With alarming frequency and rather quickly, the border between Israel and Lebanon can shift from calm to high-intensity conflict. Until the late 1970s, this frontier remained relatively quiet, despite the fact that the two countries have technically been in a state of war since the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict and have never signed a peace treaty. Early tensions largely took the form of skirmishes involving Palestinian militants affiliated with various factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization. However, after the PLO was forced out of Lebanon in 1982, resistance to Israeli occupation became a defining pillar of the newly established Lebanese Shiite militant movement, Hezbollah. This narrative of resistance also provided a powerful pretext for the Iranian-backed and financed organization to develop a military force that not only rivalled the Lebanese Armed Forces but, in several respects, surpassed it —  enabling it to exert significant influence across large parts of the country. 

Unlike the confrontation with Iran, in which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has clearly articulated objectives that extend beyond neutralizing nuclear and missile capabilities to include the prospect of regime change, one of the stated aims in Lebanon is, at least in principle, the exact opposite of creating the conditions for the Lebanese government to take control of the country. Israel seeks to degrade Hezbollah’s military capacity and, in doing so, also enable the Lebanese state to reassert control over the territory between the Blue Line, the UN-demarcated ceasefire line, and the Litani River, about 30 km to the north. The strategic objective is to establish a buffer zone separating Israeli territory from Hezbollah’s operational reach. 

Yet, pursuing this objective through overwhelming military force carries significant risks. Strikes that extend beyond Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, resulting in large-scale casualties, including civilians and children, and emergency personnel, while destroying houses and civilian infrastructure, risks producing precisely the opposite of their intended effect. Rather than weakening Hezbollah’s position, it reinforces its excuse for remaining a military force, without active resistance to it by the government or the Lebanese population. The risks would be even more pronounced if Israel were to initiate a large-scale ground offensive, potentially leading to a prolonged occupation of southern Lebanon, an outcome with a long-lasting and fraught historical precedent. 

This approach reflects a deeply embedded security paradigm within Israel’s political and military leadership: the conviction that only direct control over territory can ensure lasting security, rather than reliance on the capacity of the Lebanese state or its armed forces. 

Use of overwhelming military force carries significant risks.

Yossi Mekelberg

As in the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Hezbollah has moved to inflame Israel’s northern front, launching cross-border rocket attacks that it framed as a “revenge for the blood of the Supreme Leader of the Muslims, Ali Khamenei.” Although both sides can be accused of violating the November 2024 ceasefire before the latest escalation, Hezbollah’s actions went beyond a limited or localized breach. Instead, they signaled a deliberate re-entry into sustained hostilities, likely aligned with Iranian strategic interests and encouraged by Tehran. 

Hezbollah’s leadership is unlikely to have acted without anticipating a forceful Israeli response, particularly at a time when Israel is engaged in a war with its chief opponent, Iran, and still has to concentrate forces in Gaza and the West Bank. Indeed, this escalation may have been designed precisely to provoke such a reaction. If Israel were to refrain from responding decisively, it would risk appearing weak and overextended. After all, before the November 2024 ceasefire, large parts of northern Israel had been evacuated for over a year due to persistent rocket attacks and the threat of incursions by Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force. The displacement of tens of thousands of Israeli civilians represented a tangible strategic gain for Hezbollah —  and, by extension, for Iran —  one that Israel is unlikely to accept as a new status quo. However, a forceful Israeli response carries its own strategic dangers. The destruction of critical infrastructure, such as bridges along the Litani River, and the signaling of a potential ground operation aimed at establishing a security zone, risks alienating the local population and further weakening the already fragile Lebanese state. 

This dynamic creates a self-reinforcing cycle that undermines long-term stability. Actions intended to weaken Hezbollah risk instead entrenching its role within Lebanon’s political and security landscape. Such an outcome would complicate any future efforts to reach a negotiated settlement or move toward a broader normalization of relations between Israel and Lebanon. 

This dilemma poses a significant challenge for any Israeli government, particularly one that is not equipped to handle complex situations requiring a more nuanced approach. In this battle, the Israeli and Lebanese government and most of its population are on the same side, as the latter seems to be determined to take the country on a different path, helped by a weakened Hezbollah, together with Iran, which have for decades hijacked the political system and held the society to ransom. 

Hezbollah, together with Iran, has hijacked the political system.

Yossi Mekelberg

Israel’s desire to establish a security buffer between the Blue Line and the Litani River is not, in itself, unreasonable. However, such an objective does not necessarily require a sustained military presence or territorial occupation. A more sustainable approach would prioritize avoiding prolonged occupation while fostering cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, thereby laying the groundwork for a revised, mutually acceptable security arrangement. 

In this regard, a practical benchmark for de-escalation would be a renewed commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006 and reaffirmed in the 2024 ceasefire framework. The resolution recognizes the Lebanese government as the sole legitimate authority entitled to possess and deploy weapons within the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line. Effective implementation of this framework could allow for a full Israeli withdrawal from contested areas, including the remaining outposts held after the last ceasefire, while providing a measure of security through the demilitarization of the border zone. This cannot be achieved without regional and international support and  a peacekeeping operation with a clear mandate. 

Ultimately, the challenge along the Israel–Lebanon border lies in reconciling two competing logics: the immediate demands of security and the longer-term requirements of political stability. Military force may offer short-term deterrence, but without a credible political framework, it risks perpetuating the very conditions that give rise to recurring conflict. Only by shifting from a paradigm of territorial control to one of cooperative security can a more durable and stable equilibrium emerge along this volatile frontier. 

• Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.

X: @YMekelberg