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<\/p>\nCanadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made an impassioned pitch in the Australian parliament for middle powers like Canada and Australia to build new coalitions in the \u201cruptured\u201d global order that are less reliant on the United States.<\/p>\n
In a post-rupture world, the nations that are trusted and can work together will be quicker to the punch, more effective in their responses, more proactive in shaping outcomes, and ultimately more secure and prosperous.<\/p>\n
The question for middle powers like us is whether we preserve existing rules, write new rules to determine our security and prosperity, or let the great powers increasingly dictate outcomes.<\/p>\n
Carney made a compelling case. So, how exactly would new coalitions of middle powers work, and which countries could Australia work with more closely? <\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
The world order has \u201cruptured\u201d, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has warned \u2013 so it\u2019s time for countries like Australia and New Zealand to forge a new, less US-reliant future. In this six-part series, we\u2019ve asked top experts to explain what that future could look like \u2013 and the challenges that lie ahead.<\/p>\n
Why middle powers need to work together<\/p>\n
This enthusiasm for middle power coalitions poses some uncomfortable questions for Australia, given it requires a re-examination of our most important ally, the United States<\/a>. <\/p>\n In defence terms, Australia remains reliant on Washington\u2019s presence and military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. Much of our own military hardware simply cannot function without the US<\/a>. <\/p>\n Stepping away from the US alliance completely is not an option. This is why Canberra has expressed support for recent US and Israeli strikes in Tehran<\/a>, while not participating in them. <\/p>\n Yet, Canberra can \u2013 and should \u2013 build up other relationships to hedge against dependence on an increasingly unreliable US<\/a>. We can do this in areas such as trade, conflict prevention and international law. <\/p>\n And with great powers increasingly willing to breach international law, middle powers have a great responsibility. By working together to safeguard international institutions, they can keep the global order functioning and try to restrain the behaviours of great powers when need be. <\/p>\n Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, left, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese leave Parliament following Carney\u2019s address in Canberra, Australia. What would middle power alliances look like?<\/p>\n We need to be careful not to romanticise \u201cmiddle powers\u201d. The term often refers to countries that are not great powers, but can still exert influence and agency on the global stage through diplomacy or economic and military strength. This can include countries whose values or interests don\u2019t align with Australia\u2019s, such as Iran. <\/p>\n With that in mind, Australia should engage with other middle and smaller powers with a clear understanding of shared priorities: <\/p>\n avoiding coercion by great powers<\/p>\n shaping the architecture of international cooperation <\/p>\n holding great powers to account as \u201cresponsible stakeholders\u201d of the international order.<\/p>\n So, how would these arrangements work, practically speaking?<\/p>\n In his speech in Canberra, Carney advocated for a \u201cdense web of connections\u201d with other middle powers. He called it \u201cvariable geometry\u201d, or creating different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests. <\/p>\n Variable geometry is not a retreat from multilateralism. It is its evolution.<\/p>\n Bilateral ties<\/p>\n Let\u2019s start by looking at Australia\u2019s ties with individual countries. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n Of course, Australia has a strong alliance with New Zealand. <\/p>\n Beyond this, Canberra has signed a number of \u201ccomprehensive strategic partnerships\u201d in recent years with countries in the region, including the ASEAN bloc of Southeast Asian countries, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, South Korea, and most recently, Vietnam.<\/p>\n These agreements can deepen cooperation in a range of areas of mutual concern, including security.<\/p>\n Australia also signed a new defence agreement with Japan in 2023 that allows for each country\u2019s forces to operate in the other. This is a big deal \u2013 it was Japan\u2019s first defence treaty<\/a> with an international partner since 1960. <\/p>\n More recently, Australia has agreed to bilateral defence agreements with Papua New Guinea<\/a>, Indonesia<\/a> and Timor-Leste<\/a>. These pacts appear focused on \u201cstrategic denial\u201d \u2013 preventing potential adversaries from achieving a foothold in our immediate region.<\/p>\n These bilateral agreements are regionally focused. A key question for Australia is whether it can also cooperate with countries like Canada, the UK, Germany and France in the Indo-Pacific region. This relies in part on their appetite to engage more here. <\/p>\n As Carney mentioned in Canberra, one potential area of cooperation is the Critical Minerals Production Alliance<\/a> \u2013 an initiative launched by Canada to expand critical minerals production and processing capacity and diversify supply chains. <\/p>\n \u2018Lattice-work\u2019 arrangements<\/p>\n Australia also has small coalitions in the region that allow for more flexible models of security cooperation. <\/p>\n Coalitions, rather than alliances with firm defence commitments, are more likely to flourish in a region as geo-strategically, economically and politically complex as the Indo-Pacific. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n Australia\u2019s key \u201cminilateral\u201d partnerships include:<\/p>\n the Quad (Australia, US, Japan, India) and emerging \u201cSquad\u201d (Australia, Japan, Philippines, US)<\/p>\n AUKUS (Australia, UK, US)<\/p>\n the Trilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, Japan, US)<\/p>\n Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, US).<\/p>\n These all centre on US participation for a reason. Strategic minilateralism has long been Canberra\u2019s way of anchoring Washington to the Indo-Pacific to provide a counterweight to China\u2019s regional influence. <\/p>\n It is important to note that many middle powers hedging their bets by not aligning with either the US or China \u2013 such as Indonesia \u2013 still have strategies that rely on the US not withdrawing from the region.<\/p>\n The challenge now is how to cultivate new small-group arrangements for an uncertain future. Two new groupings that make a lot of sense are:<\/p>\n Japan, South Korea and Australia Australia, Japan and the Philippines Larger alliances<\/p>\n Australia can also deepen relationships with larger groupings in areas other than security. <\/p>\n In fact, there\u2019s already a successful group of middle and small powers in the region that doesn\u2019t include either the US or China: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership<\/a> (or CPTPP). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n This is a free-trade agreement originally for Pacific Rim countries, comprising Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. (Trump pulled the US out in 2017.)<\/p>\n The United Kingdom became the first non-Pacific nation to join in 2024; others like Uruguay, Costa Rica, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and the Philippines are interested in joining next.<\/p>\n The CPTPP has been successful in eliminating most tariffs<\/a> among member countries, while also providing a platform for economic cooperation more broadly. <\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/file-20260305-57-u4xfp2.jpg\")
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\n Adrian Wyld\/The Canadian Press\/AP<\/p>\n
\nThese three US allies have been growing closer in recent years. Now, it makes even more sense for them to collaborate in ways that may not involve the US, including in economic security, maritime security and supporting international rules<\/a>.<\/p>\n
\nLike Japan, Australia is increasing its defence cooperation with the Philippines, another US ally. The Philippines is at the coalface of a number of security challenges<\/a> involving China.<\/p>\n