For the second weekend running, Formula 1’s 2026 Frankenstein Cars have been hostage to a setting someone else controls. Last Sunday at Sepang, a wet-weather power-unit software bug left cars crawling or stopped on the formation lap and delayed the start by the better part of an hour.

–by Mark Cipolloni–

On Friday in Singapore, the failure was narrower and more human, but it made the same point. In SQ1, Overtake Mode was not switched on when the session restarted, was then switched on when it should not have been, and was switched off again 27 seconds later. Some drivers finished their lap with a tangible energy advantage. Others did not.

Overtake Mode is the 2026 stand-in for DRS. In a race, it is a proximity tool. In qualifying it is simply full beans: an extra half-megajoule that can be harvested over the lap, lifting the allowance from 8.5 MJ to 9 MJ, plus a more generous electrical map. At Marina Bay the normal ramp-down of electrical power begins at 200 km/h. In Overtake Mode that taper is delayed, so the car keeps more of the MGU-K’s roughly 350 kW for longer. Everyone is supposed to have it. Half a megajoule, even assuming perfect efficiency to make the arithmetic easy, is about 1.43 seconds of 350 kW. That is lap time before the straight-line boost is even counted.

The sequence was ordinary until it was not. The FIA enables the mode before a qualifying session. A red flag disables it automatically. Sergio Pérez’s Cadillac hit the wall, shed a front wing, and stopped SQ1. On the restart, Race Control is presented with a menu: re-enable Overtake Mode or not. The choice is manual because a wet or low-grip restart might call for leaving it off. The green flag came at 20:46 local. The menu was not actioned; other jobs took priority and the prompt was forgotten.

At 20:52 an operator noticed, opened the menu and enabled the mode. It stayed on for 27 seconds—switched on about a second before the checkered flag—until race director Rui Marques judged the uneven benefit unfair and killed it. By then, the damage was done.

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Where a car was on the track decided the size of the gift. Lewis Hamilton, Ollie Bearman, Fernando Alonso and Arvid Lindblad had already finished their laps; the late enablement gave them nothing. Valtteri Bottas, George Russell and Charles Leclerc were coming onto straights and took a large bite of the extra power. Oscar Piastri picked up a partial gain. Lance Stroll is reckoned to have had it for 10–15 meters.

Carlos Sainz, eliminated and last on the sprint grid, said half the cars did the lap with an engine half a second quicker than the others, and that his side was on the wrong end of it. Lindblad also missed SQ2 by a small margin, but he had already made a mistake at Turn 13, so the mode is not a clean alibi for anyone who went out.

The FIA later called it human error in Race Control, unrelated to a separate timing-system fault that delayed SQ2, and acknowledged that the 27-second window changed the performance of certain cars according to where they were. SQ2 and SQ3 were unaffected.

Teams talked. Single-seater director Nicholas Tombazis worked the paddock. Representatives went to Race Control. Aston Martin pressed the point in the gap before SQ2, while Formula One Management sorted the timing glitch, including the idea that everyone should be advanced. A protest was available. Wiping the session would only have fallen back on practice order, and the cars at the bottom were broadly where they were expected to be. The sport dodged a bullet in the same way it did at Sepang: the glitch hit a formation lap last week and SQ1 of a sprint this week, not Q3 of a title decider, and it did not dump a Mercedes, Red Bull, Ferrari or McLaren.

The two failures are different and the same. At Sepang the wet-weather map—a 250 kW sector cap instead of 350 kW—took more power than intended from cars at low rpm and would not give it back. Cars were effectively trapped in an offset mode. Here nobody was stranded; somebody simply did not press the button that arms a mode the driver cannot arm himself, then pressed it late, then unpressed it.

Max Verstappen, reflecting on Malaysia a day earlier, asked why the cars cannot just have a brake pedal and an accelerator. The 2026 rule set has instead produced power limits, megajoule accounts, offsets, overtake, boost, turbo maps and start procedures, all of them imposed so the electrical half of a deeply constrained hybrid can be made to work. A missed menu in Race Control is enough to hand one car half a second and leave the next car without it. That is not technical development. It is the operating cost of an engine formula so heavily parameterized that the competitive order now sits partly outside the cockpit.

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