Why It Matters

Iran nuclear program compliance can no longer be independently confirmed after United States and Israeli strikes broke inspection continuity, according to a new Congressional Research Service report. The assessment states the International Atomic Energy Agency is unable to provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of enriched uranium inventories and related activity. The Trump administration therefore must weigh claims that enrichment has not resumed without agency verification, including March 18 testimony from former Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and March comments from Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi that stockpiles remain under rubble with no plan for recovery.

For Congress, the gap leaves oversight without a confirmed baseline for centrifuges, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate, particularly for the February 2021 to June 2025 interval that the agency describes as unrestorable. The cited summary describes a United States tradeoff between pressure and diplomacy, in which sanctions and diplomatic escalation may impose costs on Iran but can also reduce Iranian cooperation.

The Big Picture

Tehran ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970 and concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 1974 requiring declaration of nuclear material and facilities, as outlined. The Board of Governors found Tehran in noncompliance on September 24, 2005 and again on June 12, 2025 for extended failures to declare material and activities and for later failure to cooperate fully, acting in the context of Article XII.C of the statute.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded in July 2015 with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States added restrictions and transparency beyond safeguards, with the United Nations Security Council endorsing the arrangement in Resolution 2231 adopted July 20, 2015 and terminating earlier requirements on Implementation Day in January 2016. Washington announced on May 8, 2018 that it would no longer participate and would reimpose suspended sanctions, while Tehran exceeded limits beginning in July 2019 and halted supplemental transparency measures on February 23, 2021.

France, Germany and the United Kingdom notified the Council on August 28, 2025 of significant nonperformance and triggered reimposition of 2006 to 2010 requirements on September 27, 2025, a step disputed by China, Russia and Iran in later correspondence. Iran adopted a July 2, 2025 law suspending government cooperation, signed a Cairo Agreement on Practical Modalities on September 10, 2025 to address inspections including at attacked sites, then declared that understanding terminated on November 20, 2025. After attacks launched February 28, the agency stopped almost all safeguards except a June 1 to June 3 visit to Bushehr and reported lost continuity at all declared facilities.

The Bottom Line

The Board requested quarterly reporting on safeguards implementation and on relevant 2006 to 2010 provisions in a November 20, 2025 resolution, then demanded complete inventories and access in a June 10 action while remaining ready to consider timing and content of a Council report. The report describes policy choices involving a negotiated arrangement with detailed verifiable provisions for access and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the use of sanctions relief as an incentive for verifiable steps and reimposition mechanisms tied to measurable Iranian violations.

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