Right, presumably there needs to be some sort of deal at some point, which requires some amount of trust, but at the same time it’s hard to blame the Iranian regime for feeling that the Trump Administration and the Israeli government are completely untrustworthy.
In terms of the Iranian security establishment, this is also about regime preservation. They feel very burned by all of the times that they have compromised—whether it’s the two times when they were negotiating with the Trump Administration and then were subsequently bombed, or when Trump, during his first term, ended the Obama nuclear deal. But, at the same time, these individuals are, of course, hostage to their own world view. And, by never being able to move beyond it, that world view becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
To return to this stalemate question: I had assumed that elevated oil prices would work in Iran’s favor and put pressure on the United States, and perhaps its allies, to wrap this up and make a deal. But the Trump Administration seems to just not really care about the politics, even with an election five weeks away. Does that then make Iran’s situation more difficult?
Well, that’s of course what’s interesting. The Iranians also thought that if they could amp up the pressure, amp up the prices, particularly around the midterms, that they would have an impact, and that has been very much their game and their gamble. But they, too, have been surprised that Trump seems unmoved by these dynamics and assumptions. I think about how he presented this conflict at the start. He is someone who is so obsessed with himself and his legacy that maybe he’s willing to take the pain, absorb the cost, and continue fighting until he can achieve something he sees as historic, perhaps a deal of some kind.
Earlier, you said that Iran isn’t thinking about this as a Western country would. And I assume what you meant by that is Iran isn’t thinking about this the way that a country with democratic feedback loops would.
Yes.
Maybe that’s also the case here in America now, though–that the normal democratic feedback loops have just sort of broken down, or Trump simply doesn’t care about them.
Yes, and it’s possible he does not consult the wider bureaucracy or intelligence agencies in the way that past Presidents would have traditionally done. It seems as if there is no consultation with the community of experts that would have cautioned, advised, and warned. And, certainly, if you look at the polling and the sentiment of the American people, the vast majority are against this war. But what I think is lacking is that Trump has not made a consistent case for why this war is necessary, and what the United States is trying to achieve. And I don’t think it’s about opening the Strait of Hormuz. So, what does the U.S. want out of this? And how does the U.S. walk away?
Let me ask you, then, about the American efforts to open up the strait more. There’s been some dispute about how much of the strait is actually open to oil tankers. What do you know about the current situation?
I think the United States is playing a role in creating safe passage—whatever that looks like—for a lot of ships to get through. There is also what’s taking place off the books—illicitly, however you want to look at it—where ships turn off their radar and are making side deals with the Iranians to get through. So I don’t think that there’s one story. I think that there are a couple of concentric explanations for what’s going on. What isn’t clear to me, though, is exactly who’s making deals with whom? There are all sorts of rumors about some Gulf countries having arrangements with the Iranians, and this could be one domain where that exists.
Secondly, if so many ships are moving through the strait, formally or informally, certainly there is some Iranian fuel that is also moving. And then, thirdly, Iran still has disruptive capability. Control over Hormuz doesn’t mean Iran is the traffic warden on the bridge; it just means they are able to disrupt things, and they can keep disrupting things going forward in ways that will still be damaging.
And there’s a sense that they could ramp up that disruption even more if they felt as if they were losing the leverage, correct?
Well, I think we have to look at the region as a broader ecosystem. There may be a logic to why they’re lowering the temperature on disruption right now, and it could be for two reasons. One, there is active diplomacy under way, led by the Qataris and Omanis, and there are several different proposals out there about sequencing a series of maneuvers and measures, in order to get back to more formal nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S. And then, second, there is the Houthi variable. We’re not back in active military conflict, and so the Iranians have wanted to showcase their disruptive capability. But I don’t think they want to disrupt or close two choke points simultaneously. At least not yet. Because they don’t want to invite or trigger the return of military conflict.
What can you tell us about the Houthi part of this?
Over the past few weeks, Yemeni government forces mobilized a campaign against the Houthis, and the Houthis marshalled a more competent military response than was expected. They overturned those government forces in key areas, including the Red Sea, and this meant an internal Yemeni conflict, as well as the extension of the conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, both of which have disrupted shipping on the Red Sea. And there were also strikes from Iraq, where Saudi Arabia said Iraqi militias hit the Saudi East-West Pipeline, taking it offline for a few days. But the Iranians, so far, have not become directly involved in either conflict. In my mind, Iran doesn’t want to reactivate or broaden the conflict at a moment when diplomacy is under way. I think they would be holding that back for the future.
There was some speculation and some reporting earlier in the war that the Saudis had become concerned about how aggressive the United States and Israel had become, and that the Saudis had broken with the United Arab Emirates, which was pushing for full-on regime change in Iran. It seems recently, though, that the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has been pushing Trump to attack the Houthis. Is this just about the importance of a shipping route in the Red Sea and the civil war in Yemen, which Saudi Arabia is involved in?