The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on developments in the Middle East over the past 24-hour period.
Note: ISW-CTP will begin publishing abbreviated weekend updates covering the Houthi-Saudi conflict beginning on September 26, 2026.
Key Takeaways
Saudi Grand Mufti Saleh al Fawzan issued a statement on September 24 urging Yemeni government-aligned forces and Saudi soldiers stationed on the Saudi-Yemen border to protect Saudi territory and defeat the Houthis. Fawzan’s statement may be intended to compel the Houthis to abandon their strike campaign against Saudi Arabia by implicitly threatening a Saudi ground offensive against the group.
International air defense missions to protect Saudi oil infrastructure challenge the Houthis’ offensive strike campaign against Saudi Arabia, which has primarily targeted Saudi oil infrastructure in order to weaken Saudi Arabia’s will to fight. International air defense support for Saudi Arabia poses a dilemma for the Houthis by expanding international action against the group.
The Houthis continued to engage Yemeni government-aligned forces and threaten the primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that connects Taiz City and Aden City on September 25. Saudi-owned, UK-based media reported on September 25 that Yemeni government-aligned forces retained control of the Taiz-Aden GLOC amid Houthi attacks and infiltration attempts in Hijat al Abd and al Ashbut, Lahij Governorate, which are near the GLOC.
Toplines
Saudi Grand Mufti Saleh al Fawzan issued a statement on September 24 urging Yemeni government-aligned forces and Saudi soldiers stationed on the Saudi-Yemen border to protect Saudi territory and defeat the Houthis.[1] Fawzan’s statement may be intended to compel the Houthis to abandon their strike campaign against Saudi Arabia by implicitly threatening a Saudi ground offensive against the group.[2] Fawzan exhorted Saudi soldiers stationed on the country’s borders to “repel aggression” and “punish” enemies that threaten Saudi territory, referring to the Houthis, as a religious duty.[3] The office of the Grand Mufti is closely linked to the Saudi monarchy, which is responsible for appointing the religious leader, and Grand Mufti statements on military matters are precedented but rare.[4] Saudi Arabia may intend to generate an informational effect to compel the Houthis to cease their attacks on Saudi territory without explicitly threatening a ground invasion of Houthi-controlled Yemen. ISW-CTP has not observed indicators that Saudi Arabia is preparing for an imminent ground invasion of Houthi-controlled territory in northwestern Yemen. The Houthis attacked a Saudi near-border military base in al Tuwal, Jizan Province, several hours before Fawzan’s statement on September 24, which may have partly motivated Fawzan to address his statement to forces on Saudi Arabia’s borders.[5]
International air defense missions to protect Saudi oil infrastructure challenge the Houthis’ offensive strike campaign against Saudi Arabia, which has primarily targeted Saudi oil infrastructure in order to weaken Saudi Arabia’s will to fight.[6] French President Emmanuel Macron announced on September 24 that France will deploy soldiers, radar platforms, and other military assets to protect energy infrastructure in the Red Sea port city of Yanbu, which is one of Saudi Arabia’s main oil export hubs.[7] Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia have primarily targeted oil infrastructure, particularly in Yanbu, since July 2026. The Houthis claimed that they fired ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones targeting the Saudi Aramco oil refinery in Yanbu and an unspecified target in Riyadh on September 25, for example.[8] ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis seek to maximize Saudi political and economic costs to compel Saudi Arabia to surrender to Houthi demands.[9] These demands include ending Saudi military activity and support for anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, paying war reparations and civil servant salaries, and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[10] The French air defense mission comes amid broader international defensive support for Saudi Arabia, including from the United States and the United Kingdom, against the Houthis.[11] Saudi and international media reported on September 25 that military leaders from Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia will soon hold an “urgent meeting” in Saudi Arabia to discuss military support for Saudi Arabia.[12]
International air defense support for Saudi Arabia poses a dilemma for the Houthis by expanding international action against the group.[13] Partner force air defense units protecting Saudi oil infrastructure pose a particular dilemma for the Houthis by reducing the strike campaign’s effectiveness. Houthi unwillingness to challenge Saudi partners’ air defense missions could convince more partners to deploy forces to protect Saudi Arabia and weaken the Houthi campaign. Saudi partners alternatively could conduct offensive military action against the Houthis, which the group has sought to avoid, if it attacked partner forces’ air defense units.[14] It is unclear whether the Houthis are more willing to tolerate the prospect of broader defensive support for Saudi Arabia if they refrain from engaging partner forces or the risk of a multinational offensive campaign in Yemen if they attack these partner forces.
The Houthis continued to engage Yemeni government-aligned forces and threaten the primary ground line of communication (GLOC) that connects Taiz City and Aden City on September 25.[15] Saudi-owned, UK-based media reported on September 25 that Yemeni government-aligned forces retained control of the Taiz-Aden GLOC amid Houthi attacks and infiltration attempts in Hijat al Abd and al Ashbut, Lahij Governorate, which are near the GLOC.[16] Saudi-owned, UK-based media reported that Yemeni government-aligned forces had “reopened” the Taiz-Aden GLOC, which indicates that the Houthis had advanced within a sufficient range to disrupt its use.[17] Yemeni government-aligned forces previously repelled a Houthi advance on September 23 that aimed to sever the Taiz-Aden GLOC.[18] Houthi control over the Taiz-Aden GLOC would effectively represent an encirclement of Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz City, as the Hijat al Abd road is the only effective main supply route (MSR) that connects Taiz City to the rest of Yemeni government-controlled territory.[19] CTP-ISW assessed on September 24 that an effective Houthi encirclement of Yemeni government-aligned forces in Taiz could, among other effects, set conditions for the Houthis to seize Taiz City, improve the Houthis’ ability to threaten the Yemeni government’s capital in Aden City, and relieve Houthi forces to pursue the group’s other objectives, such as consolidating Houthi positions along the Red Sea coastal plain.[20]
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
Nothing significant to report.
