Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20, 2026

Toplines

Swedish intelligence assessments are consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessments about the significant challenges the Russian economy is facing and the Kremlin’s efforts to conceal these issues in order to falsely present Russia as able to sustain its war effort indefinitely. The Financial Times (FT) reported on April 20 that Sweden’s Military Intelligence and Security Service Head Lieutenant General Thomas Nilsson stated that Russia’s economy has failed to recover despite rising oil prices due to the war in the Middle East.[1]  Nilsson stated that Russia needs prices for Urals crude to remain over $100 per barrel for at least one year in order to close its budget deficit but that prices would need to remain that high for significantly longer to mitigate Russia’s other economic issues. Nilsson stated that Russia will likely struggle further to finance its war in Ukraine if oil prices stabilize and the ceasefire in the Middle East holds. Nilsson emphasized that an unsustainable growth model that cannot replace Russia’s materiel losses on the battlefield is contributing to Russia’s economic issues. Nilsson noted that defense industrial sectors outside of the drone industry are lossmaking, suffering from corruption, and dependent on loans from state-run banks. Sweden’s military intelligence analysis of Russia’s economic problems is consistent with ISW’s ongoing assessment that Russia’s prioritization of its defense industry is hurting the civilian sectors of the economy and that high battlefield losses are impacting the Russian economy.[2]

Nilsson reported that intelligence indicates that the Kremlin systematically manipulates data to convince the West that Russia’s economy is effectively withstanding the pressure of sanctions and excessive military spending.[3] Nilsson stated that Russian inflation is likely closer to 15 percent even as the Kremlin claims it to be 5.86 percent. Nilsson said that Russia has understated its budget deficit by $30 billion.  ISW has long assessed that the true Russian inflation rate is higher than the Kremlin publicly claims and that the Kremlin has been spreading narratives that exaggerate Russia’s strength to support its demands at the negotiating table.[4]

Russian forces continue to struggle to defend Russian infrastructure against repeated Ukrainian strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the oil tank farm at the Tuapse oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai on the night of April 19 to 20, causing a fire.[5] Geolocated footage published on April 20 confirms large fires at the refinery.[6] Krasnodar Krai authorities acknowledged the Ukrainian strike and resulting fires.[7] Ukrainian forces have recently launched a wave of strikes against Russian military, energy, and port infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai, including against the Sheskharis oil terminal and an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate near the port of Novorossiysk on April 5 to 6, the oil pumping station in Krymsk on April 8 to 9 and April 10 to 11, the Naftoexport port and oil depot in Tuapse on April 15 to 16, the oil pumping station in Tikhoretsk on April 17 to 18, and the seaport in Yeysk on April 18 to 19.[8] Russian ultranationalist television network Tsargrad criticized Krasnodar Krai authorities for sending ”beautiful reports” that present false information about the situation to Moscow.[9] Tsargrad complained that Russian authorities are focused on keeping the beaches open for summer tourists despite ongoing Ukrainian drone strikes and recent oil spills. Tsargrad’s criticism of Krasnodar Krai authorities comes as other regional authorities are increasing their response to recent Ukrainian strikes, with Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko acknowledging the impacts of recent Ukrainian strikes against the oblast and moving to bolster regional air defenses.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are struggling to defend against Ukrainian strikes as the infrastructure that Ukrainian forces are targeting is widely dispersed across Russia’s vast territory.[11]

Russian forces attempted to use long-range one-way strike drones to assassinate Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and a drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert.[12] Beskrestnov stated on April 20 that Russian forces attempted to strike his house with four Shahed drones, injuring him and destroying his house.

Ukraine continues to expand its cooperation with Gulf States. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine has agreed to 10-year contracts with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar and has received requests for cooperation from 11 countries in the Middle East.[13] Zelensky stated that Ukraine has concluded drone deals that include at least 10 contracts to export Ukrainian weapons.

Key Takeaways

Swedish intelligence assessments are consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessments about the significant challenges the Russian economy is facing and the Kremlin’s efforts to conceal these issues in order to falsely present Russia as able to sustain its war effort indefinitely.

Russian forces continue to struggle to defend Russian infrastructure against repeated Ukrainian strikes.

Russian forces attempted to use long-range one-way strike drones to assassinate Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and a drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert.

Ukraine continues to expand its cooperation with Gulf States.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas.

