{"id":210052,"date":"2025-10-13T11:22:11","date_gmt":"2025-10-13T11:22:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/210052\/"},"modified":"2025-10-13T11:22:11","modified_gmt":"2025-10-13T11:22:11","slug":"inside-the-sino-american-cosmic-rivalry","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/210052\/","title":{"rendered":"Inside the Sino-American Cosmic Rivalry"},"content":{"rendered":"

As China prepares to select taikonauts<\/a> for its first-ever manned moon landing, a new space race is quietly taking shape \u2014 not just over who will next set foot on lunar soil, but over who will shape the rules and norms governing humanity\u2019s expansion into the cosmos.<\/p>\n

What happens when 1960s space treaties meet 2020s tech? And how will Beijing and Washington compete to define space\u2019s legal frontier? Pseudonymous contributor Ari fills us in.<\/p>\n

Ari is pursuing a master\u2019s in Chinese Studies with a focus on China\u2019s international-relations strategy. Ari graduated with honors from Harvard with degrees in social studies and environmental science, studying in particular the geopolitics of energy and critical minerals in Latin America.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Concept art for the International Lunar Research Station. Source<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was negotiated long before<\/a> the technology to mine celestial bodies even existed. But our ability to extract celestial resources has grown exponentially since then, and the tech for a wide range of space resource activities<\/a> \u2014 from asteroid mining and satellite telecommunication, to defense and space tourism \u2014 is now just decades, if not years, away from commercial-scale deployment. International law has not caught up<\/a> to these developments, and negotiations to update space treaties in the United Nations have languished<\/a> in the face of sticking points over dual civilian-military uses of outer-space exploration. In the absence of clear international guardrails, space-faring nations and private actors are rushing to develop the capabilities to mine lunar regolith and secure their access to valuable celestial resources.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, China has experienced a stunning transformation and become a space-faring nation over the past six decades. In the 1960s, China, still embroiled in the Cultural Revolution, was technologically inept, critically underdeveloped, and seemingly destined to watch from the sidelines as the United States and then-USSR battled to launch astronauts into orbit. Today, China has in most respects overtaken Russia as the United States\u2019s chief rival in shaping international norms<\/a> around conduct in the \u201cfinal frontier\u201d \u2014 and China\u2019s increasing tech prowess has coincided with increasing assertiveness<\/a> in influencing international norms and principles according to its interests.<\/p>\n

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States and China have gone about shaping international norms differently. Their divergent approaches have profound implications, not only in the contest for global influence, but also for national defense and the renewable energy transition \u2014 that is, requiring bountiful quantities of rare minerals.<\/p>\n

The United States and China have both attempted to pass legislation and establish norms around outer space exploration and use within the United Nations.<\/p>\n

When this has failed, though, the United States has continued its law-based approach, pursuing norm-building agreements and legal partnerships outside the UN system.<\/p>\n

In contrast, China\u2019s approach, when faced with UN setbacks, has shifted to pursuing project-based initiatives, including activities at the International Lunar Research Station.<\/p>\n

The space economy is valued<\/a> at $630 billion globally, nearly doubling in size over the last decade, and is set to reach $1.8 trillion by 2035. Discoveries of water, helium-3, and rare minerals on the Moon and near-Earth asteroids have led to a surge<\/a> in public and private interest regarding the mining and use of these resources.<\/p>\n

Rights of appropriation and use are subject to significant debate in the corpus of law governing outer space. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty asserts<\/a> that space is \u201cthe province of all mankind,\u201d and all nations \u2014 regardless of developmental status \u2014 have the right to freely \u201cexplore\u201d outer space and \u201cuse\u201d its resources. (The drafters of the Outer Space Treaty, however, did not define the scope of the word \u201cuse.\u201d) Article II stipulates that the Moon and other celestial bodies are \u201cnot subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.\u201d<\/p>\n

Article II\u2019s \u201cnon-appropriation\u201d clause can be interpreted in two different ways<\/a>:<\/p>\n

As a prohibition on a state\u2019s appropriation of an entire celestial body \u2014 ie. claiming the Moon or another near-Earth body as its sovereign territory, or<\/p>\n

As a prohibition on claiming ownership over only celestial resources, including those extracted from the body\u2019s subsoil. (Evidence from early drafts of the Outer Space Treaty suggests that the treaty\u2019s drafters intended this more expansive interpretation<\/a>.)<\/p>\n

And even if space-faring entities can legally own resources they have mined, there is uncertainty about how they can legally be <\/a>used<\/a>:<\/p>\n

In-situ mining entails using mining resources on the surface of celestial bodies asteroids to generate rocket propellants, energy, and life-support gasses necessary for lunar settlement and for propagating further space exploration.<\/p>\n

