Roman Gofman only took office heading the Mossad on June 2 and had little time or opportunity to work a transition with his predecessor. This was because, in a wild twist, David Barnea was part of a lawsuit trying to block his appointment, which only resolved that week.
In that sense and in the sense that the Mossad operates in the shadows, it is hard to talk about Gofman’s accomplishments as the country’s new spymaster.
But in a forward-looking sense, he will likely be one of the most powerful and influential Jews in the world over the coming year. He will have a special focus on the all-important and multi-headed Iran conflict, but also with involvement in Syria, with the US and Russia more broadly, and in combating global terror.
The Jerusalem Post understands that Gofman recognizes that his greatest challenge will probably be calibrating between advancing short-term clandestine kinetic attack or spying operations in Iran versus plans for regime change, which are likely to be a longer-term effort.
Resources will need to be devoted to each, but resources are not endless, and choices and priorities will need to be determined.
If for many years, the Mossad was assigned to thwart and stall Iran’s nuclear program, while such efforts will continue, the agency’s role in tracking and thwarting Tehran’s ballistic missiles program may grow going forward, given the regime’s direct attacks on Israel in recent years. All of this could lead Gofman to push the agency even further into kinetic attack missions, something which has grown in recent years, as opposed to its more traditional role as an intelligence collection agency – though that will still continue.
In addition, Gofman faces a unique fork in the road.
On the one hand, Israel and the US in early 2026 chose to assassinate Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and to go for an accelerated regime change plan, which in a sense broke the ice and has opened up possibilities for more rapid change. On the other hand, the failure of the early 2026 regime change plans means that there will be extra scrutiny on any such future plans, and potentially resistance from Israeli allies, including parts of the Trump administration, to trying again anytime soon.
At this point, presumably Gofman’s view would be that the old Mossad Kurdish revolt plan cannot be reconstituted and that a new plan needs to be rapidly prepared.
Moreover, one of the reasons that Gofman fired the Mossad’s deputy chief “A”, its analysis chief, and its Iran desk chief, was because he believes their former plans for regime change cannot go forward as they were, and must either be heavily modified or entirely altered.
In other words, the Post understands that Gofman did not fire the former Mossad high command officials to transfer blame for the failure of regime change generally to them from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or because of the failure of the Ahmadinejad plan specifically, according to foreign sources. The Ahmadinejad plan was a radical idea attributed to Barnea’s Mossad to replace Khamenei with former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had shifted from arch antisemite, to being willing to cooperate with unexpected partners after being dismissed by the ayatollah.
There has been no formal inquiry into the failure of the Ahmadinejad plan, and looking backward is not a priority for Gofman.
Rather, his focus is on future plans and trying to shift tactics to keep the Iranians on their heels.
His personnel changes were because, generally, the former senior officials’ plan to topple the regime failed and because he needed others with different skills and who could better connect to his mentality for how to operate going forward.
While some have criticized Gofman for not waiting at least six months or so to see how operations and relations with the former Mossad high command members might pan out, his view is that he has no time to waste.
According to his view, the situation with Iran is the most dynamic it has been in decades, and the Mossad needs to be able to jump on any openings that could be to Israel’s advantage, however unexpected, something which new outlooks will help with.
This requires organizational shifts, which can be very difficult to accomplish with any large organization, and often is much easier with some significant high-up personnel changes.
In that sense, the Post understands Gofman will probably adopt a variation of the “death by a thousand cuts” 2021-2022 Naftali Bennett strategy versus Iran, but with more aggressive short-term moves against Iran mixed in to try to accelerate the regime change and threat-reduction process.
He recognizes that Iran 2026 is weaker and more vulnerable than Iran 2021, but is also more ready to directly strike Israel with ballistic missiles, which creates new opportunities and dangers.
So there must be a mix of new versions of the Mossad’s “beepers” sabotage against Hezbollah, which often take 5-10 years to plan and materialize, but also many shorter-term actions with more immediate results (critics will point out that some of these projects may now take longer since Gofman fired three top officials).
Speaking of the “beepers”, the Post has learned that Gofman has a clearer view than ever before that Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran are really, in one way or another, mostly Iran, and this will also inform how he designs multifront strategic plans.
In addition, Gofman would note that virtually every new Mossad chief makes changes to department heads to assemble new talents and outlooks they deem necessary for strategic shifts.
Exactly where he will take the organization he cannot yet reveal, partially because many actions are classified, and partially because he is still delving into how best to reorganize the Mossad’s structure and processes to optimize the outcomes he is seeking.
But based on his running into the crossfire on October 7, despite being a brigadier general (he ended up being the most senior wounded official of the war), Gofman will be willing to take some risks to achieve certain results which his predecessors might have backed away from.
One area where the Post understands Gofman is likely to continue, and potentially expand, Mossad efforts is the social media influence campaign, which the agency went very public about it versus Iran in 2026.
In fact, the main incident that held up his Mossad appointment approval in court for some months involved a controversy over how, in the IDF, he handled or did not handle a minor-aged Israeli social media influencer, with one of the bottom lines being, regardless of his actions regarding the minor, that he has significant understanding of psychological warfare campaigns.
Some new pieces of Gofman that some are noticing are his resourcefulness and unusual determination to succeed. If his hard work and seriousness were keys to promotion within the IDF, now that he is the first immigrant head of the Mossad since its early years many decades ago, officials are seeing that only a unique character who can adapt to many kinds of roles could reach the top of the pyramid.
