Tehran (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – It appears that the main actors involved in the previous 40-day war are increasingly moving toward another confrontation for their own reasons. The regional equation has changed significantly in recent weeks, and that change is making the continuation of the current ceasefire less attractive. Iran is under growing economic pressure because it cannot export its oil normally. The Houthis have moved closer to controlling the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb. Israel is approaching an important election. And the United States is facing a decision over whether to continue the current stalemate or return to major military operations.
The argument here is simple: when the equation changes, the policies that made sense under the previous equation may stop making sense. The longer the new conditions continue, the stronger the incentives for the main actors to change them.
Iran Has an Incentive to Break the Siege
Iran’s most immediate problem is economic. The US-led naval blockade and the disruption around the Strait of Hormuz have sharply reduced Iran’s ability to sell and export oil. in September Iran was facing one of the most severe economic crises in its history, with the blockade and sanctions causing shortages of foreign currency, declining imports and rising prices. Trump has also said that the blockade has prevented Iranian oil exports.
For Iran, the calculation is straightforward. If Iran cannot sell its oil, it cannot maintain normal economic activity. If the blockade continues, the economic cost will continue to rise. Therefore, Tehran has an increasing reason to change the situation rather than simply continue under the same conditions.
A political agreement could restore oil exports and reduce the pressure. But if negotiations fail, Iran could also consider military action to break the blockade and reopen its export routes. That does not mean Iran has decided to start another war. It means that the economic situation is creating a direct incentive to take stronger action. If military force becomes the chosen way to break the siege, the result could be a new phase of war.
Bab el-Mandeb Is Creating a Second Front
The biggest change in the regional equation, however, may be taking place in Yemen. The Houthis have recently expanded along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. They captured Mocha and then moved toward the islands around Bab el-Mandeb. On September 11, Houthi forces reached Perim, or Mayun, Island in the strait, after government forces withdrew. Other reports said the group had also reached the Hanish islands. These positions are important because Bab el-Mandeb is a major shipping route connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.
This matters because Iran already has leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. If the Houthis consolidate their positions around Bab el-Mandeb, an Iran-aligned force could also threaten the second major maritime route linking Middle Eastern energy producers to global markets.
That would change the strategic calculation for every major actor in the region. Saudi Arabia is particularly exposed. Its East-West pipeline normally allows it to move oil from the eastern fields to Yanbu on the Red Sea, bypassing Hormuz. But on September 13 drone attacks had shut the pipeline, which can carry around four million barrels per day. Saudi oil production had also fallen sharply, while available stocks at Yanbu were limited.
Saudi Arabia is therefore losing some of its ability to bypass the crisis. If Hormuz remains heavily disrupted while Bab el-Mandeb becomes another pressure point, the ability of Gulf producers to move oil to international markets becomes much more vulnerable. For the Houthis, this creates an opportunity to increase their leverage. For Iran, it creates a potentially valuable second pressure point. For Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States, it creates a reason to prevent the new situation from becoming permanent.
Brent crude has already moved above $100 a barrel, while oil flows through Hormuz remain below normal levels. If both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb were simultaneously subjected to serious military pressure, the effect on oil markets would be much larger than the disruption of either route alone.
Israel and the United States Also Have Reasons to Act
The third change is political. Israel’s national election is scheduled for October 27. Recent polling shows a highly competitive race, with no clear path for either major bloc to form a government. Reuters reported that the opposition bloc was ahead in polling averages, although the final political balance remains uncertain.
The election does not mean that Israel will choose war, but it creates a deadline. If the Israeli government believes that the regional balance is changing against it, waiting may become less attractive. A government facing an election has a reason to consider whether it should change the strategic situation before the political environment changes.
The United States faces a similar problem, although for different reasons.
Photo of Tehran by Alireza Akhlaghi: https://www.pexels.com/photo/milad-tower-in-tehran-15062010/
President Donald Trump said on September 17 that he was approaching a “big decision” over whether to resume major attacks on Iran. Trump has also said that he hopes the war is nearing its end, but his latest comments show that a return to major military operations remains under consideration. Washington therefore has two reasons to reconsider the current situation: continuing the war is costly, while waiting gives Iran and the Houthis more time to strengthen their positions.
This is the central point of the changing war equation. Iran has a growing reason to break the economic blockade. The Houthis have a reason to consolidate their gains around Bab el-Mandeb. Saudi Arabia has a reason to restore secure oil-export routes. Israel has a political deadline and a reason to prevent further deterioration of its strategic position. And the United States has to decide whether the current stalemate is preferable to another military operation.
The actors are not simply waiting for the previous war to end. They are responding to a new set of conditions, and those conditions are giving them new reasons to change the status quo. The danger is not that another war could begin without anyone having a reason to fight. The opposite is true. Several actors now have their own reasons to change the current situation, and some of those reasons directly conflict with the interests of the others. As the equation continues to change, maintaining the status quo becomes harder. That is what makes a third war more plausible than it appeared only a few weeks ago.