Editor’s Note: Ibrahim Jalal is a Senior Researcher and Policy Advisor whose research explores third-party-led peace processes, maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the proliferation of non-state actors and its implications on the implementation of peace agreements, post-war security orders and stabilization, the politics of social assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states, the foreign and defense policies of the Gulf and Western states in Yemen and African Horn, and the evolving regional security architecture in the Middle East. He has worked with the United Nations, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, the Middle East Institute, the Overseas Development Institute, and Sussex University’s Institute of Development Studies.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
In past rounds of Israel-Iran and US-Israel-Iran confrontations in 2024-2025, the Houthis showed up militarily for Iran through “solidarity strikes” amid the war in Gaza.
Although they have thus far limited their broader engagement to protest mobilization and political solidarity with the Iranian regime without formally joining the current war, the Houthis will almost certainly do so soon — unless they make a strategic choice to abandon their backer altogether.
The Islamic Republic of Iran created its now declining regional “Axis of Resistance” in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, both as an expansionist forward defense and advanced deterrence architecture. In the current conflict, it has become vital for Iran’s inward defense.
On day two of the U.S. and Israeli onslaught on Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and several militias within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) joined the war by striking Israel, U.S. bases in the region, and Cyprus. Iran’s most audacious ally, the Houthi rebels in northwest Yemen, will likely follow suit.
As Israel bombed Gaza in retaliation for Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, strikes, the Houthis spearheaded the Axis’s regional escalation. Translating anti-Israel and anti-U.S. rhetoric into action, they imposed a two-year maritime blockade around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, challenging freedom of navigation, firing hundreds of missiles and drones at U.S. warships, commercial vessels, and Israel, and sinking several commercial ships.
The Houthis also weathered incoherent Western responses — from the U.S.-led Operations Prosperity Guardian and Poseidon Archer to Rough Ryder and the European Union Naval Force Operation Aspides — outlasting Hezbollah, which was decapitated by Israel, and outpacing the PMF, which acted with relative restraint under mounting external pressure.
The Houthi escalation calculus is shaped by a mix of Iranian signaling, ideologically driven religious commitment, Axis burden-sharing dynamics, domestic survival pressures, reputational and power projection incentives, the sustainability of their drone and missile arsenal, and the risks of U.S. and Israeli retaliation.
Solidarity Strikes, 2023-2025
The Houthis have attributed their “cross-border operations from October 2023 to October 2025 to staunch solidarity with the “Palestinian and Iranian people” — a framing that reflects genuine ideological conviction. As Nadwa al-Dawsari, a veteran Yemeni researcher, noted to this author, “The Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea are a manifestation of their ideology.”
The Houthis view cross-border operations not only as an opportunity to gain regional standing but also as an opportunity to undermine the Yemeni government and expand their global support base. They also frame their support for Gaza and Iran as a religious duty and see the destruction of Israel as a moral cause.
During an April 2024 exchange between Israel and Iran, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the PMF all joined Tehran. On April 13, Israeli defenses intercepted multiple Iranian-supplied, Houthi-fired long-range drones and missiles, and the Houthis threatened to impose an embargo on Israeli ports, particularly Eilat. A Houthi spokesperson described the attack as “legitimate” and denied many ships passage through the Red Sea, including Israeli-linked shipping.
The 12-day war between the U.S., Israel, and Iran in June 2025 also recorded, albeit symbolic, Houthi escalation. On June 15, the Houthis, alongside the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), struck Jaffa with long-range ballistic missiles, making the Houthis the first Iranian-aligned militia to claim such a joint attack with Iran. Their engagement reflected three dynamics: the IRGC’s own calibrated response to Israeli attacks, coupled with active back-channel diplomacy and clear U.S. nuclear degradation objectives; the Houthis’ interest in lowering the operational tempo following the 51-day U.S. anti-Houthi campaign that had paused in May; and a shared desire between the Houthis and the IRGC to conserve arsenal stockpiles for more critical times, particularly after the Israeli decapitation of Hezbollah and the ousting of the Assad regime in Syria in late 2024.
The Houthi Calculus Today
The Houthis retain long-range strike capability and have not revised the ideological tenets that have defined their cross-border operations. The Iranian signaling that mobilized Hezbollah may soon reach Sanaa as well. Their opponents in the internationally recognized government of Yemen are busy with stabilization efforts that will take months to consolidate. Public opinion within Houthi-controlled areas is polarized, with populations prioritizing salary payments and basic services over adventurism. Burden-sharing dynamics within the Axis have also changed, with the Houthis now standing as the most resilient Iranian proxy.
An external military adventure would allow the Houthis to deflect growing internal pressure and distract from the shortcomings of governance, but it would simultaneously open the Houthis to severe international military response. This is the pivotal choice before them.
In the days preceding the current war, the Houthis had redeployed missile launchers, radars, and long-range capabilities along the Red Sea coast in Hodeida and Hajjah and near the Saudi borders in al-Jawf and Sa’adah. They consolidated decentralization of stockpiles, reinforced local command autonomy, and reactivated wartime emergency protocols. When the war erupted, the Houthis initially showed restraint, announced political solidarity with Iran while signaling a posture of deliberate, conditional restraint — setting the stage for potential military re-engagement. Notably, Houthi officials had conditioned resumption of cross-border operations on the collapse of the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire and broader regional escalation, after having frozen their cross-border attacks in November 2025. Current posturing, combined with past behavior, indicates a relative but movable escalation threshold and demonstrable operational readiness that can be activated rapidly once a decision is made.
If Iran orders the Houthis to formally enter the war, the hardline faction within the movement will almost certainly comply, regardless of the costs. The question is therefore less about whether the Houthis will join the war and more about what they will strike when they do. Among potential targets:
Israeli strategic depth (ports, airports, cities) currently assessed as highly likely
Israeli, U.S., and/or U.K. ships transiting the Red Sea, currently assessed as moderately likely
Nearby U.S. bases and interests in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, currently assessed as possible
Gulf energy and desalination infrastructure, currently assessed as unlikely
Re-imposition of a maritime blockade around Bab al-Mandab Strait, currently assessed as possible
Closure of the Bab al-Mandab would be a high-cost, high-impact decision. Given the IRGC’s harassment of ships in the Strait of Hormuz, including the targeting of multiple vessels and a reported decline of traffic exceeding 70%, with hundreds of ships anchored, Houthi action in Bab al-Mandab would deepen supply chain disruptions, raise insurance and logistics costs, challenge freedom of navigation, and extend a de facto blockade from Hormuz to Suez.
Strikes on Israel would partly exhaust Israeli air defenses already managing multiple fronts, widen the active military theater, and immediately invite costly Israeli retaliation, which already eliminated much of the Houthi leadership in August 2025, including their chief of staff. Regardless, the Israeli-Houthi conflict remains open, and the Houthis understand this.
While the Houthis want to avoid high-precision, intelligence-driven Israeli strikes and to maintain their de facto truce with Riyadh and Washington, their record of reckless cross-border escalations, whose strategic direction is ultimately set in Tehran, has repeatedly drawn devastating consequences. Iran may get to balance the benefits of Houthi involvement against the risk of accelerating their decapitation, as befell both the IRGC’s own senior leadership and Hezbollah before them. The Houthis, however, retain an alternative course of action: Abandon Iran, recalibrate strategically, and engage seriously in a Yemen reconciliatory process. The coming days will clarify their answer.