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
New US secondary sanctions are restricting Iran’s international air access and deepening the regime’s economic isolation. The US Treasury Department announced secondary sanctions against countries that support Iran’s aviation sector on August 24 and warned foreign firms on September 8 against providing aircraft transfers, cargo services, sales support, and other assistance to sanctioned carriers.[21] Iraq subsequently suspended Iranian flights from Tehran to Najaf, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah on September 25.[22] Iran had originally re-routed flights to Najaf after Iraq suspended Iranian flights to Baghdad on September 23.[23] Iraq’s compliance also comes amid broader US economic pressure on the Iraqi government to disarm Iranian-backed militias.[24] The United States threatened to suspend monthly transfers of Iraq’s oil revenue held in the US Federal Reserve if Iraqi militias fail to surrender their weapons by September 30, according to two Iraqi government sources speaking to an Iraqi Kurdish outlet on September 12.[25] The elimination of the Tehran to Najaf route further reduces Iran’s regional aviation activity.[26] The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have also restricted or suspended the operations of Iranian airlines in their countries in recent days.[27] Iranian airlines continue to operate flights to Turkey, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Russia, however.[28]
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
Nothing significant to report.
Arabian Peninsula
See topline section.
Endnotes
[1] https://www.spa dot gov.sa/N2685324 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-grand-mufti-tells-troops-be-ready-sacrifice-their-lives-fighting-houthis-2026-09-25/
[2] https://www.spa dot gov.sa/N2685324 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-grand-mufti-tells-troops-be-ready-sacrifice-their-lives-fighting-houthis-2026-09-25/
[3] https://www.spa dot gov.sa/N2685324 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-grand-mufti-tells-troops-be-ready-sacrifice-their-lives-fighting-houthis-2026-09-25/
[4] https://www.newarab dot com/news/why-saudi-arabias-new-grand-mufti-sparking-debate ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-grand-mufti-tells-troops-be-ready-sacrifice-their-lives-fighting-houthis-2026-09-25/ ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/saudi-cleric-calls-military-conscription
[5] https://t.me/army21ye/3761 ; https://www.spa dot gov.sa/N2685324
[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/24/world/middleeast/france-saudi-arabia-red-sea-yemen-houthis.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share
[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/24/world/middleeast/france-saudi-arabia-red-sea-yemen-houthis.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/more-ships-change-course-red-sea-after-houthi-threats-shipping-data-shows-2026-07-22/
[8] https://t.me/army21ye/3768
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/ ; https://t.me/army21ye/3768 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2096973833844535598?s=20
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-18-2026/
[11] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqlykpe4dk0yo ; https://theaviationist dot com/2026/07/31/task-force-air-arabia/
[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/allies-unite-behind-saudi-arabia-houthis-step-up-attacks-2026-09-25/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social ; https://www.alhadath dot net/2026/09/25/رئيس-الاركان-التركي-يحضر-اجتماعا-بالسعودية-ضمن-اتفاقية-مكة
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-16-2026/
[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/houthi-ceasefire-followed-us-intel-showing-militants-sought-off-ramp-2025-05-13/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-16-2026/
[15] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5322558-زحف-الحوثيين-يصطدم-بضربات-موجعة-في-جبهات-تعز-ولحج
[16] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5322558-زحف-الحوثيين-يصطدم-بضربات-موجعة-في-جبهات-تعز-ولحج
[17] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5322558-زحف-الحوثيين-يصطدم-بضربات-موجعة-في-جبهات-تعز-ولحج
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-24-2026/ ; https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2026/09/24/الجيش-اليمني-يفشل-محاولة-حوثية-لقطع- الشريان-الوحيد-الذي-يربط-تعز-وعدن ; https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2102909930625802527 ; https://x.com/Yem_army_media/status/2102936724821176325 ; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/2102893865241809191 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2102881848091185421 ; https://x.com/IbrahimJalalYE/status/2102895096383594674 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2102884149056946583 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2103182506526663141
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-24-2026/ ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2098154891835298027
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-24-2026/
[21] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0623 ;
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0614/
[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-iraqi-airports-suspend-iranian-flights-starting-friday-sources-state-media-2026-09-25/ ;
https://t.me/Tasnimnews/446791
[23] https://t.me/MyAsriran/796095
[24] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/939335/us-warns-iraq-disarm-militias-by-sept-30-or-dollar-transfers-stop
[25] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/939335/us-warns-iraq-disarm-militias-by-sept-30-or-dollar-transfers-stop
[26] https://t.me/MyAsriran/795921
[27] https://t.me/MyAsriran/796492
[28] https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ep-hna#41d335a3 ;
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ep-mmc#41d3977c ;
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ep-mmd#41d39ef7