Meanwhile, the national anti-corruption agency is beginning an investigation<\/a> into the project, and now it looks as if the government will have to bail it out<\/a>.<\/p>\n Where once observers might have invoked debt-trap diplomacy as an easy explanation for what went wrong, that concept looks increasingly dubious<\/a>.<\/p>\n Nonetheless, the mundane reality of an ambitious project that failed to live up to its hype illustrates some of the wider problems of Chinese investment in the region.<\/p>\n A March 2024 report<\/a> on the BRI by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute found that China\u2019s penchant for funding megaprojects vulnerable to problems, delays, and political change had meant that it had yet to deliver on $50 billion in financing.<\/p>\n For a period, it looked as if China had learned its lesson on scaling back investments<\/a>, promoting projects with the slogan<\/a> \u201csmall but beautiful.\u201d But now BRI investments have surged<\/a> again\u2014and Indonesia\u2019s stumbling high-speed rail project shows the risks this might bring.<\/p>\n The $7.2 billion project<\/a>, dubbed Whoosh, kicked off in 2015, when the Indonesian government announced that China would build a high-speed rail link between the capital of Jakarta and the nearby city of Bandung and gradually extend the line to other cities. China beat Japan\u2019s tender, and the high-speed rail joined the ranks of other Chinese investments in Indonesia.<\/p>\n Since the start, experts have questioned the viability of the project. Delays set in, and costs have risen<\/a> to about 20 percent more than the initial estimate.<\/p>\n The company running the line, KCIC, still generates enough revenue<\/a> to cover operations. But interest, foreign exchange losses, and depreciation have put it in the red.<\/p>\n The China Development Bank lent<\/a> at a modest 2 percent interest on principal and 3.4 percent on overrun costs\u201460 percent borne by a consortium of Indonesian state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, and 40 percent by a consortium of Chinese SOEs. Hardly a debt trap\u2014but the KCIC is still struggling.<\/p>\n The key problem is the number of passengers, with ticket revenue well below target. From January to October of this year, the trains served more than 5.1 million<\/a> passengers. Initial studies predicted many more riders.<\/p>\n With the need for a bailout increasingly apparent, the question has become who is to blame and who will pay.<\/p>\n On whom to blame, the focus for now is on potential corruption, with a probe launched by the anti-corruption commission. A former minister has claimed<\/a> that the cost per kilometer of the track reached $52 million, compared with $17 million to $18 million per kilometer in China.<\/p>\n Whether this claim stands up, though, is questionable. The average cost per kilometer of high-speed rail in China in fact may be $47.7 million, according to data<\/a> from the Transit Costs Project.<\/p>\n On who will pay, it\u2019s even more unclear. Indonesian Investment Minister Rosan Roeslani has said he\u2019s pushing<\/a> for Chinese lenders to take a haircut by extending repayment terms, cutting interest rates, and maybe converting the dollar loan to yuan, but this has yet to be confirmed. There\u2019s also a row<\/a> between the Finance Ministry and Indonesia\u2019s state-owned holding company, Danantara\u2014which Rosan oversees\u2014over who will shoulder KCIC\u2019s burden.<\/p>\n The issue has sparked a wider discussion in Indonesia on whether the project was ever supposed to make money in the first place.<\/p>\n Joko Widodo, who was Indonesia\u2019s president when Whoosh kicked off, has argued<\/a> that since the project is a public service aimed at addressing congestion, profit is not a priority. Notably, Jakarta\u2019s bus and metro systems\u2014the latter he broke ground on as governor\u2014both rely<\/a> heavily on subsidies. Whether this is viable for the much more expensive Whoosh, though, is dubious.<\/p>\n The mess\u2014marked by overoptimism, policy muddle, and now a scramble to avoid the blame\u2014can\u2019t be pinned only on China.<\/p>\n While the temptation is to read this debacle geopolitically, it ultimately obscures what went wrong, Indonesian analyst Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat wrote<\/a> in Asia Times last week: \u201cChina financed the steel and supplied the trains, but Indonesia designed the deal, ran the project and now owns the problem.\u201d<\/p>\n Of course, Chinese companies can also be faulted for their willingness to throw weight behind a project whose risks were well-known. As the latest wave of Chinese investment rolls out, it remains to be seen if they will repeat the same mistakes.