As a growing number of Western states are moving towards recognising the Palestinian State, a powerful segment of the ruling Israeli coalition is moving in the opposite direction. Cabinet Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced plans to build a new settlement between Jerusalem and the settlement of Maale Adumim in the West Bank. In the words of the Finance Minister and the leader of the Religious-Zionist party, the new proposal “finally buries the idea of a Palestinian State, because there is nothing to recognise and no one to recognise.” He went on to say: “Anyone in the world who tries today to recognise a Palestinian state will receive an answer from us on the ground.” With 14 lawmakers, the Religious Zionists, led by Smotrich, is the second-largest party (after the Likud with 32 seats) in the ruling coalition headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The area designated as E1 covers about 12 sq. kms and has been home to a larger Bedouin community. From the heydays of the Oslo Accords, Israel has been seeking to geographically link the Maale Adumim, the largest Israeli settlement in the occupied territories, with Jerusalem and ensure a territorial continuity. Since the late 1970s, this has been an integral Likud strategy towards settlement activities. While the Labor Party focused on establishing settlements in areas considered vital for Israel’s security, the Likud’s priority has been different. By establishing Jewish settlements closer to Palestinian population centres, it has been seeking to break the territorial continuity of the West Bank and, in the process, scuttle the prospects of a future Palestinian State. Thus, today the West Bank looks more like a Swiss cheese; more holes with less cheese.
Maverick Ariel Sharon was the architect of this settlement drive. At the same time, he was also the first Israeli leader to publicly admit and recognise the inevitability of a future Palestinian State. His plans to build a security fence along the Israeli-West Bank—derided by the Palestinians as the apartheid fence—were partly aimed at limiting the territorial composition of a future Palestinian State. His preference was for a smaller and demilitarised Palestinian state that would not threaten Israel.
The Israel-Palestinian conflict has an interesting twist. The Palestinian leadership literally took four decades to recognise the two-state option of the UN partition plan adopted on 29 November 1947. The UN General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the formation of independent Arab and Jewish states after the British withdrawal from Mandate Palestine. The prevailing regional sentiments were not conducive to the Palestinians to accept that proposal. Rest, as they say, is history. It was only on 15 November 1988—after the First Intifada—that the Palestinian leadership accepted the 1947 partition resolution, declared the State of Palestine and signalled its willingness to co-exist with Israel. The Oslo Accords were based on that premise, but they did not fructify.
Still, the mainstream international opinion during the past three decades revolved around a two-state solution; an independent Israel and Palestinian state co-existing side by side, in peace and with security. However, since the historic Rabin-Arafat-Clinton handshake of 13 September 1993, Benjamin Netanyahu was not a fan of the Oslo Accords and did everything in his power to scuttle the process and derail the chances of coexistence.
Earlier, Palestinians were opposed to coexistence with Israel; now it is the turn of the ruling Israeli coalition to tread on the same route. Whether the new settlement materialises or not, coexistence is the only option for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the two-state solution is the only way forward, with or without Netanyahu.
(The author teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)