There is also growing interest \u2014 and technological potential \u2014 for ex-situ resource extraction, such as bringing water, minerals, and other resources to Earth for additional processing and commercialization.<\/p>\n

How can these disputes be resolved?<\/p>\n

International norms often develop through customary international law. CIL \u201cconsists of rules of law derived from [1] the consistent conduct of States [2] acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way\u201d; the second prong of CIL is called opinio juris. CIL is developed not through written treaties between states, but through state practice. For example, when the United States first sent astronauts to the Moon in 1969, Neil Armstrong returned with moonrocks that became the property of NASA. But in 1973, Nixon ordered<\/a> fragments of the samples to be distributed to 135 foreign heads of state and all 50 states. Whether Nixon\u2019s worldwide distribution of the moon fragments developed CIL or not depends on whether Nixon distributed the fragments because he felt legally obligated to do so.<\/p>\n

Share<\/a><\/p>\n

In this case, Nixon likely did not do so under opinio juris given the lack of historical precedent regarding property rights around space resources. Nevertheless, as cases of space-resource utilization become more prevalent, the paucity of clear international guardrails will both generate considerable uncertainty and present opportunities for space-faring actors to fill gaps in their stead.<\/p>\n

The United States approaches outer-space norm-building primarily through promulgating domestic legislation and building multilateral voluntary codes of conduct.<\/p>\n

Congress in 2015 passed<\/a> the Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act, or SPACE Act, which sought to address the growing liability facing private space actors. This law marked the first time<\/a> any government legislated on the question of private companies\u2019 legal right to space-resource ownership. Other countries have since followed suit. In 2017, Luxembourg passed the law \u201cOn the Exploration and Utilization of Space Resources,\u201d which states<\/a> that \u201cspace resources can be appropriated (Les ressources de l\u2019espace sont susceptibles d\u2019appropriation)\u201d and also permits private corporations to explore and use space for commercial purposes. Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and Liechtenstein have also recently passed domestic space legislation guaranteeing property rights in space.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Watch out, universe \u2014 Luxembourg is coming through. (Source<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the United States has leveraged its bilateral relationships to generate codes of conduct. In 2020, the United States launched the Artemis Accords<\/a>, a series of multilateral agreements to build consensus and generate new international norms of conduct in outer space. The Accords seek to establish \u201ca common vision via a practical set of [non-binding] principles\u201d to govern the exploration and use of outer space outside of the UN system. The Accords emphasize the importance of reserving outer space for peaceful use cases, in addition to reinforcing the idea that \u201cthe extraction and utilization of space resources\u2026 complies with the Outer Space Treaty.\u201d As of January 2025, 53 states<\/a> are Artemis Accords signatories.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Indian Ambassador Taranjit Sandhu signs the Artemis Accords at a ceremony with Deputy Assistant Secretary for India Nancy Jackson, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson, and Indian Space Research Organization Representative Krunal Joshi, June 2023. Source<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Artemis Accords and domestic space legislation cannot themselves bind all states to shared rules and principles. Although the Artemis Accords are meant to shape state practice in theory, they are voluntary<\/a>, and thus their influence on state activities in practice is yet to be determined. The Accords have also been criticized by key space-faring actors<\/a> \u2014 such as Russia, Germany, and China \u2014 who are skeptical of attempts to act unilaterally to establish precedent over an issue of global concern. Nevertheless, although domestic laws alone cannot generate CIL, domestic space legislation may be replicated by other states hoping to foster a lucrative space industry \u2014 and these activities could generate norms that, over time, evolve into binding customs.<\/p>\n

While the United States is building customs outside the UN, China is generally committed to negotiating laws and establishing norms within the purview of formal international legal institutions. Even so, when conventional avenues for formal law-building are blocked, China isn\u2019t opposed to operating within gray zones of international law to secure its access to critical space resources.<\/p>\n

China has been a leader in outer-space negotiations at the United Nations, conducted mostly within the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). China is the largest voluntary contributor<\/a> to UNOOSA, which allocates most of its funds to equip developing states with space data to mitigate and respond to natural disasters.<\/p>\n

In response to gaps in international outer space law, China and Russia jointly submitted drafts of the \u201cTreaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects\u201d (PPWT) to the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The PPWT proposed new legal instruments and a multilateral conflict resolution mechanism to prevent the weaponization of outer space, but the proposal was blocked by the United States. The U.S. representative<\/a> to the CD argued that the PPWT is \u201cfundamentally flawed,\u201d in that it does not explicitly prohibit the deployment of space-based weapons disguised as civilian commercial activities, nor does it restrict the development, testing, or stockpiling of Earth-based weapons that can shoot down targets in orbit. Critics also noted the lack of verification mechanisms<\/a> to ensure compliance \u2014 a death sentence given Russia\u2019s abysmal track record<\/a> of (not) complying with past arms control agreements.<\/p>\n