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast that aims to interdict Russian logistics. Russia launched 142 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Note: ISW has changed how it reports Russian order of battle (ORBAT) details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on April 20, 2026. ISW previously published all ORBAT information collected in a daily 24-hour reporting period in the daily assessment. Moving forward, ISW will only publish ORBAT information that is new or indicates a change in Russian units’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and control arrangements in order to focus the daily publication on inflections and new information. ISW continues collecting a large amount of repetitive ORBAT information and can make this unpublished data available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for additional Ukrainian operations in the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Belgorod Oblast that aims to interdict Russian logistics. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that Russian forces struck ammunition depots near Loknya, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 46 kilometers from the international border).[14]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces’ advances in northern Sumy Oblast have not achieved tactically significant effects as Russian forces failed to advance in the area on April 20 in continued assaults.[15] Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force reported on April 20 that Russia is not threatening to semi-encircle Sumy City from the north and east despite recent media statements.[16] Ukraine’s Joint Forces Task Force reported that Russian forces have only managed to seize villages directly on the Ukrainian-Russian border. Ukraine’s Kursk Group of Forces reported on April 20 that the situation in its area of responsibility (AoR) is stable.[17]

Russian forces attempted to infiltrate through gas pipes in northern Sumy Oblast for the second time since April 14.[18] Geolocated footage published on April 20 shows that Russian forces attempted to infiltrate south of Varachyne (north of Sumy City) through a gas pipeline in roughly reduced company strength while also employing light equipment.[19]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations and infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 20 but did not advance.[20] Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Geolocated footage published on April 20 shows Russian forces intercepting a Ukrainian drone dropping munitions on a building in southern Symynivka (northeast of Kharkiv City), likely the site of a Russian position resulting from a prior infiltration mission.[21]

Ukrainian forces are counterattacking and complicating Russian advances northeast of Kharkiv City. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that large numbers of Ukrainian drones are complicating Russia’s ability to advance.[22] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from Karaichne (northeast of Kharkiv City) and that Ukrainian counterattacks prevented Russian forces from consolidating positions seized near Okhrimivka (northeast of Kharkiv City). Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zakharivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 20 but did not advance.[24]

Russian forces are reportedly intensifying motorized assaults and drone strikes in the Kupyansk direction amid changing weather and foliage conditions. The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on April 20 that Russian forces have begun to use motorcycles in attacks due to the appearance of spring foliage.[25] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are increasing the intensity of their drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian logistics.[26]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.[27] Geolocated footage published on April 19 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian-occupied trench network southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova), indicating that there are likely no Russian positions in the area.[28] The footage also indicates that Russian forces most likely infiltrated around existing Ukrainian positions southwest of Lozova rather than seizing them as previously assessed.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 20 as Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks.[29]

Russian forces recently advanced and infiltrated in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on April 20 shows Russian forces attacking and shelling a Ukrainian position northeast of Novomarkove (northeast of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[30] The footage also indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north and northeast of Novomarkove, contrary to Russian claims. Geolocated footage published on April 15 and 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Novodmytrivka, Russian positions in northeastern Kostyantynivka, and a Russian servicemember in eastern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Kostyantynivka.[32]

Russian officials continue to dampen expectations for the Russian offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov stated on April 20 that the situation in Donetsk Oblast is a “positional standoff” in which Russian advances occur in “hundreds of meters” per week, and that Russian forces could take “months” to seize Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[33]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Geolocated footage published on April 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember south of Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 20 but did not make confirmed advances.[35] Ukrainian forces reportedly continued efforts to stop Russian attacks in central and southern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[36] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces published geolocated footage on April 20 that shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian troop concentration in Hryshyne.[37] The corps noted that Russian forces are attempting to move through open terrain and windbreaks southwest of Hryshyne to gain a foothold on the southern and southwestern outskirts of the settlement. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Hryshyne.[38]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on April 20 but did not advance.[39]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of April 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Urzuf (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline), a drone depot near Novaya Karakuba (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline), and a command and observation post near Blahodatne (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[40]  Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported and geolocated footage published on April 20 confirms Ukrainian forces striking a Russian S-350 Vityaz air defense system in Novooleksandrivka (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline).[41]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction on April 20 but did not make confirmed advances.[42] Geolocated footage posted on April 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember at an agricultural compound in southwestern Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assess was a Russian infiltration mission.[43]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 20 but did not advance.[44]

Ukrainian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on a prior date. Geolocated footage published on April 17, likely from February 2026, shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building on Molodizhna Street in central Stepnohirsk, indicating that Russian forces infiltrated in central Stepnohirsk on a prior date.[45] ISW assesses that this footage is archival and that Russian forces do not currently maintain positions in central Stepnohirsk. ISW codes all areas where Russian forces were previously assessed to be present as Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strikes against Russian air defense assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on April 19 to 20. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2KM air defense system near occupied Melitopol (roughly 76 kilometers from the frontline).[46]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction, specifically in the Dnipro River Delta, on April 20 but did not advance.[47]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet based at occupied Sevastopol and other Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published geolocated footage and reported on April 20 that GUR elements struck the Russian Yamal Ropucha-class Project 775 large landing ship and the Nikolai Filchenkov Tapir-class Project 1171 large landing ship (both of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) in Sevastopol Bay overnight on April 18 to 19.[48] The GUR also published geolocated footage and reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Podlyot-K1 radar in occupied Sevastopol.[49] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst assessed based on satellite imagery that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Olshansky Project 775 large landing ship rather than the Yamal overnight on April 18 to 19 and assessed that an unidentified warship that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) struck in Sevastopol Bay overnight on April 17 to 18 was the Project 1288.4 Gofri-class large intelligence ship Slavutych.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 20 that Ukrainian forces also struck an oil depot in occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight on April 19 to 20.[51]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces continued long-range drone strike against Ukraine overnight on April 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 142 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other long-range strike drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[52] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the strike package included about 100 Shahed-type drones, including jet-powered ones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 113 drones, that 28 drones struck 18 locations, and that debris fell at six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged energy and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[53] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian strikes damaged public safety infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast on the afternoon of April 20.[54]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing Significant To Report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Endnotes

