Arthur Ashe Stadium by Wally Gobetz, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Many professional athletes compete at the international level, and some have accused the governing bodies of various sports of unlawfully restricting global competition for their services. When athletes bring antitrust claims in U.S. courts, however, it can be difficult to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign sports organizations. In a recent decision, Judge Margaret M. Garnett (Southern District of New York) held that a group of tennis players had successfully cleared that bar in a suit against foreign and U.S. tournament operators.

Background

In 2025, fifteen current and former tennis players, along with the Professional Tennis Players Association, sued the bodies that control the men’s and women’s tennis tours and the operators of the four Grand Slam tennis tournaments. The plaintiffs alleged that these entities had entered into agreements restricting player compensation, limited the players’ ability to play in outside events, and restrained competition among tournaments. The complaint included a number of claims under federal antitrust law along with a common-law claim for unjust enrichment.

Two of the defendants—the All England Lawn Tennis Club (AELTC) and Federation Française de Tennis (FFT) (the operators of Wimbledon and the French Open, respectively)—moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Analysis

For federal courts relying on Rule 4(k)(1)(A) (a choice that I discuss further below), establishing personal jurisdiction involves a two-step inquiry: the court must identify a statutory basis for jurisdiction under the law of the state where the court is located, and then determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would satisfy constitutional due process requirements. While some states have enacted broad long-arm statutes authorizing jurisdiction on any constitutionally acceptable basis, effectively collapsing these two steps into one, New York has not—its statute authorizes jurisdiction only when one of a list of specific bases has been established. Judge Garnett therefore considered the two steps in turn.

Statutory Basis for Jurisdiction

New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 302(a) authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who either directly or through an agent “commits a tortious act within the state.” In the event of a conspiracy, a co-conspirator can be considered an agent, such that its (local) acts may be attributed to a (foreign) defendant for purposes of establishing jurisdiction over that defendant.

The requirements for establishing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident entity on this conspiracy basis are complicated. First, the plaintiff must satisfy the basic test for conspiracy jurisdiction by alleging that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the non-resident defendant participated in that conspiracy, and (3) overt acts taken within the forum by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy established sufficient contacts to subject the co-conspirator to jurisdiction there. Next, the plaintiff must satisfy three additional requirements: that the non-resident co-conspirator was aware of the effects of the conspiratorial activities in the forum; that the acts taken with the forum were for the benefit of the non-resident co-conspirator; and that those acts were taken “at the behest of or on behalf of, or under the control of, the out-of-state conspirators.”

Judge Garnett began by concluding that the basic test for conspiracy jurisdiction had been met. In a previous section of her opinion, she had determined that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged an antirust conspiracy involving all defendants. That finding satisfied the first two elements of the jurisdictional test too. In considering the third element, she examined actions taken in New York by the U.S. Tennis Association (USTA), an alleged co-conspirator. The defendants argued that the USTA had merely staged the U.S. Open in New York, which could not be considered an “overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Here Judge Garnett sided with the plaintiffs. She held that they had pleaded facts regarding the selection of entrants, the restriction of endorsements, and restrictive compensation arrangements sufficient to allege that the USTA’s actions in New York had implemented the conspiratorial arrangement among all the Grand Slam entities.

She then turned to the additional requirements and concluded that these too were met. The U.S. Open is operated pursuant to the same “shared Grand Slam governance structure” that regulates Wimbledon and the French Open. As a result, she concluded, AELTC and FFT must have been aware of the effects that the USTA’s arrangements would have in New York. In addition, she stated, the USTA’s implementation of those arrangements at the U.S. Open “directly benefits AELTC and FFT by sustaining [that] common system.” It would seem less clear on the facts that the third element was satisfied—that is, that USTA had acted at the direction or under the control of the foreign associations. But Judge Garnett cited a previous case in which the Second Circuit held that this requirement “may be satisfied by an allegation that the out-of-state defendant was ‘aware of the torts being committed by’ co-conspirators in New York.” She concluded that as alleged participants in the conspiratorial scheme, AELTC and FFT would surely have been aware of the allegedly tortious acts committed by USTA.

Due Process

The court next turned to the question whether exercising jurisdiction over AELTC and FFT would be consistent with due process. Judge Garnett analyzed this question under the familiar International Shoe framework: minimum contacts plus reasonableness. Based on the facts discussed above, she concluded that minimum contacts within the New York forum had been established. AELTC and FFT had allegedly joined a conspiracy knowing that overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy were taking place in New York, and that was sufficient to indicate purposeful availment.

Judge Garnett then concluded that the defendants had failed to show that the exercise of jurisdiction over them would be unfair or unreasonable. Here she relied on two factors in particular. First, the defendants did not persuade her that litigating in the United States would be unduly burdensome given “the conveniences of modern communication and transportation.” Second, in considering forum interests, she reasoned that the United States has a strong interest in adjudicating violations of its antitrust laws.

Concluding that due process had been satisfied, Judge Garnett denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

What about Fuld?

In 2025, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization. Reasoning that the federal government enjoys “broader sovereign authority” than the states, it held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment called for a “more flexible jurisdictional inquiry” than the due process clause of the Fourteenth. It specifically “decline[d] to import the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard into the Fifth Amendment.”

Fuld applies when a federal court exercises jurisdiction on the basis of a federal statute. That would seem to have been the case here, since the federal antitrust laws authorize nationwide service of process, triggering Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(C). (Prior to Fuld, that rule permitted courts to consider aggregate nationwide contacts in determining whether the requisite “minimum contacts” were present.) However, in a brief footnote, Judge Garnett stated that the court was proceeding under Rule 4(k)(1)(A), limiting its jurisdiction to the jurisdiction that a New York state court would enjoy. As a result, she followed the traditional Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts analysis.

There is one place in the decision that shows some slippage between these two frameworks. As Judge Garnett noted, one factor in the “reasonableness” analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment is “the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case.” In this case, that would have meant the interests of the state of New York. What she considered instead was the federal interest in adjudicating alleged violations of U.S. antitrust laws. Having said that, though, it does seem that the state of New York has an interest in adjudicating alleged antitrust violations that affect local competition.

Conclusion

AELTC and FFT had apparently cited Fuld as the source of the appropriate constitutional analysis in this case and might believe that the court applied the wrong standard here. However, the lesson of Fuld is that the scope of personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment is broader than under the Fourteenth. Allegations that satisfy the more restrictive minimum contacts test—as the court held the plaintiffs’ allegations did—would necessarily satisfy Fifth Amendment due process requirements as well. In such cases, proceeding under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) may present the clearest path forward given the ongoing uncertainty about what, exactly, Fifth Amendment due process analysis requires.