At his inaugural event, Netanyahu addressed Gofman and his history as someone who moved to Israel from Belarus at the age of 14, saying, “you paved your own way with 10 fingers,” adding later that Gofman was a successful boxer, finishing second in a competition at age 17.
Will Gofman survive as Mossad Chief if Eisenkot is the next PM
Gofman views himself as a nonpartisan figure politically, and is immediately ready to work to advance the Mossad’s mission, whoever is the next prime minister, whether that be Netanyahu, or Gadi Eisenkot, or Naftali Bennett.
What about the specific, now widely published incident in which Gofman, then a mid-level IDF officer, publicly butted heads with Eisenkot years ago when Eisenkot was the IDF chief?
Gofman would neither back away from his comments in the moment about the need for the IDF to shift to a more aggressive attack posture (comments which he would say were justified after-the-fact of October 7), nor would he view it as having any bearing on their future ability to work together.
Rather, the Post understands that Gofman will pursue the future mission of the Mossad without regard to any past interactions, and even under Netanyahu, he has been willing to voice dissent when necessary.
In June, shortly after taking up his role, when Israel attacked in Beirut against objections (or running into post-attack criticism) from the US, the Post understands that Gofman opposed the strike.
The Israeli attack on Beirut led to a series of additional exchanges between Israel and Iran, and some say led the US to lose focus on the nuclear issue, having lost trust in Israel’s discretion of what attacks made sense on the eve of what many thought would be a major deal between Washington and the Islamic Republic.
Meeting with the CIA, conducting other Mossad foreign relations
On July 22, Gofman made his first trip to the US since being named chief of the Mossad.
Generally, the visit aimed to coordinate US and Israeli positions regarding ongoing negotiations with Iran and the nuclear issue, but the talks were too sensitive to reveal more beyond that at this time.
Broadly speaking, Gofman, like his recent predecessors, recognizes that intelligence cooperation with allies, especially the US, is more critical than ever to achieve Israeli goals.
While critics wondered about how he would handle relations with America, given that his fluency in speaking English (as opposed to reading) is reportedly not at the same level as some recent Mossad chiefs, reviews so far show that Mossad-CIA ties are as strong and effective as ever.
Of course, intelligence chiefs do get even more comfortable with one another over time. Further, Gofman and CIA Director John Ratcliffe are not necessarily expected to immediately introduce their wives to each other as Yossi Cohen and Mike Pompeo did early in their terms in 2017. But plenty of spy chiefs have worked together effectively without such additional pieces.
Gofman also has an edge in some ways, as he had been heavily involved in foreign affairs meetings as Netanyahu’s military secretary. This is something which not all prior Mossad chiefs had as much experience with at the highest levels.
One question which still is unanswered, but regarding which more details will doubtlessly be revealed in the future, is where Gofman stood on the issue of discussions between Israel and the US regarding the nuclear threat at Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain nuclear facility.
In July, suddenly Trump and other US officials said that Israeli officials had told them the Islamic Republic was moving toward reassembling and rebuilding aspects of the nuclear weapons program at the site. The US president then used this as a potential reason to return to war and attack specifically at that site.
Various IDF officials have denied that they made claims about any imminent nuclear threat at Pickaxe Mountain.
Besides the US, Gofman is the first Russian-speaking Mossad chief, something which gives him an edge over prior chiefs in conducting aspects of relations with Russia, a country which continues to have a wide variety of impacts on Israeli national security.
Syria and Gaza
The Post previously confirmed reports that Gofman met with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, as well as the heads of the country’s general and military intelligence services.
Gofman’s involvement in these highly sensitive talks early on in his term only emphasizes both the trust that Netanyahu has in the Mossad chief to handle high-stakes and sensitive issues as well as the idea that even adversaries respect him for being straightforward and not playing games.
More specifically, it is public knowledge that Israel has tried a variety of ways to convey to Syria that it will not quietly ignore any new presence of Turkey in Syrian territory, which could limit Israel’s freedom of action to protect its security interests.
This comes after a recent Israeli attack on a Syrian airport where top Jerusalem officials said that Turkey was setting up a radar and other items.
Regarding Gaza, despite multiple claims in recent months by Innovation, Science, and Technology Minister Gila Gamliel that the Mossad and Gofman had been assigned a project of spiriting Gazans out of the Strip, if they chose to leave willingly, the Post has confirmed for the third time that there is no substance to the claims to date.
Rather, such issues remain in the purview of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and other agencies. While the Mossad sits in on intergovernmental committee meetings on the issue and may make certain contributions, as all agencies do, it is nowhere near being at the forefront of this project.
As a general matter, it is also worth noting that despite occasional news cycles about Gazans potentially wanting to leave, such as to Somaliland, there are no signs of any large-scale emigration from the Strip. Moreover, the Trump administration has been pushing for some time in the opposite direction, to rebuild Gaza for the Palestinians.
Iran and global terror generally
Another major priority of the Mossad is protecting Jews worldwide from terror plots. In recent years, a large number of these plots – sometimes dozens per year in many different countries – have emanated from Iran.
The Post understands that while obviously the Mossad remains committed to the defensive side of this equation, Gofman sees that changes in the balance of power with Iran may be opening up new opportunities to cut off aspects of these terror plots in a more offensive-minded manner. For Gofman, it will all start and end with Iran.
For a shorter version of this profile as it appears in The Jerusalem Post’s 50 Most Influential Jews 2026 list, click here to read Gofman’s entry.