[1] https://www.ft.com/content/04a9d05d-2502-44d4-b7e0-041aaa4f83cd?segmentId=2c1df321-36a4-1206-2c08-112c059dd69d&syn-25a6b1a6=1
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025/
[3] https://www.ft.com/content/04a9d05d-2502-44d4-b7e0-041aaa4f83cd?segmentId=2c1df321-36a4-1206-2c08-112c059dd69d&syn-25a6b1a6=1
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/scott-bessent-treasury-secretary-face-the-nation-transcript-10-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-weakness-offers-leverage-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/
[5] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37521
[6] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2046048669086916756?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2046047369977102752?s=20; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2046055763857002533; https://x.com/jeanpire33/status/2046061594870690227; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/19108
[7] https://t.me/opershtab23/15758; https://t.me/kondratyevvi/10342; https://t.me/proc_23/27871
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2026/

[9] https://tsargrad dot tv/articles/chjornoe-more-v-ogne-i-mazute-v-kreml-poleteli-krasivye-doklady-da-zdravstvuet-kurortnyj-sezon_1650328
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/
[12] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7303
[13] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18726
[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37521
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522; https://t.me/wargonzo/33662; https://t.me/dva_majors/91615; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42104
[16] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20493
[17] https://t.me/uvkkursk/326
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2026/
[19] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2045906223472537746; https://t.me/immitis71/1750; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2044478538766557337; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35002
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522; https://t.me/severnnyi/7649; https://t.me/wargonzo/33662
[21] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2045966058440311288; https://t.me/kcaebirds/2696
[22] https://t.me/rybar/79623
[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/33662
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522; https://t.me/gvZapad/18355; https://t.me/dva_majors/91615; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522
[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/20/tyagnut-za-soboyu-pylyuku-poblyzu-kupyanska-vorozhi-motoczykly-zmagayutsya-u-shvydkosti-z-fpv/
[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/20/zakinchuyutsya-tumany-ta-doshhi-nebo-zapovnyuyetsya-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-dronovi-shturmy/
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/33662; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/207635
[28] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2046042026526040238; https://t.me/kantemirovec_svo/434
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20490; https://t.me/gvZapad/18355; https://t.me/wargonzo/33662; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42112; https://t.me/dva_majors/91615
[30] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045914171129098264; https://www.instagram.com/men.of.sky/p/DXUQ8bqiNK4/?img_index=2
[31] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045895726333362677; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045895937487171992; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11734; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045869528752509065; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045895937487171992; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045895814069776877; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045895747829162206; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045895771770261682; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045895937487171992
[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/207612
[33] https://lenta dot ru/news/2026/04/20/v-rossii-raskryli-obstanovku-v-zone-svo/
[34] https://www.instagram.com/men.of.sky/p/DXUQ8bqiNK4/?img_index=2 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2045914171129098264
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522; https://t.me/wargonzo/33662; https://t.me/dva_majors/91615
[36] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1363; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/20/syly-oborony-zavdaly-aviaudaru-po-skupchennyu-okupantiv-u-gryshynomu/
[37] https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/status/2046217703107547434; https://t.me/MaxximOSINT/351; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1363
[38] https://t.me/rybar/79621
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13784 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13793 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91615
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37521
[41] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2046174642922995831; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2046150898653519904; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2237
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13784; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13793
[43] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2046230977173659995; https://t.me/ptashkaDoDo/3046
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13784; https://t.me/wargonzo/33662
[45] https://t [dot] me/WarArchive_ua/34991 ; https://t [dot] me/kraken_diu/239
[46] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2237 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/20/ukrayinski-drony-znyshhyly-ochi-vityazya-i-rosijskyj-zrk-tor-m2km/
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37501 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37522 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37499 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91615
[48] https://t.me/DIUkraine/8234; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2046115656098107667; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35001; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12837
[49] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35001;
[50] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12837
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37521
[52] https://t.me/kpszsu/60357
[53] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/28644; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/62114; https://t.me/astrapress/110298; https://t.me/astrapress/110314; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/38543; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/38548; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/38549; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/38551;
[54] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/28645