than 400 cities and 4,000 separate sites of confrontation.
The scale of the protests and its crackdown has led many to view the episode as a turning point in the country’s modern history.
Even before the protests began, Iran was already under severe strain: persistent inflation, an energy system operating close to capacity, mounting environmental pressures, and security structures weakened by a mix of external shocks and internal attrition.
An economy with little cushion left
Official figures put unemployment at just over seven percent, but nearly 40 percent of the unemployed were university graduates, a mismatch that had been widening for years.
The national currency continued to lose value. Point-to-point inflation rose from about 39 percent in early spring to nearly 53 percent by late autumn. Even households traditionally considered middle-income were cutting back on basic goods.
The government’s proposed budget projected wage increases of 20 percent, well below the officially acknowledged inflation rate. But even that was rejected by lawmakers outright, citing unrealistic revenue assumptions.
A month of disrupted commerce appears to have left many businesses with little remaining buffer, while reports of burned commercial districts and threatened asset seizures have compounded losses.
Even under optimistic assumptions, restoring activity would require substantial public spending. The availability of such resources remains unclear.
Energy and limits of revenue
Energy has long been treated as Iran’s most reliable economic lever. That assumption has increasingly come under strain.
Oil exports never fully recovered from earlier sanctions, and recent enforcement efforts appear to have further narrowed room for maneuver.
At the same time, domestic shortages intensified.
Power plants turned to heavy fuel oil, worsening air pollution, while export volumes were quietly reduced to meet internal demand.
These constraints matter because energy income underpins much of public spending, including security outlays.
Environmental stress
Environmental pressures have shifted from background concern toward immediate risk.
Official estimates attribute around 58,000 deaths annually to air pollution. Water scarcity has become acute enough that authorities have publicly acknowledged difficulties supplying drinking water to the capital, with rainfall described as the only short-term relief.
Agriculture, which consumes over 90 percent of national water use and employs nearly a fifth of the workforce, cannot be restructured quickly without risking further social disruption.
Modernization would require investment levels current budgets may struggle to support.
After December 28
What distinguishes the period since December 28 is not only the scale of violence, but its social reach.
A large share of the population would now be directly connected to loss—through families, relatives, or neighbors—potentially creating levels of resentment that may be difficult to contain through force alone.
Inside the country, prolonged internet disruptions have obscured events, but have not halted them. Outside, large diaspora communities have mobilized in parallel, amplifying international attention and pressure.
Taken together, the available indicators suggest that while short-term stability may be imposed through force, restoring even the fragile equilibrium that existed before the protests will be a tall order.