Key Takeaways:
The essay says the last U.S. forces left Iraq on Sept. 30, 2026, under a 2024 deal now carried out by the Trump administration, ending a presence that began with the 2003 invasion and a 2014 return against Islamic State; about 4,500 Americans died over the wars.
It treats the exit as a gain for Iran-aligned militias that resist disarmament, while noting Islamic State cells remain and that Iraq is not Afghanistan 2021: it has a state, oil, and forces that retook territory.
The author’s test is whether Baghdad can hold militias, the Kurdish region, and Islamic State without U.S. intelligence support; Iranian influence is not the same as control, and chaos could also hurt Tehran.
The United States has completed the withdrawal of its remaining forces from Iraq, closing a military chapter that began with the invasion of 2003. For Washington, the departure marks the end of more than two decades of military involvement. For Baghdad, it represents the restoration of full sovereignty and the removal of a foreign military presence that remains controversial. The central question is therefore not simply why the United States is leaving Iraq, but who gains from its departure? The immediate answer appears to be Iran:
The withdrawal was agreed between Washington and Baghdad in 2024 and is now being implemented by the Trump administration. The final American departure comes at a particularly sensitive moment: the United States and Iran are engaged in a wider confrontation, while Iran continues to possess considerable political, military and institutional influence inside Iraq. For Iran and its allies, the American withdrawal is considered to be a victory for their long-running effort to remove US military forces from the Middle East.
Iraqis themselves broadly favour the end of the foreign military presence, while at the same time some Iraqi security officials fear that their country may not yet possess all the capabilities needed to prevent a renewed security vacuum. That contradiction is at the heart of Iraq’s uncertain future seeing Afganistan.
Saddam’s fall to Iran’s influence
The paradox of the American intervention in Iraq was that US removed Saddam Hussein, a long-standing regional adversary of Iran, but the political order that followed enabled Iran to expand its influence inside Iraq.
The 2003 invasion destroyed Saddam’s Baathist state and eventually produced a Shiite-led political system. The US spent years fighting an insurgency involving Saddam loyalists, Al-Qaeda and other armed groups. American forces withdrew in 2011, only to return less than three years later when the Islamic State captured large areas of Iraq.The campaign against Islamic State was eventually successful in recapturing the territory occupied by the organisation. But the struggle simultaneously strengthened several Iraqi Shiite armed formations that had close relationships with Iran.
Iran thus benefited from a strategic paradox: the US incurred the enormous cost of defeating threats to the Iraqi state, while Tehran developed influence within the political and security structures that emerged afterwards.
The present withdrawal of US Forces are likely to empower Iran-backed militias and increase their ability to influence Iraqi political institutions.
The Militia Question
The most immediate challenge is the status of Iraq’s armed groups. The Iraqi government has sought to establish the principle that weapons should ultimately remain under state control. But several Iran-aligned militias have resisted disarmament, and armed groups have indicated that they had no intention of surrendering their weapons. This creates a fundamental problem for Iraqi sovereignty. These groups may formally be incorporated into Iraq’s security architecture, but the more important question would be-“To whom are they loyal to and who controls their decisions?”
Iran has spent decades cultivating relationships with Iraqi armed groups. Iran can regard the American departure as a strategic gain even if Iran does not directly take control of Iraq. Influence does not require occupation.
The Islamic State Caliphate Factor
There is, however, another actor waiting in the shadows: Islamic State. The defeat of the Islamic State territorial Caliphate did not eliminate the organisation’s underground networks. Sleeper cells remain capable of exploiting weak governance, sectarian tensions and gaps in security coverage.
American forces have provided Iraqi security institutions with intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and other capabilities. Has Iraq been provided these capabilities following the withdrawal? Particular concern exists over the possibility of Islamic State cells acquiring more sophisticated capabilities, including armed drones.
Is Iraq strong enough to control the militias and contain Islamic State, and if the state is not strong enough opposing forces could simultaneously gain space. Iran-aligned militias on one side and Islamic State remnants on the other. That would be the worst possible outcome for Iraq.
The Afghanistan parallel
The Iraqi development inevitably recalls Afghanistan. I n August 2021, the US completed its military withdrawal from Afghanistan after almost two decades of war. The Afghan government and security forces collapsed with extraordinary speed, and the Taliban entered Kabul on August 15. The final US military presence ended on August 30.
