In a campaign-style rally in Hebron, state of Kentucky on Wednesday, March 11, President Donald Trump declared the United States “won” the confrontation with Iran, asserting that the nation’s military and nuclear capabilities have been “practically destroyed.” President Trump claimed that the US-Israeli military campaign—officially named Operation Epic Fury—was “practically over the first hour it started,” though he later moderated his tone, cautioning “you have to be careful” before concluding that “the war will end whenever I want it to end.” The announcement comes despite ongoing reports of Iranian attacks on commercial shipping and cyber operations targeting US-linked businesses.
The current hostilities began on February 28, 2026, when the US and Israel launched a large-scale wave of airstrikes targeting Iranian command centers, missile sites, and nuclear facilities. The White House justified the assault as a necessary measure to “permanently deny” the regime a nuclear weapon following the collapse of diplomatic negotiations. In the opening hours, a US-Israeli airstrike on a leadership compound in Tehran killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, along with his daughter, son-in-law, and one-year-old granddaughter, Zahra Mohammadi Golpayegani—a move the US dismissed as insufficient, despite its devastating impact on Iran’s political structure.
The regime has since moved to stabilize its leadership; the Assembly of Experts—an 88-member body of clerics constitutionally empowered to select and oversee the country’s top office—named Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the new Supreme Leader on March 8. The 56-year-old assumed power while recovering from injuries sustained in the initial strike—a bombardment that also killed several of his closest relatives, including his wife Zahra Haddad-Adel. However, Iranian officials and independent analysts have disputed the US narrative of success, pointing to Mojtaba Khamenei’s ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as evidence of a hardline consolidation rather than the regime’s collapse. The Trump administration has dismissed his succession as “unacceptable,” with President Trump labeling Mojtaba Khamenei a “lightweight” and insisting the US must be “involved in the appointment” of a leader who will bring “harmony and peace” to Iran.
The narrative of a collapse in Iran is underscored by the Pentagon’s March 24 order to deploy approximately 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division’s “Immediate Response Force”—units specifically designed for rapid and sustained ground combat. While President Trump has alternatively signaled a desire to wind down military efforts, the arrival of these specialized units (alongside nearly 4,500 Marines) signals a pivot toward a more expansive ground posture, potentially aimed at securing critical infrastructure like Kharg Island or the Strait of Hormuz.
President Trump’s declaration of “victory” is further complicated by the administration’s own previous statements. In June 2025, following a separate military campaign known as Operation Midnight Hammer, President Trump stated on social media and in an official press statement that Iran’s alleged nuclear facilities had been “completely and totally obliterated.” The need to launch the significantly larger follow-up campaign just eight months later raises questions about the administration’s current legal justification for the strikes. For legal observers, if the threat was already “obliterated” last summer, the preemptive nature of the February 28 operation may struggle to satisfy the necessity and proportionality requirements for lawful self-defense under international law and the United Nations (UN) Charter.
The financial and legal architecture supporting the campaign remains equally volatile. In a closed-door briefing on Tuesday, March 10, Pentagon officials informed senators that the first six days of the operation cost US taxpayers $11.3 billion. With operational costs exceeding $1.5 billion per day, the administration is expected to request a $50 billion emergency supplemental funding package from Congress. The request raises additional constitutional questions: the president has so far relied solely on his Article II powers as Commander-in-Chief, without seeking a formal Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)—a joint resolution of Congress that provides the legal authority to use the military for specific objectives. This legal ambiguity is deepened by the administration’s own conflicting narratives: while President Trump has openly referred to the campaign as a “war” that he could “end whenever [he] wants,” officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio have carefully avoided using the legal term “war” in official briefings, instead framing the campaign as “hostilities designed to eliminate a threat.” Rubio has further argued that the administration has “over-complied” with the law by notifying the “Gang of Eight”—a select group of eight senior lawmakers from both political parties who oversee the highest-level intelligence secrets—within 48 hours of the strikes. By briefing just this small group of individuals instead of the full legislative branch, the executive branch maintains that it has fulfilled its reporting duties even while it continues to challenge the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution itself. For legal observers, this distinction is critical, as the refusal to formally designate the hostilities as a “war” allows the executive branch to skirt the necessity of a new AUMF while maintaining a unilateral hold on the duration of attacks. Meanwhile, the campaign has drawn criticism from the United Nations Secretary General António Guterres, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier and other European leaders, who have questioned its legality under international law, as well as from China’s Foreign Ministry and Russia’s Foreign Ministry, which have condemned the strikes as destabilizing.
Despite the rhetoric in Kentucky, the path ahead appears to be one of attrition rather than an immediate exit. The March 24th deployment of the 82nd Airborne signals a departure from what CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper initially characterized as the “surgical” nature of the early airstrikes. It appears the United States’ presence in Iran will not be a short one, as President Trump indicated that the US would not “leave early,” and that “finishing the job” would involve a sustained US military presence to prevent the regime from rebuilding.
For legal observers, the next few weeks will test the limits of executive war powers as the administration seeks to formalize its financial demands and reconcile its “victory” narrative with the reality of an ever-growing US military ground presence in hostilities now entering their second month. With the March primary season underway, the legal debate over whether the “imminent threat” standard has been met is clashing with the political necessity of maintaining a narrative of success.
This tension is compounded by the economic reality: as of March 25, the national average for a gallon of gas reached $3.98, according to data collected by the American Automobile Association (AAA)—a $1.00 surge since the US-Israel strikes on Iran. Meanwhile, the strikes have triggered widespread fuel shortages, power outages, and civilian casualties across Iran. With thousands of American troops now deployed, the stakes for constitutional oversight and domestic stability have risen sharply. As the military campaign grows increasingly costly for US citizens and civilians worldwide, their unscripted and expanding nature continues to unsettle allies, Americans, and global observers alike.
Opinions expressed in JURIST Dispatches are solely those of our correspondents in the field and do not necessarily reflect the views of JURIST’s editors, staff, donors or the University of Pittsburgh.