<\/p>\n Myanmar \u201celection\u201d campaign kicks off. The campaign season for Myanmar\u2019s sham election kicked off last week.<\/p>\n The election will take place in two phases<\/a>, according to junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, with the first phase scheduled for Dec. 28. Voting will not occur in 128 townships due to the ongoing civil war.<\/p>\n However, according to reporting by the Irrawaddy, nearly half<\/a> of the townships listed in the second phase, scheduled for Jan. 11, are at least partly rebel-controlled. (Notably, the junta was able to conduct<\/a> complete census operations for the election in only 145 of the country\u2019s 330 townships in 2024.)<\/p>\n The election, such as it is, will be unfree and unfair. While 57 parties will reportedly be on the ballot, the National League for Democracy\u2014which led the civilian government the military overthrew in 2021\u2014remains banned.<\/p>\n The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party is expected to dominate. Meanwhile, shows of dissent are meeting with a harsh response. On Oct. 27, a director and two actors were arrested<\/a> for criticizing a junta propaganda film and artists who participated in it.<\/p>\n The election seems aimed at trying to legitimize the junta<\/a>, which has based its authority on a legally dubious state of emergency.<\/p>\n The election has attracted support<\/a> from China, which is thought to have pushed the junta to adopt the plan, as well as India, which promised to send election observers<\/a>. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), however, has steered clear and declined to send observers. Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono explained<\/a> that the bloc did not wish to legitimize the election.<\/p>\n Duterte\u2019s latest ICC appeal. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is launching yet another appeal<\/a> to try to prevent his trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC).<\/p>\n Duterte faces charges of crimes against humanity<\/a> for extrajudicial killings carried out during his \u201cwar on drugs\u201d campaign. The latest appeal, made public on Oct. 29, contests an earlier ruling by the ICC affirming its jurisdiction over Duterte.<\/p>\n Duterte\u2019s legal team has argued that the court lacks jurisdiction, as it did not start a full investigation<\/a> into alleged crimes in the Philippines until 2021, two years after Duterte withdrew the Philippines from the ICC.<\/p>\n The ICC has already dismissed<\/a> other attempts by Duterte\u2019s legal team to have the trial indefinitely suspended and have Duterte granted interim release on the grounds that he has \u201ccognitive impairment\u201d and is thus unfit to stand trial.<\/p>\n The case is being followed closely in a number of quarters. In the Philippines, it is a live political issue.<\/p>\n Duterte\u2019s arrest on Philippine soil was the latest blow<\/a> in the war between President Ferdinand \u201cBongbong\u201d Marcos Jr. and his former Duterte allies, including Vice President Sara Duterte, Rodrigo\u2019s daughter. But the move backfired<\/a>, igniting the Duterte base and hurting Marcos\u2019s popularity.<\/p>\n The implications of a case centered on the extrajudicial killings of alleged drug dealers resound beyond the Philippines. Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra\u2019s own \u201cwar on drugs\u201d in 2003 saw some 2,000 people killed<\/a> in a three-month period. U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s ongoing strikes<\/a> on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean also draw parallels.<\/p>\n Journalist blocked from leaving Vietnam. The BBC is \u201cdeeply concerned<\/a>\u201d about one of its journalists in Vietnam, who has been prevented from leaving for several months, the broadcaster said last week.<\/p>\n The journalist is a Vietnamese national who lives and works in Thailand full time with the BBC. She returned in August to renew her passport, which Vietnamese authorities then withheld along with her ID card. She has also since been subjected to dozens of hours of questioning, according to reporting<\/a> by the New York Times.<\/p>\n The BBC broke the news on Oct. 29, the day that Vietnamese leader To Lam met with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer during a visit to Britain.<\/p>\n Starmer is understood to have raised the issue with Lam during the meeting. Notably, however, this is not mentioned in the U.K. government\u2019s official press release<\/a>.