The Wall Street Journal reports that Iran may have targeted U.S. service members’ living quarters at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in attacks that killed at least two Americans last week:
While Iran has made repeated efforts with missiles and drones to hit the crowded base, no evidence has been released by U.S. officials that shows Iran specifically targeted the servicemembers’ quarters, known as “containerized housing units” or CHUs, in an effort to cause widespread casualties.
During the first of the three missile attacks on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, debris from the missile strike hit the base’s gym, U.S. officials said. A siren signaling the incoming attack sounded in time for troops to try to shelter in the bunkers. Some were wounded on the way to the bunker, but none were killed, officials said. Hours later sirens sounded again, sending troops heading toward the bunkers. This time, an Iranian missile hit an empty aircraft hangar, officials said. The third missile strike hit containerized housing units, where soldiers had been sleeping, the officials said. The sirens sounded for a third time, but not everyone made it to the bunkers.
CBS News spoke with a Jordanian military analyst who pointed out that Iran wasn’t just getting lucky, but was effectively evading U.S. and allied air defenses:
“The Iranians have advanced missile technology,” said Jordanian Lt. Gen. Qasid Mahmoud, who served as Deputy Chief of Staff for his country’s armed forces before he retired. “They’re developing techniques and capacities to extend their reach, combining with drones to overwhelm radar defenses.”
“The Iranians use simple missiles to distract the radar,” Mahmoud, who has studied Iran’s military capabilities for years, told CBS News. “They then fire better quality missiles, which change their final target in the last 30 or 40 kilometers.”
As Stimson Center analyst Kelly Grieco pointed out in an X thread, the Pentagon’s earlier decision to pull back U.S. personnel to Jordan and Israel created new risks. That move, in combination with other factors, has made Iran’s attacks more dangerous:
One way to defend against missile/drone threats is dispersing aircraft and personnel, so no single hit does much damage. But dispersal needs airfields, and per the NYT, US pulled out of more exposed bases in Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar while other partners restricted basing and overflight. This leaves the US with fewer places to park aircraft, and Iran with fewer places to attack.
Second, US missile defense is weaker than it was at start of war, both in sensors and interceptors. In the war’s opening days, Iran destroyed an AN/TPY-2 radar (the sensor that lets a THAAD battery see incoming ballistic missiles) at Muwaffaq Salti. Whether the radar was replaced before this week isn’t clear. But if not, then then the base hosting the largest concentration of US tactical airpower in the region (per NYT) has been operating without its primary ballistic missile sensor for nearly five months.
And then there’s the interceptor issue. Round two resumes from stockpiles already half empty: CSIS estimates the US fired 53% of its THAAD and 43% of its Patriot interceptors in the war’s first six weeks. That means the US can’t sustain these exchanges the way it did in the spring. With fewer interceptors, more Iranian missiles/drones will get through. This phase of the war will likely be more costly.
And the Pentagon’s ability to protect American troops remains a question mark. As recently as two weeks ago, we were still learning troubling new details about the deadly Iranian strike on a poorly fortified U.S. Army operations center in Kuwait on the second day of the war.