Maj.-Gen. (res.) Nitzan Alon, who headed the IDF’s hostage and missing persons directorate during the war, said Friday that Israel could have ended the war in Gaza and returned the hostages significantly earlier, possibly as much as a year before the intense fighting ultimately ended, Walla reported on Saturday.
Alon said different decisions could have saved thousands of lives on both sides and that some of the hostages who were killed or murdered in captivity might have returned alive to their families.
He made the remarks during a Washington Institute for Near East Policy panel titled “Three Years After October 7: A Bridge or a Chasm Between the Peoples?”
During the discussion, moderated by David Makovsky and featuring Israeli, Palestinian, and American experts, Alon was asked about the decisions that prolonged the war and whether an opportunity to return the hostages earlier had been missed.
‘We missed the opportunity. The war was too long’
“I think we could have reached this point much earlier, perhaps a year earlier, without significantly harming the other strategic objectives of the war,” Alon said.
Former lead hostage negotiations coordinator Maj.-Gen. (res.) Nitzan Alon speaks at the Reichman University Conference, Herzliya, July 1, 2026. (credit: AVSHALOM SASSONI/MAARIV)
“We could have achieved the same strategic accomplishments in terms of damaging Hamas’s military strength, and in terms of many other security issues, much earlier. Perhaps we would have brought back alive some of the hostages who were killed or murdered during captivity,” he said. “We missed that opportunity. The war was too long.”
Alon stressed that he was not attempting to analyze Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s personal motivations.
“I’m not a psychologist who can know exactly what is going on in the prime minister’s mind,” he said, adding that political leaders are influenced by strategic and ideological considerations, political constraints, and personal matters, and that it was impossible to determine which factor had been decisive.
Still, he said, “I’m fairly certain that we could and should have shortened the war, brought back all the hostages, perhaps a year earlier, moved forward, and maybe saved thousands of lives on both sides. It is likely that some of the hostages who were killed or murdered in Gaza could also have returned alive to their families.”
Alon was later asked about the tension between the war’s two objectives, destroying Hamas and returning the hostages. He acknowledged that there had been significant tension between them, but argued that, in retrospect, the strategic achievements obtained after two years of intense fighting were not materially different from those that could have been achieved earlier.
He said the agreement reached in October 2025 was slightly better than an arrangement that could have been reached several months earlier, but not from a strategic standpoint. He noted that even after the war, Hamas remained in power and continued to control Gaza’s population, although it no longer controlled more than half of the territory of the Gaza Strip.
‘Not leadership based on slogans such as total victory’
In another part of the discussion, Alon addressed the October 7 failure and the leadership’s conduct during the war.
“On October 7, there was of course a severe intelligence and military failure, alongside a mistaken and catastrophic conception by the political leadership,” he said.
Alon said that while the government struggled to manage the war, Israeli society demonstrated initiative, solidarity, and mutual responsibility. He said meeting members of the public and thousands of Israelis who worked on behalf of the hostages and their families gave him personal strength during the difficult period in which he headed the directorate.
He contrasted what he viewed as the positive qualities of Israeli society with sharp criticism of the country’s leadership.
“Israel needs leadership that takes responsibility as it is and offers hope. Not leadership that relies on slogans such as ‘total victory,’ but leadership that presents realistic and balanced plans for dealing with our security, economic, and social challenges.”
Alon added that despite manifestations of extremism in Israeli society, the war had also revealed extraordinary civilian strengths.
“We definitely need different leadership, which will take these wonderful people forward with a realistic approach,” he said.
Changing security doctrine: Buffer zones and military freedom of action
Alon also addressed the profound change that October 7 brought to Israeli attitudes toward the Palestinians and the prospects for a diplomatic agreement.
He said many Israelis had developed a deep loss of trust in the Palestinian side, in the two-state solution, and in the very possibility of reaching an agreement. The fact that the Hamas attack was carried out inside the June 4, 1967, lines, rather than only in connection with the dispute over territories captured that year, deepened the sense that the conflict extended beyond the question of borders.
He added that the brutality of the massacre, its documentation on social media, and the kidnapping of women, children, and elderly people deepened the trauma and made it more difficult for many Israelis to distinguish between Hamas and the broader Palestinian population, or to feel empathy for suffering on the other side.
Security thinking had changed as well, Alon said. The current approach relies on establishing buffer zones not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon and Syria, while demanding full military freedom of action, including extensive destruction of neighborhoods and villages within those buffer zones.
Nevertheless, Alon expressed hope that after Israel’s elections, scheduled for October 27, a deeper understanding would emerge regarding the limitations of military force.
“I believe that over time there will be a deeper understanding of the limitations of the use of force, alongside recognition that diplomatic measures and nonmilitary solutions are necessary to deal with our national security problems,” he said.
In closing, Alon pointed to diplomatic possibilities involving Lebanon and Syria as an opportunity for regional change. Progress in those arenas, he said, could be the first step toward creating renewed optimism regarding the broader Israeli-Arab conflict.