<\/p>\n Vietnam and the United Kingdom also used the occasion to announce<\/a> a comprehensive strategic partnership covering trade, security, climate action, migration, and education. This is the seventh such partnership Vietnam has launched since August 2024, when Lam took power.<\/p>\n Thailand-Cambodia heavy weapons withdrawal plan. Thailand and Cambodia have agreed<\/a> on a three-month plan to withdraw heavy weapons from border areas, following the signing of a peace deal at the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, last month.<\/p>\n The first phase started on Nov. 1 and covers the withdrawal of rocket launchers. The second phase starts on Nov. 22 and covers all types of artillery. The last phase starts on Dec. 13 and covers all armored vehicles and tanks.<\/p>\n The agreement was drawn up by the Regional Border Committee, which convenes direct conversations between Thailand\u2019s and Cambodia\u2019s military commanders.<\/p>\n However, tensions remain. Various Thai military commanders expressed skepticism<\/a> about whether Cambodia could be trusted to properly implement the agreement, speaking to the Nation, a Thai newspaper of a nationalist bent.<\/p>\n Bird-shaped hot air balloons are released during the Tazaungdaing Lighting Festival in Taunggyi in Shan State, Myanmar, on Oct. 31.<\/p>\n Bird-shaped hot air balloons are released during the Tazaungdaing Lighting Festival in Taunggyi in Shan State, Myanmar, on Oct. 31. Sai Aung Main\/AFP\/Getty Images<\/p>\n FP\u2019s Most Read This Week<\/p>\n Last week, Vietnam once again saw devastating floods. Why do they keep happening? This AFP piece explores<\/a> how climate change and inadequate infrastructure are contributing.<\/p>\n \u201c\u2018When staying alive has become a hard choice, dying becomes an easy decision.\u2019\u201d An article by Su Chay in Myanmar Now describes<\/a> the suicide of a husband and wife in Yangon and explores the increasingly desperate economic situation of the city\u2019s inhabitants as war grinds on.<\/p>\n Have they learned nothing? Indonesia\u2019s House of Representatives awarded itself a $600 million budget for 2026, just two months after rage over lavish parliamentary housing allowances sparked national riots, the Jakarta Post reports<\/a>.<\/p>\n \u201cBuan and her family of four sleep atop two crypts in a mausoleum.\u201d AFP correspondent Pam Castro looks at<\/a> the lives of impoverished Filipinos who make a living among the dead in Manila\u2019s vast cemeteries.<\/p>\n In Focus: Vietnam Builds Up in the South China Sea<\/p>\n Vietnam is on track to overtake<\/a> China in its efforts to reclaim land in the South China Sea. Press attention on the struggle for control of the area often focuses on China and the Philippines. However, in recent years, Vietnam has quietly accelerated<\/a> its own activity.<\/p>\n Since 2022, Hanoi has sharply increased its island-building efforts. Vietnam has created<\/a> about 3,319 acres in disputed areas in the South China Sea, 71 percent of China\u2019s total, according to a March report by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). And more than 95 percent has been created since 2022.<\/p>\n The new land affords new possibilities. New harbors have been constructed, facilitating greater logistical capacity for Vietnamese security forces to operate in the area. A large airstrip has also been built on Barque Canada Reef.<\/p>\n So, what spurred the burst of activity? \u201cThe pattern we see with Vietnam is usually bursts of construction in response to what China does,\u201d AMTI director Gregory Poling told Foreign Policy. He suspects a standoff with China around a strategic gas field in 2021 spurred the latest round.<\/p>\n Vietnam\u2019s push to reclaim land and bolster its capacities can be tracked back to 2014, which saw a monthslong standoff between China and Vietnam over an oil rig.<\/p>\n Vietnam\u2019s island-building in reaction was then fairly modest. What has changed now is \u201cmoney and technology,\u201d said Nguyen The Phuong, an expert on Vietnam\u2019s maritime strategy<\/a>. Cash has now been set aside and dredging vessels built. Vietnam has also had time to gauge China\u2019s likely reaction, he added.<\/p>\n Indeed, in contrast to its regular harassment of Philippine vessels, China seems willing to keep the issue on a low simmer. \u201cThere is no evidence of China trying to interfere physically with these operations,\u201d Poling said. China has also been quiet on the diplomatic front. He speculated that the fact that Vietnam is not a U.S. treaty ally and a wary respect for the Vietnamese military among Chinese counterparts may be contributing factors.<\/p>\n![\"Bird-shaped](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/birds-myanmar-GettyImages-2243763019.jpg\")
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