Iran’s greatest concern is Israel. The rivalry between the two will remain intense. Iran will seek to rebuild its position in Lebanon and use its perch in Yemen to pressure Israel, and for its part, Israel will seek to undermine the Islamic Republic at home and in the region. Iran, however, believes that the war has weakened Israel. The expectation that military power could achieve all of Israel’s strategic objectives and confirm its regional hegemony met an immovable object in two wars with Iran. The calamitous outcome of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has badly damaged the strategic consensus between the two allies and potentially opened a breach between the two over the future of the Middle East.

Iran believes that its hold over the Strait of Hormuz will diminish U.S. appetite for another war with Iran, and that will in turn limit Israel’s military options. Since 2023, Israel’s strategy has been anchored in military victory. Without war, Israel’s strategy will remain caged.

Israel has gained no new allies in the region since the war. Iran believes the Abraham Accords are unlikely to expand any further, and may even be under pressure. The Israel-UAE-India axis will face a challenge from the Mecca alliance forged between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and other alliances likely to surface. The Arabs see Iran’s threat growing, but they now also see Israel as a threat. The Arab security dilemma now must contend with both, and that is to Iran’s benefit. It believes that the future security order in the region will not be assembled around containing Iran alone.

The End of U.S. Primacy Opens the Door for a Multipolar Middle East

In the vacuum left by the United States, Iran expects that China will play a larger role in the Middle East. Its economic presence will likely increase, as will its diplomatic role in mediating peace between rival alliances. China may also become a larger military presence in the Persian Gulf. It has close military ties with Pakistan, and in the past it has conducted naval exercises with Iran. The Chinese navy may set up bases in Pakistan’s Gwador port and Iran’s Chahbahar naval facilities. It could provide maritime security that would be acceptable to all Gulf countries. The greater security role that Pakistan is set to play, forging defense pacts with Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait, is supported by China. The United States will inevitably have to compete with China to a greater extent, and that competition will change the nature of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Europe, too, will have to adopt a new posture. Its Middle East policy has since the 1950s followed Washington’s lead—Tehran believes that this is particularly true when it comes to its posture toward Iran. Now Europe’s own interests in the Middle East, revolving around stability of energy supplies and trade, demand that it also adopt a new posture. It is already evident to Tehran that Brussels is keen to rebuild severed ties with Iran to be able to act as power broker between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Europe’s utility to Arab security needs will hinge on it having some degree of influence in Tehran.

Iran sees the immediate future of the Middle East as defined by the decline of U.S. influence. There will be a period of vacuum and transformation. Iran sees ample opportunity to influence the shape of an emergent order and sees itself as an important part of it. It does not see the Middle East organizing against Iran alone but reflecting the multiplicity of economic and security interests of divergent actors. In the meantime, other tensions, such as that between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will bubble to the surface. A new order will have to take account of the fact that Turkey will be more concerned with Israel, the Pakistanis with India and Israel, while the Saudis will have to balance their worries over Iran with those over Israel and the UAE. In this melee Chinese, Russian, and European interests will mix to shape outcomes. The future looks chaotic, and that means receding military and economic pressure on Iran.

Vali Nasr is a senior adviser (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).