If the war killed off antisemitism as a political movement, antisemitism as a form of hatred and prejudice did not suffer the same fate. How could it be otherwise, asks Mazower, considering how predominant it had become over the previous decade and more, and how much cultural and governmental power remained in the hands of those who had grown up under Nazism?
While the far right was marginalized in most of Western Europe, a broader racism flourished. Although there were variations from one country to the next, overt antisemitism was generally taboo. Racism in its various other forms — particularly against the new immigrants from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean — was not.
What was dramatically altered by the war and its aftermath was the geographical dispersion of the Jews.
What was dramatically altered by the war and its aftermath was the geographical dispersion of the Jews. Europe had been their heartland for centuries, but this was no longer the case. More Jews lived in the United States than anywhere else, with Israel emerging as the second-largest concentration. Jewish life was to be increasingly shaped by the dynamics between these two centers, and those dynamics in turn were unfolding in the context of the Cold War.
Although the end of the war had seen an increase in antisemitism in the United States, the period from the 1950s onward was good for American Jews, as “a system of institutionalized discrimination was dismantled with the same surprising rapidity with which it had been constructed,” and barriers in housing, education, and employment fell at every turn. Whatever residual prejudice remained, “on the whole Jews had accelerated faster into middle-class comfort than any other of the ethnic groups that had passed with them through Ellis Island.”
Even the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) considered American Jews to be enjoying levels of unprecedented security and social acceptance. This improvement is not so easy to explain, Mazower remarks, pointing out that historians of antisemitism rarely dwell on the times when the phenomenon subsides. Still less do campaigners against antisemitism ask what they can learn from such periods.
Mazower suggests some lessons. Wartime experience had discredited overt antisemitism, but, more tellingly, Jewish organizations at the time did not see antisemitism as something to be treated separately from other kinds of bigotry. They saw secure employment and public education as central to dealing with all forms of discrimination. Members of the younger generations increasingly viewed the fight against bigotry in action with its other victims as key to improving American democracy more generally.
Of course, Jews in the United States also had one great advantage: in a country where race was an overarching principle, they were white. But above all, it was the emergence of the state of Israel that changed the place of Jews in the United States forever.