Arms deals, new pipelines, laying down rail – Gulf states’ steps to protect themselves from a hostile Iran are rapid, diverse, and growing by the day.

In the days since Iran’s missiles stopped amid a fragile ceasefire with the United States, Gulf Arab states have moved quickly to lessen their reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. For weeks, the waterway, vital to an oil-thirsty world, has remained closed nearly completely by Iran, and as of Tuesday is purportedly under an additional U.S. blockade targeting Iranian ports.

For Gulf states that use the artery to export oil and gas and import goods, no price is too steep and no project is too large to mitigate the risk of Tehran blackmailing the region and closing the strait in the future, officials and observers say.

Why We Wrote This

Iran’s missile attacks and its closing of the Strait of Hormuz have cost the oil-producing Gulf Arab states untold billions. In response, they are moving to arm themselves against a military threat that hasn’t been erased, and construct workarounds to the Hormuz choke point.

Yet more is afoot than simply backup plans and alternative pipelines.

The stream of projects and the defense buildup is strengthening intra-Gulf and inter-Arab cooperation, forging a new Middle East economic model that excludes Iran, which has seemingly decided to tear up ties with its neighbors.

“We are Iran-proofing our economies,” explains one Gulf official, who was not authorized to speak to the media.  

While Gulf states insist they still wish to coexist with Iran as a neighbor, they are preparing for a future in which their economies and security are no longer dependent on good relations with Tehran.

Avoiding Hormuz

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which the bulk of Persian Gulf oil and gas is exported, along with the estimated $25 billion in damage wrought by Iranian rockets and drones on gas and oil infrastructure, is triggering the worst economic crisis in the Gulf region in decades.

Even should the strait reopen, the International Monetary Fund reports that the economies of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait will contract in 2026 to the tune of several tens of billions of dollars, while the entire Middle East’s projected economic growth will drop from 3.6% prewar to 1.1%.

A cargo vessel is anchored in the Strait of Hormuz, near the coast of Oman, April 12, 2026.

According to London-based Capital Economics, Qatar’s gross domestic product is forecast to shrink by 13% this year, the UAE’s by 8%, and Saudi Arabia’s by 6.6%.

Gulf states are decoupling themselves from Iran and any shared geography with Iran at lightning speed.

The success of Saudi Arabia’s existing pipeline that runs from its eastern oil and gas fields west to the Red Sea – allowing the kingdom to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and transport 7 million barrels per day – has led to a flurry of similar inland projects.

An infrastructure construction boom is set to be heard across the Gulf.

“The recent crisis has turned bypass infrastructure from a backup plan to an urgent priority,” says Hesham Alghannam, a Saudi Arabia-based political scientist at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.

In one such project announced in late March, Saudi Arabia began a new freight rail and logistics corridor connecting its eastern ports, oil and gas fields, and petrochemical plants, and running northwest to its border with Jordan. The 1,000-plus-mile bypass route across the desert would provide another means for Saudi Arabia’s exports to reach the Red Sea via Aqaba, Jordan, or land routes to Syria, Turkey, and Europe.

Altered threat perception

“From the Saudi and Gulf viewpoint, the 2026 Hormuz crisis has permanently altered their threat perception. Iran’s willingness to weaponize the strait is no longer seen as an occasional risk but as a permanent structural vulnerability,” says Dr. Alghannam.

A profound new mindset has been created, he says: “Reliance on a single choke point is now considered unacceptable.”

The past few weeks have seen the acceleration or launch of the following projects, which carry a total price tag of some $290 billion and estimated completion dates ranging from the end of 2026 to 2034:

The $250 billion Gulf Railway Project, 1,352 miles of track linking the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries

Rail links between the UAE and Oman

Cross-border pipelines toward Oman’s Duqm port and the Red Sea

Expansion of the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline running from Emirati onshore oil fields to Fujairah near the border with Oman, at the other end of the strait

New Red Sea ports in Saudi Arabia, and the expansion of the port of Yanbu

Saudi Landbridge rail connecting eastern oil fields to Jeddah on the Red Sea

The Saudi freight and logistics corridor to Jordan.

The goal of the projects, multiple Gulf officials say, is to permanently divert 30% to 50% or more of exports away from the Strait of Hormuz through the Red Sea or land routes, with future phases to divert up to 70-80%.

The alternative pipelines and rail corridors are not themselves impenetrable. As part of its punishing attacks on Gulf states, Iran targeted existing bypass pipelines such as Saudi Arabia’s East-West Crude Oil Pipeline and the UAE-Oman line.

Iranian proxies such as Yemen’s Houthis have warned that should the U.S. and Israel attack Iran again, they would attack the Red Sea coast in an attempt to seal off the Gulf.

Saudi Aramco engineers walk in front of a gas turbine generator at the Khurais oil field in Saudi Arabia, during a tour for members of the media, June 28, 2021.

But Gulf observers say the regional integration projects could one day include Iran, should Tehran end its hostilities.

“If Iran says ‘my future is interlinking with the global economy and interconnectivity, and I need the Gulf states, central Asia, and Turkey,’ they will find people willing to work and cooperate with them,” says Mohammed Baharoon, director-general of the Dubai Public Policy Research Center. “If they don’t want to, that is a different issue. We want Iran to say, ‘I want to be a part of this.’”

Arms race

Meanwhile, a quiet arms race is afoot.

While not abandoning their security partnership with the U.S., Gulf states are pursuing additional defense deals and military partnerships to diversify their defense and accelerate their own military industries at home to withstand the potential for future waves of Iranian attacks.

The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have all signed agreements with Ukraine to secure drone defense systems and offensive drone technology.

Saudi Arabia has reached out to Japan for Patriot interceptors, the Wall Street Journal reports, and is accelerating an order from South Korean firms for other surface-to-air missile interceptors.

There is specific interest among Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to learn from the Turkish military industry and adapt to produce their own missile interceptors and drones, Gulf officials tell the Monitor.

Multiple Gulf states are actively shopping for new radar systems and early-warning missile systems.

Work is also underway to integrate the individual Gulf drone and missile defenses into one large network, so that they no longer are piecemeal, and can better counteract Iranian barrages.  

“The development of our own capabilities will continue as part of a larger diversification and a patching of holes we found in our systems,” during the conflict, Mr. Baharoon says.

“Nationalizing our defense was a priority prior to this conflict. Now, our top priority is accelerating our indigenous production of interceptors and missiles,” says a Saudi official, who asked to remain unnamed. “We want to have normal ties with Iran, but due to the recent aggressions, we are preparing for a future with a hostile Iran.”

While Gulf states wish to avoid a head-on confrontation with Iran, says Carnegie’s Dr. Alghannam, “overall, the conflict has produced a more self-reliant, defensively hardened Gulf that is economically tougher and psychologically less tolerant of Iranian leverage.”