Another point of contrast: unlike the United States\u2019s highly law-based approach to international consensus-building, China is shaping outer-space norms through project-based initiatives:<\/p>\n

In 2004, China launched its Chang\u2019e Lunar Exploration Program \u5ae6\u5a25\u5de5\u7a0b. In 2013, China successfully landed a lunar rover on the Moon \u2014 the first state to visit the Moon in 30 years. Six years later, in a historic moment, China landed a rover on the far side<\/a> of the Moon, returning two kilograms of lunar regolith to Earth. The Chang\u2019e program is an early stage of China\u2019s long-term project to solidify a permanent economic and military presence on the Moon.<\/p>\n

China has fostered bilateral agreements for project-based collaborations on the International Lunar Research Station. Thus far, the Chinese National Space Agency<\/a> has over 170 such cooperation agreements, or MOUs, with more than 50 national space agencies and international organizations. The ILRS, on track to be finalized in 2028, will use lunar regolith to construct a base, mining ice and helium-3 to support permanent settlement.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>The Chang\u2019e-4 lander, photographed by the Yutu-2 rover (\u7389\u5154\u4e8c\u53f7) on the far side of the moon. Source<\/a>.<\/p>\n

China is not engaging in norms-based consensus building like the United States. There are no clear examples of China actively attempting to promulgate space norms internationally. China\u2019s actions, though, will undoubtedly leave a significant footprint going forward \u2014 by being among the first to land boots on the Moon and leading project-based collaborations around lunar settlement, China will set the standard and lay the groundwork<\/a> for other actors to follow.<\/p>\n

What are the implications of these divergent strategies for shaping outer-space norms?<\/p>\n

The United States is responsive to a blossoming private space sector seeking legal guarantees from their government to safeguard their capital investments. With avenues for providing those safeguards blocked at the international level, the United States has not hesitated to act unilaterally and leverage its web of alliances to develop norms toward peaceful, sustainable, and commercially viable uses of space \u2014 with or without the rest of the world on board. This strategy<\/a> reflects the United States\u2019s historical leadership in designing international law and institutions reflective of American interests, values, and free-market economic principles.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s outer-space strategy emerged from a different historical backdrop. China initially approached the international order as a \u201cregime taker\u201d in the post-Mao era, complying with laws and institutions shaped by European colonial powers. Since it acceded to the WTO in 2001, however, China has taken an increasingly assertive approach<\/a> to international governance in alignment with its own values and interests. Yet, despite such increased assertiveness, the Chinese Communist Party remains at least nominally committed to promoting international decision-making within the UN system. China refers to<\/a> this approach as \u201cUpholding Multilateralism and the UN-centered International System\u201d \u7ef4\u62a4\u4ee5\u8054\u5408\u56fd\u4e3a\u6838\u5fc3\u7684\u56fd\u9645\u4f53\u7cfb.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s operations within the United Nations are strategically advantageous. The United Nations, in theory, has an equalizing effect on international law-making by providing all states with the opportunity to shape shared rules of conduct. As the self-proclaimed leader of the Third World, it\u2019s unsurprising that China has refrained from leveraging consensus-building mechanisms outside of traditional multilateral institutions. Nevertheless, China may also uphold the UN system in service of realist aims; China has significant influence over UN decision-making as a member of the Security Council and as the world\u2019s second-largest economy.<\/p>\n

By virtue of China\u2019s state-centered economic model, space innovation and commerce are highly regulated or outright owned by the state<\/a>. Experts argue that China is not likely to promulgate domestic space legislation due to the risk of inadvertently restricting state ownership of valuable space resources and scientific data. China may promulgate a domestic regulatory regime<\/a> in the coming decades \u2014 if economic factors and international trends toward widespread adoption of private property in space necessitate such measures.<\/p>\n

At a fundamental level, China and the United States are realist actors working within loose international frameworks. Their strategies demonstrate not only their diverging visions for a future international order, but also diverging international imperatives. Without agreement on space-resource governance, outer space risks becoming controlled by a powerful few rather than benefiting all humanity.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"As China prepares to select taikonauts for its first-ever manned moon landing, a new space race is quietly…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":210053,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[64,63,128,285],"class_list":{"0":"post-210052","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-space","8":"tag-au","9":"tag-australia","10":"tag-science","11":"tag-space"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/210052","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=210052"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/210052\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/210053"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=210052"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=210052"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=210052"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}