Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, August 31
Israel enters its Oct. 27 election at one of the most sensitive moments of political and strategic transformation in its history. The vote comes after the shock of October 7, 2023, a prolonged war in Gaza, and the expansion of confrontation to Lebanon, Iran, and Yemen, all amid deepening internal division over the nature of the state, the limits of authority, and the relationship between security and democracy. The election is therefore not only about who will govern Israel next, but about what kind of Israel will emerge: one increasingly dependent on military force and religious nationalism, or one seeking to rebuild a political and social balance capable of translating military power into sustainable security and stability.
The 2026 election also carries special significance because it will be the first since 1988 to take place on schedule, after the 25th Knesset completed its full legal term following years of electoral instability. Yet completing a term does not mean the political system’s crisis has ended; rather, it shows the government’s ability to survive despite the profound divisions surrounding it. The paradox is that temporal stability did not produce political or strategic stability.
The election is being fought largely as a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu as much as a contest between political programs. That equation has begun to change with the rise of former chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar party, who now leads Likud in several polls and has also overtaken Netanyahu personally when voters are asked who is best suited to serve as prime minister. But electoral momentum does not necessarily translate into a transfer of power because the decisive battle remains the ability to construct a coalition controlling at least 61 seats.
Netanyahu has become more than simply the leader of Likud; he is the center around which most Israeli political equations revolve. Alliances are increasingly built around attitudes toward him rather than policy platforms, deepening personal polarization and weakening the political system’s ability to generate stable consensus. The election may therefore alter the balance among parties without necessarily changing the government, while the real struggle may be over whether any side can build a coalition capable of surviving for an extended period.
The deeper transformation created by the wars, however, is Israel’s shift away from the doctrine of the “short, decisive war” toward managing prolonged, open-ended conflicts on multiple fronts. Since its founding, Israel’s security doctrine emphasized brief confrontations designed to restore deterrence and avoid attrition. Today it is engaged in conflicts that stretch both geographically and temporally, without decisive strategic victory or a clear concept for how to end them. This is not merely a military problem. It exposes the limits of military power when force stops being a means to achieve political objectives and becomes a substitute for politics itself.
Here lies the central dilemma of the election: Israeli society feels the costs of war and exhaustion, yet the forces seeking to replace Netanyahu do not necessarily offer an integrated strategic alternative to the logic of force. Even his strongest rivals come from the military and security establishment, meaning a change of leadership may be far easier than a change in strategic doctrine.
Gaza illustrates the dilemma most clearly. Its future is no longer merely an Israeli domestic matter, but a test of relations with Washington and of Israel’s ability to translate military superiority into stable political arrangements. The Trump administration is pressing for arrangements that move beyond the war, while Netanyahu insists that Hamas’s military capabilities must be dismantled before any withdrawal. The disagreement goes beyond tactics to a strategic question: Can Israel move from managing war to managing the postwar phase, or has perpetual conflict itself become part of its definition of security?
Domestically, the struggle extends beyond Netanyahu personally to a deeper crisis over the meaning of the state. The issue of Haredi conscription exposes the tension between sharing the burdens of national defense and preserving coalition cohesion, while the growing weight of religious-nationalist and fundamentalist currents reflects a transformation in Israeli society and raises questions about the influence of religion on political and security decisions, as well as the relationship between the state’s Jewish and democratic identities. Arab parties, meanwhile, could exercise influence beyond their numerical strength if the two main blocs remain closely balanced, even without joining the government directly.
Regionally, Israel enters the election in a more complex strategic environment, with tensions in Lebanon and Syria, an open confrontation with Iran, and Gaza’s future unresolved. Security, long Netanyahu’s strongest electoral asset, may become a source of accountability. The question will no longer be only who can wage war, but who can end one and turn its results into durable security and political gains.
From this perspective, the 2026 election may not mark the end of Israel’s crisis but the beginning of a new phase in redefining the state and its regional position. It may produce a change in leadership or another Netanyahu term, but either outcome leaves Israel confronting the same dilemma: Can it translate military superiority into a political strategy capable of producing security and stability while rebuilding domestic consensus over the country’s future?
Despite sharp divisions, broad sectors of Israeli society still believe in the centrality of military power and in its ability, with Western and particularly American backing, to provide permanent security, while support for a two-state settlement and Palestinian national rights continues to decline. Yet military power can deter and destroy; by itself, it cannot create sustainable security or resolve a political and historical conflict.
The real post-election test, therefore, will not simply be who governs Israel, but whether the country can reconsider a doctrine that has long assumed military superiority can substitute for political settlement. Otherwise, its crisis will remain deeper than anything the ballot box alone can resolve.
Amr Helmy (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)