The comparison with Iraq is cautionary in nature. Iraq in 2026 is not Afghanistan in 2021. Iraq has functioning state institutions, a substantially different political structure, significant energy resources, and security forces that have fought a major war against Islamic State. Nevertheless, the two cases reveal a common strategic problem.
It is not difficult to enter a country but leaving it without creating a vacuum is very difficult.
Afghanistan demonstrated the danger of building security institutions that remained heavily dependent on external support. The collapse of Afghanistan also produced a dramatic humanitarian and political aftermath. The Taliban returned to power, while Afghanistan subsequently faced severe economic and humanitarian difficulties. The country remains deeply dependent on international humanitarian assistance, and recent natural disasters have exposed the weakness of its infrastructure and emergency-response capacity.
The American Dilemma: Intervention or Abandonment?
The US faces a strategic dilemma that has no easy answer. Maintaining troops indefinitely in countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan is enormously expensive and exposes American personnel to continuous risk. In Iraq, thousands of American service members died during more than two decades of conflict. Around 4,500 Americans died during the Iraq war and its subsequent military involvement. There is therefore a powerful domestic argument for ending prolonged wars. When American forces leave, the strategic space they occupied does not disappear. Other powers, militias, terrorist organisations and regional actors compete to fill it.
In Iraq, Iran is geographically positioned, politically connected and historically invested. It does not need to deploy a conventional army into Iraq to increase its influence. Political parties, militia networks, religious connections, economic relationships and security structures provide Tehran with multiple channels of influence. That makes Iraq fundamentally different from Afghanistan but also makes the American withdrawal strategically significant.
Is Iran Really the Winner?
Iran has certainly achieved one of its long-standing objectives: the departure of US military forces from Iraq. Tehran can portray this as evidence that American military power has failed to establish a permanent regional presence.
But Iran also inherits risks. A destabilized Iraq would not necessarily serve Iranian interests. Islamic State resurgence could threaten Iran itself. Sectarian conflict could destabilise Iran’s western frontier. An Iraqi government unable to control armed groups could create problems for Tehran as well as Washington.
Iran therefore needs an Iraq that is stable but strategically close, rather than a completely chaotic Iraq. The American withdrawal may expand Iranian influence, but it does not guarantee Iranian control.
Chaotic Region with Changing American Role
The larger issue is the perception created by repeated American withdrawals. Afghanistan in 2021 and Iraq in 2026 are separated by geography, political systems and circumstances. Yet, in both cases, the US leaves after a prolonged military commitment, while the countries concerned continue to face significant security and governance challenges.
For countries dependent on American security guarantees, the question becomes: What happens when American strategic priorities change? The Middle East has already witnessed the expansion of Iranian influence, the growing role of regional powers and the emergence of multiple armed non-state actors. America’s reduced military footprint could encourage regional states to develop their own security arrangements rather than depend exclusively on Washington.
The Real Test Begins Now
September 30, 2026, may mark the end of America’s military presence in Iraq, but it is certainly not the end of the strategic story. The real test begins the day after the last American soldier leaves. Iran may gain greater strategic space, but influence is not the same as control—and instability in Iraq could ultimately threaten Iran.
For Iraq, the challenge is far greater: can the state control its armed groups, prevent an Islamic State resurgence, protect its Kurdish region and maintain security without external military dependence? If it can, the withdrawal could become a genuine transition towards sovereign self-reliance. If it cannot, the vacuum will inevitably be contested by militias, jihadists and regional powers.
For Washington, the Afghan experience provides a stark warning. Military victory, years of institution-building and an orderly withdrawal are three different achievements. History will ultimately judge the Iraq mission not by how America entered or how it left, but by whether the Iraqi state was strong enough to stand when America was gone. September 30 is therefore not the conclusion of America’s Iraq story—it is the moment when the consequences of that story truly begins.
About Patial RC
Patial RC is a retired Infantry officer of the Indian Army and possesses unique experience of serving in active CI Ops across the country and in Sri Lanka. Patial RC is a regular writer on military and travel matters in military professional journals. The veteran is a keen mountaineer and a trekker.